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Paper summary
This paper proposes ACE-Guard, a prompt injection defense framework that combines a rule-based Multi-Signal Prompt Inspector (MSPI) layer, an LLM-based forensic layer (MSPI Layer 2), and a Defense Arbiter. During offline calibration, adversarial generation and evaluation feedback are used to update attack strategies, defensive prompts, and decision thresholds while keeping the underlying LLM weights frozen. The resulting guard screens inputs before downstream execution. The paper evaluates this framework across nine attack streams and reports component ablations and a comparison with continual LoRA fine-tuning.
Critical strengths
- Relevant problem and practical deployment motivation. Separating offline adversarial exploration from online filtering is a reasonable design for deployments where model weights cannot be modified and runtime overhead matters.
- Explicit consideration of the security–utility trade-off. Reporting both defense success rate and benign acceptance rate recognizes that indiscriminate blocking is insufficient. The range of attack streams and the inclusion of round-by-round results provide useful material for examining robustness and adaptation.
Critical weaknesses
- The ablations do not isolate the contributions of prompt evolution or MSPI. The comparison against "without Eval" does not distinguish natural-language prompt evolution from threshold calibration, attack-distribution changes, or generic feedback-based tuning. The paper itself attributes the advantage of the full system partly to calibrating thresholds (Section 3.3) and notes that, without evaluation feedback, the adversarial agent fails to explore sophisticated mutations (Appendix E.3), so the two variants also face different attack distributions. Furthermore, the MSPI ablation changes the classifier's task instructions and output requirements, as shown in Appendix B.2, in addition to removing forensic augmentation. Consequently, the reported differences do not cleanly identify which components produce the gains. A controlled comparison on a common frozen test set, with consistent classification instructions and inference budgets, is needed to substantiate the contribution of the proposed optimization mechanism.
- The reported classification metrics contain substantial internal inconsistencies. Under the stated evaluation setting of 100 adversarial and 100 benign examples per round (Section 2.3), Table 10, round 4, reports DSR = 0.860 and FPR = 0.360 for the variant without MSPI. These imply TP = 86, FN = 14, FP = 36, and TN = 64, yielding Macro F1 ≈ 0.747, whereas the table reports 0.2692. Similarly, Table 9, round 6 (full ACE-Guard; DSR = 0.920, FPR = 0.200), implies Macro F1 ≈ 0.859 rather than the reported 0.667. Some reported rates are not multiples of 0.01, so the actual per-round counts may differ slightly from 100/100, but the gap persists for any plausible class ratio, and Algorithm 4 computes Macro F1 from the same TP, FP, TN, and FN as DSR and FPR. In addition, Table 4 is described as averaging 10 rounds, yet its values match the 20-round Mean rows of Tables 9 and 10, and several Mean rows do not equal the averages of their own columns. These discrepancies directly affect the central claim that removing MSPI causes a large F1 collapse. The metric definitions, underlying predictions, and aggregation procedure need to be reconciled before the ablation conclusions can be assessed reliably.
Questions for authors
- With the guard architecture and evaluation set held fixed, how much improvement comes from defensive prompt evolution beyond threshold-only calibration? Can this be established while keeping the classification instructions and output parser consistent?
- What does the prompt transformation operator (Eq. 10) concretely do? Please provide a representative before-and-after defensive prompt, the associated feedback, and the final deployed prompt, distinguishing prompt edits from threshold and exemplar updates.
- Could you provide the per-round confusion matrices and metric computation script for Tables 9 and 10, explain the discrepancies above, and clarify how the averages in Table 4 relate to the 20-round trajectories? Are DSR, FPR, and Macro F1 computed using the same examples and labels?
I'll consider raising score if my questions are addressed.
2 comments
Thank you for the detailed response and revisions. The added prompt examples clarify the update procedure, and the revised binary F1 and FPR values for the full system are consistent with the supplied confusion matrices. I appreciate these corrections and the explicit acknowledgment of the limitations of the ablation design.
However, my main concern remains unresolved. The independent calibration streams, together with the different input wrappers and output instructions in the no-MSPI configuration, prevent the reported comparisons from isolating the contributions of individual components. In particular, the current experiments do not establish whether defensive prompt evolution improves performance beyond threshold-only calibration. Narrowing the claims is appropriate, but a controlled comparison on a shared frozen test set, with consistent instructions, parsers, and inference budgets, is still needed to substantiate this central contribution.
