- Rating
- 3(+1)
- Confidence
- 3
- Informativeness
- 3
- Presentation
- 2
- Soundness
- 2
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Paper summary
This paper presents an information-theoretic analysis of modern neural watermarking systems and proposes Secure Neural Watermarking (SNW). By learning isotropic watermark representations and incorporating a secret orthogonal projection, SNW aims to improve watermark capacity while providing security against PCA-based key estimation attacks. Experiments demonstrate substantially higher estimated capacity than several existing watermarking methods.
Critical strengths
The paper investigates the communication channel and security properties of neural watermarking systems, providing useful insights beyond conventional architecture-driven improvements.
Critical weaknesses
The claimed perfect security is restricted to PCA-based key estimation. Isotropic covariance does not imply statistical independence or general key secrecy, and higher-order attacks such as ICA may still recover information about the secret projection. Moreover, Proposition 1 uses the capacity formula for a hard-decision binary symmetric channel rather than the soft-output BPSK-AWGN channel. These issues limit the strength of the theoretical claims.
SNW uses a 768-dimensional codeword, compared with 256 bits for PixelSeal and VideoSeal. Its absolute capacity advantage therefore does not necessarily imply better per-symbol efficiency. Indeed, Table 7 shows lower normalized capacity than PixelSeal under JPEG Q50, rotation, and cropping. The evaluation also omits the closely related high-capacity ChunkySeal method. Furthermore, the claimed capacity is estimated theoretically without demonstrating reliable message recovery using actual error-correcting codes.
The watermark capacity of the proposed method is not particularly impressive, considering that the input image resolution is 1024 × 1024. Existing methods, such as MBRS (ACM MM 2021) and FIN (AAAI 2023), have demonstrated the ability to embed dozens of bits in much smaller images. For example, if a method can embed 128 bits in a 256 × 256 image, scaling the payload proportionally to the number of pixels would correspond to 2,048 bits at 1024 × 1024 resolution. Although this scaling is not necessarily achievable in practice, it suggests that the reported capacity of 768 bits may not be particularly high. Therefore, the authors should compare their method with existing approaches under the same image resolution and payload length, while reporting both watermarked image quality (e.g., PSNR) and robustness.
Questions for authors
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4 comments
SNW uses a 768-dimensional codeword, compared with 256 bits for PixelSeal and VideoSeal. Its absolute capacity advantage therefore does not necessarily imply better per-symbol efficiency. Indeed, Table 7 shows lower normalized capacity than PixelSeal under JPEG Q50, rotation, and cropping. The evaluation also omits the closely related high-capacity ChunkySeal method. [...]
We respectfully disagree that this is a valid criticism. Two major points in the paper are:
- It is highly non-trivial to "add more bits" for a fixed backbone. One cannot change the payload size of modern watermarking with the same ease as what was possible with classical schemes: the DNNs need to be fully retrained. We would also like to point out that, contrary to ChunkySeal, we don't "add more bits" simply by making the DNN larger, a point which was raised by the reviewer themselves. One important lesson of the paper is that we can "add more bits" by simply using the watermarking space more efficiently.
- Bit-accuracy is meaningless by itself. As we already state in the paper (line 448), even for PixelSeal which boasts a bit-accuracy of 0.997 the probability of decoding error is still 0.53! Maybe one of the most important message we wanted to deliver in the paper is that Shannon capacity IS the better metric since it allows to measure the expected number of transmitted bits while still being agnostic to implementation details (choice of error-correcting code, block-length, etc...) and valid for any strictly positive probability of decoding error. Consequently, we argue that higher capacity still means that bits are also "stronger" overall.
We chose not to include ChunkySeal in the experiments because it is based on exactly the same design as PixelSeal but with a larger backbone (2048 vs. 768). The whole point of the paper was to show that current approaches don't use the latent space efficiently and that one can reach far better performance without ever touching the architecture.
As a sign of good faith, however, here are the results requested by the reviewer:
| Attack | Codeword bit-accuracy | Capacity (bits) |
|---|---|---|
| Identity | 0.87 | 445 |
| Contrast_2.0 | 0.85 | 394 |
| Brightness_0.2 | 0.87 | 441 |
| CenterCrop_0.9 | 0.86 | 421 |
| CenterCrop_0.8 | 0.85 | 403 |
| CenterCrop_0.7 | 0.84 | 374 |
| CenterCrop_0.6 | 0.82 | 334 |
| CenterCrop_0.5 | 0.75 | 230 |
| JPEG_50_augly | 0.85 | 395 |
| JPEG_80_augly | 0.86 | 430 |
| GaussianBlur_3_3_1.0_1.0 | 0.87 | 445 |
| Rotate_90 | 0.86 | 419 |
| Rotate_45 | 0.5 | 1 |
| Resize_0.5 | 0.87 | 445 |
| HorizontalFlip | 0.87 | 441 |
| MedianFilter_3_3 | 0.87 | 445 |
| Saturation_1.5 | 0.87 | 442 |
As the reviewer can see, ChunkySeal consistently underperforms compared to SNW! To be perfectly transparent, we were extremely surprised by these results. This lack of performance can be linked to the whitening operation that we perform to make individual bits independent -- see Appendix F. Before this operation, the bit accuracy of ChunkySeal is indeed close to 100%, after it, it drops close to 85%! This means that baseline ChunkySeal is heavily biased towards certain messages. Even worse, if one were to use its baseline bit-accuracy to compute its actual capacity, one would overestimate it significantly due to the dependence and bias between the message bits. To be clear, this does not mean that ChunkySeal could not be made to perform better with a more sound training setup. However, the official implementation and weights significantly underperform compared to SNW which uses a smaller model.
