- Rating
- 3(+1)
- Confidence
- 2
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 3
- Soundness
- 2
Read review
Paper summary
This paper proposes a training-free multi-bit watermarking method for image generators that use binary tokens. Specifically, it modifies bits with high model uncertainty in Infinity and biases sampling probabilities in BiGR to embed 16–64 bits of information. The watermark is extracted through tokenizer re-encoding and majority voting. The authors further use the image’s DINOHash perceptual fingerprint as the watermark payload, following a process of generating an image, computing its fingerprint, and regenerating the image with the fingerprint embedded to detect semantic tampering. Experiments evaluate watermark recovery, image quality, and robustness on both models, and semantic tampering detection on Infinity. The method performs well on images without attacks, but its robustness to common image processing remains limited.
Critical strengths
It can embed and recover information in Infinity and BiGR without retraining the generator or training an additional watermark decoder. This shows that binary latent representations can serve as watermark carriers.
Infinity achieves 99.77% bit accuracy for 32-bit watermarks, and all watermark bits are correctly recovered in 95.18% of images. The image-quality metrics change little, supporting the basic effectiveness of the method.
Carrier-selection ablations support the uncertainty-guided strategy. The authors also evaluate transformed negative samples and compare different content within the same tampering geometry, helping explain the effects of detection-threshold shifts, watermark damage, and perceptual-hash changes.
Critical weaknesses
At the threshold used in the paper, JPEG compression at quality 75 causes a 48.1% false-alarm rate on untampered images, while color jitter causes a 12.6% false-alarm rate (Table 16). Meanwhile, without additional processing, the detection rate for object insertion covering 5% of the image area is only 52.8% (Table 4). These results show that fingerprint differences may arise from watermark recovery errors rather than actual semantic changes, substantially limiting the usefulness of this application.
At comparable image quality, TrustMark achieves better payload recovery and robustness than the proposed method (Tables 18–19). Center cropping also raises the false-positive rate of Infinity’s watermark detection to 33.7%. Although TrustMark relies on a pretrained watermarking network while the proposed method requires no training, the authors still need to explain which specific scenarios make the convenience of training-free integration worth the loss in robustness.
Questions for authors
Does semantic tampering detection assume that a valid watermark has already been confirmed? Algorithm 2 requires a known reference payload to determine whether a watermark is present, whereas Section 5.1 directly compares the extracted payload with the current image’s perceptual fingerprint. How are these two steps connected? If arbitrary images are accepted as inputs, please report the proportion of unwatermarked real photographs and generated images that are incorrectly classified as carrying a valid watermark. The existing known-payload detection results do not directly answer this question.
How much semantic tampering detection performance remains after controlling false alarms? Could the existing experimental data be used to select a single threshold that maintains a low false-alarm rate on images that have undergone only ordinary processing, without semantic tampering, and report the detection rates for the three tampering areas at that threshold? This result would directly affect my assessment of the method’s practical usefulness.
3 comments
Answers to raised issues
(1) False alarms caused by watermark recovery errors This was correct for the submitted version: under JPEG the payload was misread by 6.69 bits on average, which produced most of the 48.1% false alarms. In the revision the payload error is at most 0.04 bits under every transformation (Table 12). We attribute this to where the carriers sit. In the submission all carriers of a payload bit lay in one bit-plane (and at 64 bits in one half of the image), so a transformation that disturbs that plane or region hit every carrier of the bit at once (64-bit bit accuracy of 82.3% under noise and 89.6% under JPEG). Spread over all 32 bit-planes and the whole token grid, with the same number of carriers per bit, each bit now loses only a little margin. At the held-out threshold τ = 6, false alarms on untampered images are 1.0% under JPEG, 1.3% under color jitter, 1.5% under noise and 0.6% under blur, and 0.62% without processing (Table 4). These rates are at τ = 6 and the submission's at τ = 8; since a lower threshold flags more images, the comparison understates the reduction. Detection of 5% insertions without processing is 59.3% (submission: 52.8% at a 2.34% clean false-alarm rate).