I also have a remaining question about the revised DSR definition. Section 3.1 describes DSR as measuring post-defense target-model resistance. However, Algorithm 4 appears to obtain target-model outcomes before defense classification, and Algorithm 3 computes ASR from those outcomes without explicitly incorporating the guard’s admission decision. Could the authors clarify how blocked prompts enter this calculation and provide the exact guard-conditioned attack-success definition? As written, it is unclear whether this metric measures the guarded pipeline or the target model’s own resistance.
Finally, the revised confusion matrices establish consistency for the updated full-system results, but the relationship between the original and revised tables remains unclear. Please distinguish corrections to metric definitions from recomputation or new experimental runs, and provide the corresponding counts and metric computation code for the ablation configurations.
Overall, the revisions improve transparency and methodological clarity, but the evidence needed to establish the proposed optimization mechanism’s contribution is still missing. I therefore maintain my current recommendation of weak rejection.
Author Response
We sincerely thank the reviewers for their thoughtful comments and constructive suggestions. We have carefully revised the manuscript to improve its clarity, methodological consistency, and reproducibility. We provide our point-by-point responses below and welcome further feedback during the ICLR 2027 discussion period.
Official Review of Submission 33053 by Reviewer VK9Y
Critical Weaknesses
1. The ablations do not isolate the contributions of prompt evolution or MSPI
Response: We clarified that the full framework, the variant without MSPI, and the variant without defense feedback were evaluated using three independent calibration streams, each with 20 rounds, rather than a shared fixed test set. Furthermore, the variant without MSPI used different input wrappers and output instructions, introducing additional variations beyond MSPI removal. Therefore, these results provide descriptive comparisons rather than establish the independent causal contributions of individual components. We revised the discussion, removed unsupported causal and statistical-significance claims based on paired comparisons, and acknowledged the need for controlled evaluation.
Changes: Section 3.3 (Ablation and Component Analyses), Table 5, and Tables 15 and 16 clarify the independent calibration streams and the need for evaluation on a controlled frozen test set.
2. Reported classification metrics contain substantial internal inconsistencies
Response: We clarified that DSR measures target-model resistance, whereas positive-class binary F1 and FPR evaluate defense-classifier predictions. We also added per-round confusion-matrix counts for verification.
Changes: Section 3.1 (Evaluation Metrics) and Appendix I (Tables 13 and 14).
Questions for Authors
1. With the guard architecture and evaluation set fixed, how much improvement comes from defensive prompt evolution beyond threshold-only calibration? Can this be established with consistent instructions and parsers?
Response: The current ablation study does not independently isolate the effects of defense-prompt evolution and threshold calibration. Their individual contributions therefore cannot be determined reliably. A rigorous comparison requires a shared fixed test set, consistent input instructions, output parsers, and evaluation protocols across configurations. We acknowledge this limitation and identify such controlled experiments as future work.
2. What does the prompt transformation operator (Equation 10) concretely do? Please provide before-and-after prompts, associated feedback, and the final deployed prompt.
Response: The operator combines FN/FP correction examples with recommendations from the Evaluation LLM, updates the defense system prompt, and retains historical snapshots. The updated prompt is then inserted into the runtime classifier. Representative before-and-after excerpts, including a Round 20 correction example, are provided in the Appendix.
Changes: Section 2.3 Stage 5 and Appendix E (Defense System-Prompt Evolution, Table 10).
3. Could you provide per-round confusion matrices and the metric computation procedure? Are DSR, FPR, and Macro F1 calculated using the same examples and labels?
Response: We clarified that these metrics evaluate different tasks and do not use the same labels. DSR is calculated from target-model responses to adversarial prompts as DSR = 1 − ASR, where ASR is the Attack Success Rate. F1-score and FPR evaluate the defense classifier using
original_labelas ground truth anddefense_labelas prediction. We also corrected the metric description: the implementation computes positive-class binary F1, not Macro F1. Per-round TP, FP, TN, and FN counts are provided to enable independent verification.Changes: Section 3.1 (Evaluation Metrics) now distinguishes the two evaluation tasks. Appendix I (Tables 13 and 14) provides the updated 20-round calibration results and confusion matrices. Table 5 summarizes ablation results, with per-round trajectories in Tables 15 and 16.