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Paper summary
This paper investigates why unsupervised transfer learning for EEG may fail. The authors propose that, even with complete knowledge of how each component changes from the source domain to the target domain, it may still be impossible to identify the optimal classifier for the target domain. The paper first demonstrates this phenomenon through a mathematical counterexample and then derives a lower bound on the classification risk that no algorithm can avoid. The authors further prove that certain learning guarantees can be established when additional information, such as covariance predictions and classification directions, is available. Finally, the authors investigate this phenomenon through experiments on both simulated and real EEG data.
Critical strengths
The paper is generally well-written, the figures and tables are clearly presented, the research question is well-defined, and the examples are easy to understand.
Critical weaknesses
My main concern is that the connection between the EEG research motivation and the core theoretical contributions is not sufficiently strong:
The authors limit their study to the EEG domain, but I think the problem they investigate is actually a general one. The paper simply uses EEG as the application scenario throughout, rather than formulating the research question to specifically address a particular challenge in this field. Moreover, none of the mathematical conditions in the formulas seem to be unique to EEG. Therefore, it seems that the paper could have discussed a general problem. If so, then, in my view, many of the authors' claimed contributions cannot be clearly distinguished from existing work. See the questions below for details.
Questions for authors
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Is Theorem 1 merely a direct application of the classical Le Cam two-point lower bound (Tsybakov, 2009), with the loss separation expressed as (C_{\mathrm{conf}})? Given that its proof does not use the EEG-specific assumptions or the additive mixture structure, what independent theoretical contribution does this theorem provide?
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The conditions of Theorem 2 do not seem to depend on EEG-specific properties, and related methods have already been studied in previous work (Minimally Informed Linear Discriminant Analysis: Training an LDA Model with Unlabelled Data, Heintz et al., 2023). Could the authors answer the following question: What new guarantees does Theorem 2 provide compared with existing theories on unlabeled LDA and Gaussian classification, such as Heintz (2023)?
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Is Proposition 1 essentially a reparameterization of existing domain adaptation non-identifiability results? In its scalar construction, and imply and . Thus, without additional restrictions on the latent components, arbitrary source–target couplings can be represented using the same fixed operators. Does the known-operator assumption impose any substantive constraint that prevents the classical counterexamples of Ben-David et al. (2010) from being embedded in this model?
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What evidence shows that the non-identifiability described in Proposition 1 occurs in real EEG transfer tasks?
8 comments
Official Response to Reviewer moos [2/5]
Is Theorem 1 merely a direct application of the classical Le Cam two-point lower bound (Tsybakov, 2009), with the loss separation expressed as ? Given that its proof does not use the EEG-specific assumptions or the additive mixture structure, what independent theoretical contribution does this theorem provide?
We appreciate the reviewer's thoughtful question, which gives us a welcome opportunity to clarify both the role of the Le Cam technique in Theorem 1 and its connection to EEG's generative structure.
- The generality of the proof does not imply a disconnect from the EEG mechanism. We distinguish two claims: that Theorem 1's lower-bound proof does not explicitly use EEG-specific assumptions or the additive-mixture structure, and that Theorem 1 is unrelated to these structures. The former is correct; the latter does not follow. EEG provides the scientific origin of our research question, the underlying additive-aggregation structure, and the structural scope of the mechanism we study. The two conflicting worlds used to instantiate the lower bound are not postulated independently of this structure; they arise from attribution ambiguity within the EEG-motivated generative model (Proposition 1). Once this mechanism has been shown to produce incompatible target-optimal decisions, Theorem 1 characterizes its learning consequences at a general decision-theoretic level. The absence of EEG-specific assumptions from the proof therefore reflects the abstraction of a structurally grounded learning obstruction, not a disconnect from its scientific origin.
- Determining the right decision-theoretic separation functional is non-trivial. We agree that the coupling step in Theorem 1 uses the standard two-point total-variation argument (Tsybakov, 2009). However, applying it here first requires establishing which differences between Oracle-compatible models can actually force excess risk. Appendix A.7.1 (Proposition A.1) rigorously proves that neither structural non-identifiability necessarily implies risk non-identifiability, nor risk non-identifiability necessarily implies decision conflict. These strict separations are established within the same additive generative family, under identical Oracle information and fixed component-specific transformations: different latent attributions can yield identical risk functions, while different risk functions can still share the same Bayes-optimal decision. Definition 1 and Lemma 1 then characterize the decision conflict genuinely relevant to learning, enabling Theorem 1 to quantify its unavoidable cost under protocol-dependent distinguishability. The classical two-point argument provides the lower-bound technique; identifying the decision-relevant consequences of attribution ambiguity is a distinct theoretical task.
