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Paper summary
VeilMoE is a two-party secure inference framework for mixture-of-experts (MoE) models, built on function secret sharing (FSS). It keeps the model’s native Top-k routing and drops no assignments, which existing systems give up: SecMoE forces a single expert and CryptoMoE caps expert capacity. The servers rank masked router scores once, then use that ranking in one of three variants. VeilMoE-C shuffles the private expert bank and reveals only anonymized expert slots. VeilMoE-O selects public experts with secret-shared one-hot selectors. VeilMoE-CG does the same oblivious selection over private, shared weights. In every variant, only k FFNs are evaluated cryptographically.
Critical strengths
VeilMoE keeps native Top-k selection and drops no assignments, instead of changing routing to make the cryptography easier. Capacity limits cost up to 6.75 points, and the paired bootstrap intervals exclude zero.
The framework ranks masked router scores once, then branches into three variants depending on whether weights are public or private and whether membership may be revealed. Online communication falls by up to 7.2×.
Critical weaknesses
- Limited technical novelty. VeilMoE mostly combines existing primitives. it builds on CmpAgg ranking and FSS inference primitives and that its contribution is “their integration with protected expert access”
-lacks baselines. The only cryptographic baseline is Dense-SIGMA. it runs on the same stack and backend, evaluates all N experts, and then masks out the unselected ones. Several comparisons that would place the gains in context are missing, for example, SecMoE and CryptoMoE. None of the HE- or hybrid-HE/MPC systems the paper cites (e.g., Hao et al. 2022, Pang et al. 2024, Lu et al. 2025) are evaluated, even with their dense-MoE cost estimated.
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lack of security proof.Theorem 1 rests on a single-paragraph argument, Proposition 1 in Appendix A.3. It says the simulator “composes the primitive simulators” in a hybrid model, but it never constructs a simulator or gives a hybrid sequence for any variant.
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the end to end deployment is not evaluated. The abstract describes the gains as “end-to-end online communication and latency,” but none of the measurements cover a working deployment.
Questions for authors
Beyond integrating CmpAgg, threshold differencing, and Beaver-style gathers, which part of the protocol do you regard as a new technical contribution?
We thank the reviewer for recognizing drop-free Top-k and our communication savings.
Q1 / Weakness 1. What is the technical contribution beyond existing primitives?
SecMoE selects one expert; CryptoMoE caps expert capacity. Replacing native Top-k with Top-1 or dropping selected assignments changes checkpoint computation; Our policy study (Table 2) shows losses up to 6.75 points at capacity c=1. We preserve drop-free Top-k while controlling access leakage and avoiding all-expert evaluation.
FSS material is generated before the route is known. Secure Top-k alone cannot align selected weights, gates and activation corrections. For v^W−rvW=vW, both terms must use the same hidden expert.
Our protocol makes one protected ranking control these dependencies. C jointly permutes bank and routing correspondence; O/CG derive rank-wise one-hot selectors to gather parameters and matching corrections. O uses public-bank scans; CG selects private shares through offline correlations and a masked selector opening. This design evaluates only k FFNs cryptographically, without capacity drops, under public/private-weight access policies.
Weakness 2. Missing secure MoE baselines
We added encrypted CryptoMoE runs to compare with VeilMoE-CG (ours) on OLMoE and DeepSeekMoE, batch=1, 4/16 tokens. The table reports mean online backbone costs for our membership-hiding variant.
In these settings, CG uses 24.53-28.79x fewer online bytes. The two hosts each have dual AMD EPYC 7532 CPUs, 503 GB RAM and an A100 80 GB. CG uses GPU/FSS; CryptoMoE uses CPU HE/OT with 48 workers/party. Historical CG runs use 1-Gbps LAN; added runs use the same link without new shaping.
CG and CryptoMoE use the same configuration. Dense-SIGMA remains the same-backend control.
† Differences use Table 3 (t=2.0)'s 1.31/2.46 GB for OLMoE/DeepSeek, assuming per-token normalization and scaling by 4/16. They are within 8.14%. The original Xeon 8468/3-Gbps setup differs from ours; latency gaps alone do not imply implementation mismatch. Source
CryptoMoE's release covers balanced routing, not full encrypted inference. Our reproduction follows the paper and cited libraries and uses the authors' expert MatMul from SPU PR #1271. Code.
SecMoE's full public code was unavailable to us; Top-1 also changes native Top-8/Top-6.
Weakness 3. Explicit simulator and hybrid sequence
We have expanded Appendix A.3 with per-variant simulators and execution-order hybrids, specifying the functionality, corrupted view, replacements and retained correlations.
For example, the single-opening gather uses Δ=Q−A, C=AB and Zb=ΔBb+Cb. Given the corrupted party's shares and output, its simulator samples Δ,Ab uniformly, sets Cb=Zb−ΔBb, and determines the other opening share as Δ−(Qb−Ab). Fresh masks and independently split correlations make this a joint-view simulation.
The complete argument preserves dependencies among masks, keys, selected weights and activation corrections. C's simulator receives the declared ordered membership leakage; O/CG use route-independent access schedules. The proof is stated under the paper's semi-honest, single-online-party corruption and trusted-preprocessing assumptions.
Weakness 4. Meaning of end-to-end
Our timing covers one connected secure Transformer-backbone execution: input hidden states pass through every attention, normalization, routing, expert and residual block to the final hidden states. It is neither an isolated MoE microbenchmark nor a sum of extrapolated layer timings. The boundary excludes embedding lookup, the vocabulary head and an autoregressive serving loop.
This is an end-to-end online computation measurement, not a claim of production deployment. SIGMA likewise uses end-to-end secure-inference terminology and separates offline and online costs. Zero-valued benchmark payloads do not remove the cryptographic operators or restrict the protocol to zero weights; nonzero secure correctness and checkpoint-based fidelity are checked separately.