- Rating
- 3(+1)
- Confidence
- 2(−1)
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 3
- Soundness
- 2
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Paper summary
This paper proposes an inference-time defense framework to safeguard diffusion language models. The framework mainly consists of three components: response detection, adaptive steering, and safety-aware remasking. As shown in Figure2, the lightweight detector detects in the first generation block, if the unsafe probability is greater than a threshold, then safety-aware remasking is triggered, followed by adaptive steering. Otherwise, adaptive safety steering is directly used throughout denoising. Overall, this paper needs more clarification and validation of the proposed framework.
Critical strengths
- This paper explores steering-based defenses for diffusion language models, which is a timely and interesting problem.
- The evaluation uses three benchmarks and two model families, which is reasonably broad.
Critical weaknesses
- Steering-based defense is not new and is well-established on autoregressive LLMs, so the paper misses a dedicated section of related work on activation steering to establish the novelty of this paper more clearly.
- The paper does not compare the proposed adaptive steering with fixed steering or a denoising-step-based scheduler. Moreover, the hyperparameters in Table 3 lack detailed selection procedure, and there is no sensitivity analysis for core hyperparameters such as the steering layer and steering threshold.
Questions for authors
- Could you add a paragraph of steering-based defense to the related work section so that the contribution of this paper can be assessed more accurately?
- How are the core parameters in Table3 selected? Can you do a sensitivity analysis?
- I am a bit confused about the design of integrating the detector with steering. If the detector works so well (A.3), why can’t you just use the detector to identify harmful generation states and directly refuse it without steering?
4 comments
Thanks for the rebuttal. My concerns regarding W1 and W3 are mostly addressed. Regarding W2, it seems that the ASR and over-refusal are sensitive to the hyperparameters. The authors stated that they selected hyperparameters "heuristically". Could the authors further elaborate on this? Did you use a validation set to select them?
We thank the reviewer for the follow-up question. The hyperparameters in Table7 were selected through expert-guided heuristic evaluation, informed by empirical sensitivity analyses rather than arbitrary choice. As shown in the table provided in our reponse to Q2, we examined different steering layers and steering/remasking thresholds, comparing their effects on ASR and over refusal. Based on these results, we selected configuration considering the trade-off between defense effctiveness and over-refusal, rather than simply minimizing ASR. The selection was informed by these empirical observations, with no separte validation set used for hyperparameter tuning.
Thanks for the response. Though I still think the hyperparameter selection procedure is not very rigorous when comparing with previous methods, overall this paper could be interesting to the relevant community. Thus I raise the score by one level.
W1 and Q1. Steering-Based Defenses in Related Work
We thank the reviewer for this suggestion.
Steering-Based Safety Defense. Activation steering modifies internal representations during inference to control LLM behavior without updating model parameters. Prior work has identified refusal-related directions in activation space [1], investigated multidimensional safety representations [2], and introduced conditional steering to selectively induce refusal based on input context [3]. More recent approaches, including AlphaSteer [4] and Steering Beyond the Support [5], seek to improve safety while preserving benign utility or robustness to unseen attacks. SteeringSafety [6] further highlights the safety-utility trade-offs of representation steering. For masked diffusion language models, [7] demonstrated that activation steering can manipulate refusal behavior throughout denoising, primarily examining refusal suppression. In contrast, our work focuses on improving safe generation by dynamically adjusting steering strength at each denoising step and combining it with detector-triggered prompt and response remasking to recover from unsafe generation trajectories.
We have included this paragraph in the revised version.
[1] Refusal in Language Models Is Mediated by a Single Direction, NuerIPS 2024
[2] The Hidden Dimensions of LLM Alignment: A Multi-Dimensional Analysis of Orthogonal Safety Directions, ICML 2025
[3] Programming Refusal with Conditional Activation Steering, ICLR 2025
[4] AlphaSteer: Learning Refusal Steering with Principled Null-Space Constraint, ICLR 2026
[5] Steering Beyond the Support: Adversarial Training on Unsupervised Jailbroken Activation Simulation, ICML 2026
[6] SteeringSafety: Benchmarking Representation Steering in LLMs Across Safety Perspectives, ICML 2026
[7] Activation Steering for Masked Diffusion Language Models, ICLR 2026
W2 and Q2. Adaptive Steering Comparison and Hyperparameter Sensitivity Analysis
We thank the reviewer for this suggestion. We conduct additional experiments to evaluate the effectiveness of adaptive steering compared to fixed steering, as well as the sensitivity of the core hyperparameters in Table3. For hyperparameter sensitivity, we evaluate LLaDA-8B on JBB under DIJA using a single seed (42), with over-refusal measured on XSTest.
(a) Remasking threshold
(b) Steering threshold
(c) Steering layer
(d) Fixed Steering
Our hyperparameters were selected heuristically to balance jailbreak robustness and benign utility. The sensitivity results show that lower steering and remasking thresholds generally improve defense effectiveness at the cost of increased over-refusal, while the selected layer (25) achieves the lowest ASR and over-refusal among the evaluated layers.
Furthermore, the fixed steering comparison highlights the advantage of our adaptive gating mechanism. Although stronger fixed steering can achieve lower ASR, it increases over-refusal. In contrast, our adaptive approach adjusts the intervention strength based on the current denoising state, achieving 63.4% ASR with only 14.0% over-refusal, the lowest among the evaluated configurations.
These results support our design choices and demonstrate the importance of adaptive steering for balancing safety and benign utility. We have incorporated these additional analyses into the revised version.
Q3. Motivation for Integrating Steering and Detection
Our goal is to guide the model toward safe but helpful responses rather than simply detecting harmful generations and refusing them. Our framework applies adaptive steering from the beginning of denoising, before the response detector is invoked. The detector subsequently identifies unsafe trajectories that remain despite steering and triggers remasking to enable safer regeneration. Since even a highly accurate detector may produce false positives, directly refusing every flagged response could unnecessarily limit benign utility. By combining preventive steering with selective detection and recovery, our framework aims to reduce unnecessary refusals while preserving helpful responses.