(2) TrustMark and center-crop false positives The 33.7% came from the submitted layout. Center crop now has an FPR@θ of 1.4%, and every transformation of Table 2 stays within 0.5–1.4%. We attribute the change to the carrier layout. In the submission all votes of a payload bit came from one bit-plane, so the white padding (36% of the image) cast the same value, the white token's value in that plane, on every padded carrier of the bit, pulling watermarked and unwatermarked images alike toward a fixed bit pattern; this moved unwatermarked scores past θ. With votes from all 32 bit-planes, the padding now pulls every bit toward the same average value instead. With the re-run, ours and TrustMark are on par on our suite (Tables 14–15): both keep at least 99.87% bit accuracy and 100% TPR@θ under every transformation, image quality matches, and 100% of our payloads are recovered against 99.93% of TrustMark's.
The two methods rest on different deployment assumptions (App. L): our watermark is written by the generator's own sampler, needs no training and no post-processing step, and its reader needs the carrier key, whereas TrustMark's decoding is public by design. We have not evaluated attacks on the key, so this is a design property rather than a demonstrated advantage. Our standard suite does not include crop-and-resize, flips or rotation; in the zero-bit comparison (Table 18) our scheme does not survive them. Regeneration attacks are not evaluated. We leave both to future work.
(3) How detection and integrity verification connect; unwatermarked inputs (Question 1) The two uses are separate. Algorithm 2's score S tests for a known payload; this is the provenance use, for example a known model or user ID. In the integrity protocol the payload is the image's own hash and is not known in advance, so the verifier runs extraction only (Algorithm 2 without a reference payload) to obtain Ĥ, recomputes H' = H(x') from the received image, and flags the image when HD(Ĥ, H') ≥ τ (Section 5.1).
As you note, the known-payload results of Table 1 do not answer this question, and the paper does not report how often unwatermarked images pass the integrity check. The closest measurement is in App. I: the payload read from one issued image, compared with the hash of a different image, differs in 29.45 bits on average, and τ = 6 flags 99.98% of such pairs. An unwatermarked image is in a similar position, since the bits read from it are unrelated to its hash, but this is an indirect argument. We have not measured the rate on unwatermarked real photographs or generated images and leave it to future work.
(4) One threshold for all ordinary processing (Question 2) Table 12 reports this for the single threshold τ = 6, which is chosen on 1,000 held-out images before any evaluation (App. I). Over no processing, noise, blur, color jitter and JPEG, the false-alarm rate on untampered images is at most 1.5% (noise), and detection is 59.9–60.7%, 84.1–84.6% and 91.7–92.9% at 5%, 10% and 15% area. These rates hold at the strengths listed in Table 9; the suite contains no rescaling or brightness change.
Grayscale conversion and our two crops are the exception: at τ = 6 they flag 41.9%, 46.5% and 51.5% of untampered images, because DINOHash itself moves by 5.1–5.7 bits while the payload is intact. Raising τ does not remove the problem: at τ = 8 they still flag 18.7–25.6% of untampered images, while detection at 5% area without processing falls to 40.9% (App. H). The limiting factor for these transformations is the invariance of the perceptual hash, not the robustness of the payload. We have not reported a full threshold sweep under processing and leave it to future work.
I appreciate the author's detailed response and supplementary experiments. The revised carrier design, independent threshold calibration, and baseline comparison significantly alleviated my main concerns. Although the applicability of integrity detection to some common transformations and watermark-free inputs remains limited, I am raising my rating to 3.
Thank you for the review and for the two concrete questions. Since submission we have revised the Infinity instantiation and re-run every Infinity experiment; all Infinity numbers in the revised paper come from this re-run. The changes are:
Below we answer each point with the revised results; table and appendix numbers refer to the revised paper.