The watermark capacity of the proposed method is not particularly impressive, considering that the input image resolution is 1024 × 1024. Existing methods, such as MBRS (ACM MM 2021) and FIN (AAAI 2023), have demonstrated the ability to embed dozens of bits in much smaller images. For example, if a method can embed 128 bits in a 256 × 256 image, scaling the payload proportionally to the number of pixels would correspond to 2,048 bits at 1024 × 1024 resolution. Although this scaling is not necessarily achievable in practice, it suggests that the reported capacity of 768 bits may not be particularly high. Therefore, the authors should compare their method with existing approaches under the same image resolution and payload length, while reporting both watermarked image quality (e.g., PSNR) and robustness.
We thank the reviewer for the opportunity to clarify a point that was not precise enough in the paper. All images are rescaled to before embedding and decoding, following the method used by VideoSeal and PixelSeal (TrustMark resizes to ). So every model in this work is compared for the same input size. Note that this not by choice: a limitation of watermarking based on neural networks is that they require a fixed input size (contrary to classical watermarking systems such as Broken-Arrows which could take an arbitrary input size) .
The references proposed by the reviewer are outdated, as they embed far fewer bits in smaller images compared to the current state-of-the-art that we study in this paper (i.e. the Seal family + Trustmark).
As an aside, we would like to point out to the reviewer that, contrary to their claim, doubling the input size does not double the capacity: a well-known result of the Information Security community is the square root law of capacity which states that under very general conditions the capacity of a data hiding scheme is only sublinear in the dimension of the host -- a good reference, albeit derived for steganography (the arguments would not differ much), can be found in Ker's landmark paper [1].
We argue that a fair watermarking comparison compares two schemes for a given input size and distortion budget. In this context, it is possible to compare different payload as the goal is to measure the expected number of transmitted bits without error. One could say that Chunkyseal is more efficient (though it is not, as we have just shown), but at the cost of a larger model (backbone of 2048 vs. 768). The main point of this paper is that the SNW construction method is more efficient for the same model size.
[1] Ker, A. D. (2017, June). The square root law of steganography: Bringing theory closer to practice. In Proceedings of the 5th ACM Workshop on Information Hiding and Multimedia Security (pp. 33-44).
Thank you for the detailed rebuttal and additional experiments.
The clarification that the security guarantee is specifically established against PCA-based attacks is reasonable. I also appreciate the explanation of using the hard-decision BSC model to ensure a fair comparison with existing watermarking systems.
The additional ChunkySeal results are valuable and address my concern regarding the missing high-capacity baseline. Furthermore, the clarification regarding the common model input resolution and the fixed distortion budget resolves my concern about the capacity comparison with earlier methods. I agree that linearly extrapolating watermark capacity based on image pixel count is not justified.
The rebuttal has strengthened my confidence in the proposed method and its experimental evaluation. I increase my score.
We thank the reviewer for pointing out that the channel analysis provides useful improvements in the construction of a watermarking scheme. We address the concerns below.
The paper is very clear about that fact, and we don't see why it should be considered a critical weakness given that we are the first to propose:
Secondly, the burden of proof that "ICA may still recover information about the secret projection." does not lie with us since we never made any claim about it. We would appreciate the reviewer to exhibit how such an attack would be written down and performed, otherwise, one could always find a "possible" attack for any watermarking system by claiming such an attack "could" exist.
In any case, we are highly doubtful that mounting such an attack is trivial because:
If both of these things are true, then ICA is impossible (because either independence is broken or the sources are Gaussian due to the isotropy). Nevertheless, we don't rule out the possibility of mounting such an attack, for example by imposing some structure on the steering vectors (breaking the isotropy of the samples) or providing more information to Eve. But we hope that the reviewer sees that describing the conditions under which ICA is possible or not, and how to perform it, is completely different work that might require another paper.
Again, it is unclear to us why this is a "critical weakness". We chose the hard-decision BSC because it is the actual channel used by every current post-hoc modern watermarking system, and as such accurately model their limits. Of course, we could have used a soft-decision BSC for SNW, or better yet, the continuous alphabet model which SNW readily accomodates. However, this would have been unfair to VideoSeal and PixelSeal, and one could have critiqued our evaluation on the ground that we compare the capacity of systems with different channel models. Consequently, we respectfully disagree that this "limits the strength of the theoretical claims", it is a conscious decision made to allow both an accurate model of the current art as well as a fair comparison with SNW (which could have boasted larger capacity simply by using a continuous alphabet on the AWGN channel).