- Classical proof techniques do not diminish the novelty of a newly characterized learning barrier. The use of a classical proof technique does not, by itself, determine whether the learning phenomenon being characterized or the resulting theoretical understanding is novel. Learning theory advances not only through new mathematical tools, but also by turning domain-specific learning phenomena that lack rigorous explanations into precise scientific problems whose mechanisms and performance limits can be characterized. Our work follows this direction by uncovering an information-theoretic source of learning difficulty in EEG transfer.
Official Response to Reviewer moos [3/5]
Is Proposition 1 essentially a reparameterization of existing domain adaptation non-identifiability results? In its scalar construction, and imply and . Thus, without additional restrictions on the latent components, arbitrary source–target couplings can be represented using the same fixed operators. Does the known-operator assumption impose any substantive constraint that prevents the classical counterexamples of Ben-David et al. (2010) from being embedded in this model?
Thank you for pointing out the coupling freedom in the scalar construction.
- The algebraic observation is correct. We agree that known operators alone do not exclude arbitrary source–target couplings in the unrestricted scalar construction, and therefore do not rule out classical UDA counterexamples. 🔵 We have clarified in Section 3.2 that Proposition 1 establishes the existence of incompatible target Bayes decisions under identical Oracle information, with the scalar construction serving as a transparent minimal witness of attribution ambiguity.
- The decision conflict persists under substantive generative restrictions. The conflict exhibited by Proposition 1 does not rely on arbitrary coupling freedom. 🔵 To make this explicit, we have added a constrained EEG realization of Proposition 1 in Appendix A.2 and summarized it in Section 3.2. This construction fixes the EEG lead field, component-specific rotations, and residual covariances, while requiring conditionally independent, nondegenerate Gaussian components. The two worlds differ only through a one-dimensional reallocation of predictive activity, while their joint source–target residual law is fixed rather than arbitrary. Nevertheless, they share identical Oracle information, and their full-observation Bayes rules are each unique almost everywhere and opposite almost everywhere.
Therefore, the general impossibility results of Ben-David et al. (2010) do not by themselves establish decision conflict under our stronger Oracle information and restricted generative assumptions. Their specific disjoint-support constructions (Theorems 1–2) also cannot be directly embedded in this constrained Gaussian subclass.
Significance: The Oracle Information Limit and a Necessary Test for Target-Decision Recovery
The constrained construction has two further implications.
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The information limit of the Oracle protocol. The Oracle gives the learner the complete source observation–label distribution and target observation marginal, together with exact component transformations. Yet even this information is insufficient to determine the target Bayes rule. Under an equal prior over the two candidate worlds, one bit of uncertainty remains about which world is true. Further labeled-source or unlabeled-target samples under the same protocol cannot resolve it.
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A necessary test for exact target-decision recovery. Existing theories give conditions under which recovery is possible. Attribution ambiguity raises a question that any such guarantee in our setting must address. Do its additional information or structural assumptions resolve the conflict between target Bayes decisions? Exact recovery across the remaining compatible models requires that they admit a common Bayes-optimal rule.
Thus, our contribution goes beyond demonstrating non-identifiability: it identifies a concrete decision-sufficiency requirement that positive Bayes-recovery guarantees must satisfy in additive-aggregation systems, while deepening our understanding of the generative mechanisms underlying transfer difficulties in these systems.
Official Response to Reviewer moos [1/5]
We appreciate your thorough review and positive feedback on the clarity of our research question, examples, figures, and tables. Your penetrating questions on the EEG motivation, theoretical novelty, and empirical scope have helped us sharpen the manuscript.
Overarching Concern: Connection between EEG motivation and general theory. Our study builds a two-way link between the physical structure of EEG generation and general learning theory:
Below, we address your four questions to explain the mechanism, clarify what our theoretical results add to prior work, and show what the EEG evidence supports.