- Rating
- 3
- Confidence
- 3
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 2
- Soundness
- 2
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Paper summary
This paper proposes ActAuditor, a runtime defense against action-level indirect prompt injection in tool-enabled LLM agents. The key idea is to move the security boundary from controlling what external instructions an LLM is allowed to process to controlling which proposed actions an agent is allowed to execute.
For each proposed tool call, ActAuditor requires the agent to produce a structured provenance record identifying the operative instruction, the sources of the call arguments, and a rationale. Calls attributed directly to the trusted user task can be deterministically allowed, while calls driven by external instructions require additional auditing. ActAuditor-full maintains an experience base of previously audited externally induced actions, represented using structured semantic features and trusted allow/block labels. At runtime, similar experiences are retrieved and supplied to an LLM auditor, which returns allow, block, or defer.
The paper evaluates ActAuditor on AgentDojo and AgentDyn with multiple backbone LLMs and a large set of baselines. ActAuditor-base achieves 0% ASR against the evaluated static attacks, and ActAuditor-full improves the security–utility trade-off on open-ended AgentDyn tasks by permitting legitimate externally induced actions. The system also performs strongly against the evaluated adaptive attacks.
Critical strengths
The paper presents a strong conceptual reframing of indirect prompt-injection defense. In open-ended workflows, external instructions are not inherently malicious, so simply suppressing or rejecting all externally induced actions creates a poor security–utility trade-off. Auditing concrete proposed actions and their authorization relationships is a natural and practically meaningful alternative.
The provenance design is thoughtful. In particular, separating the source of the operative instruction from the source of tool arguments avoids conflating external data used to instantiate an authorized action with external instructions that authorize a new action.
I also find the role-level normalization idea interesting. Presenting the original user task and subsequent observations at comparable conversational roles reduces attribution bias while preserving the user task as the trusted root in the runtime.
The distinction between ActAuditor-base and ActAuditor-full is experimentally useful. AgentDyn clearly demonstrates why blocking all externally induced calls can achieve security at the cost of essentially zero utility, while experience-augmented auditing recovers substantial utility.
The experimental coverage is broad. The paper evaluates multiple LLM backbones, closed- and open-ended benchmarks, many baseline defenses, ablations, parameter sensitivity, human auditing, efficiency, and adaptive attacks. The adaptive attack evaluation is particularly valuable because several strong static defenses degrade substantially while ActAuditor remains near zero ASR.
Finally, the paper is unusually transparent about limitations, including the dependence on model capability and relevant experience availability, as well as the exclusion of output-only and data-integrity attacks.
Critical weaknesses
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My main concern is the fairness of the comparison between ActAuditor-full and training-free baselines on AgentDyn. Although ActAuditor does not update model parameters, its experience base is populated during cold-start rounds using human-validated audit decisions. Subsequent autonomous evaluation therefore benefits from domain- and benchmark-specific labeled precedents. The competing training-free defenses do not appear to receive an analogous set of supervised examples. I therefore do not think the strongest AgentDyn comparison should be interpreted simply as one training-free defense outperforming other training-free defenses. Rather, the result demonstrates the value of experience-augmented, human-seeded runtime adaptation. Relatedly, the cold-start protocol changes task arguments and wording to prevent exact matches, but this does not establish generalization to genuinely unseen workflows. The retrieved cases may remain close semantic neighbors from the same task family. A task-template or workflow-level held-out evaluation would substantially strengthen the generalization claim.
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A conceptual concern is that the provenance record is generated by the same LLM that is exposed to the adversarial observation. Thus, “provenance-aware attribution” is not equivalent to trusted causal provenance tracking; it is a model-generated attribution grounded by trusted source labels. In particular, the deterministic layer directly allows calls attributed to the trusted user task. This creates an important attack target: induce a malicious call while causing the model to falsely attribute the operative instruction to the trusted root. I would like to know whether the adaptive attack explicitly targets this failure mode.
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The experience base is assumed to be trusted and uses human-verified labels. Since ActAuditor-full depends heavily on retrieved precedents, the process by which experiences are curated, updated, and protected becomes part of the security boundary. Experience poisoning or stale/incorrect precedents are not currently studied.
The method also incurs nontrivial deployment cost. The reported full system has approximately three times the latency and input-token consumption of the undefended agent, with tens of seconds of end-to-end latency per task. This is acceptable for some applications but potentially significant for interactive agents.
- The scope is narrower than general indirect prompt injection: the method specifically targets attacks that manifest as malicious tool behavior and does not address output-only manipulation or factual/data-integrity corruption. The paper acknowledges this clearly, but the headline claims should consistently preserve this distinction.
Questions for authors
How should the comparison with training-free baselines be interpreted when ActAuditor-full uses a human-seeded experience base constructed from prior AgentDyn interactions? Can the authors evaluate with an experience base built only from disjoint task families or provide baselines with access to the same labeled historical examples?
Can the authors evaluate generalization to previously unseen workflow/task templates rather than only changing arguments and wording of related tasks across rounds?
Does the adaptive attack explicitly attempt to forge action provenance, especially by inducing a malicious action while causing the model to cite the trusted call 0 user task as its operative instruction? Can the authors report this failure mode separately?
How would ActAuditor handle poisoned, stale, or conflicting entries in the experience base, and what operational assumptions are required to keep this base trusted?
Given the reported ~3× latency/token overhead, can auditing be selectively applied to consequential or externally induced actions to reduce deployment cost?
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Area Chair