acceptodds
Withdrawn from ICLR 2027

RouteMIA: Expert Routing Leaks Membership in MoE LLMs

Withdrawn from ICLR 2027, so left out of the paper lists and the map.

Abstract

Many membership inference attacks on large language models rely on log-probabilities of the input tokens that deployed services do not expose. Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) models, however, leak a different MIA signal: how input tokens are distributed across experts, which may be exposed through side channels even when log-probabilities are hidden. Specifically, we find that fine-tuning shifts this distribution more for members than for non-members. Building on this observation, we propose RouteMIA, which infers membership by measuring the Jaccard distance between expert sets selected by a public base model and by its fine-tuned counterpart from the same input. Unlike prior attacks, RouteMIA uses only the number of tokens routed to each expert, a signal that side channels may reveal, rather than log-probabilities. Because some routing changes occur regardless of membership, RouteMIA calibrates these changes against token identity and base routing margin using non-member reference data. Experiments across three MoE LLMs and four datasets demonstrate routing-based membership leakage and show that the proposed calibration generally improves attack performance. Our findings identify expert routing as a new privacy attack surface introduced by sparse MoE architectures.

Primary area:
alignment, fairness, safety, privacy, and societal considerations
Keywords:
Membership Inference, Mixture-of-Experts, Side-Channel Attacks, Expert Routing, Training Data Privacy

Reviews

Among:
Shape:
1234this paper, Bottom 10%
Figure 1. Mean review rating of the reviewed papers at ICLR 2027. This paper averages 1.67 over 3 reviews, above 10% of the others.
Reviewer_NeU7OpenReview ↗
Rating
1
Confidence
3
Informativeness
2
Presentation
2
Soundness
1
Read review
Paper summary

This work studies membership inference against fine-tuned Mixture-of-Experts LLMs using changes in expert routing. The proposed attack, RouteMIA, compares the experts selected by a public base model and its fine-tuned counterpart, using their Jaccard distance as a membership signal. It then calibrates this score against token identity and base-model routing margin using non-member reference data. The attack assumes that the target’s per-token expert selections can be recovered through a hardware side channel. Experiments cover three MoE models and four datasets under expert-only LoRA fine-tuning.

Critical strengths

S1. Studying membership leakage through expert routing is an interesting direction. The reported results suggest that changes in internal computation paths can carry some membership information without observing the target’s token probabilities. This observation can be potentially useful independently of whether the proposed attack is practical. (See W2)

S2. The analysis of token identity and routing margin provides useful empirical observations. The paper recognizes that large routing changes are not necessarily caused by membership and attempts to account for these alternative explanations rather than relying only on raw Jaccard distance, which aligns with the domain adaptation signal model introduced in works like Chen et al., 2026a (cited in the paper).

Critical weaknesses

W1. I am not convinced that the proposed method is well-motivated. The paper argues that training members experience larger hidden-state drift, which leads to more routing changes. However, the theoretical analysis only establishes a relationship between drift magnitude and routing changes under a fixed direction, not that these changes reliably distinguish members from non-members. The two-stage calibration also feels somewhat heuristic, without sufficient justification for why this specific design is preferable to simpler alternatives.

W2. The practical feasibility of the attack is questionable. The method seems to requier recovering per-token expert identities through a hardware side channel, but the paper does not implement or evaluate this process. Appendix C assumes that prefix caching allows individual token routing to be isolated through sequential queries. This is a strong assumption that needs experimental validation. Without an end-to-end evaluation, the paper essentially assumes access to the most challenging component of the attack.

W3. The evaluation relies too heavily on AUROC, which is insufficient for assessing practical MIA effectiveness. Recent MIA literature emphasizes TPR at low FPR (Carlini et al., 2022, cited in the paper), where high-confidence membership predictions matter most. Table 9 reports TPR@1%FPR shown in the appendix, and the results are often disappointing. For example, Qwen–Reddit achieves 0.679 AUROC but only 0.9% TPR@1%FPR, which suggests the method is not effective. I encourage the authors to report TPR at 1% and 0.1% FPR for all baselines and include log-scale ROC curves in the main text.

W4. I also find the calibration evaluation protocol problematic. If I understand it correctly, Appendix F seems to state that non-members are scored using a single held-out calibration fold, whereas members are scored by averaging results from five calibration tables. This means members and non-members are evaluated using different scoring procedures, which will affect the score distributions. A cleaner evaluation would use an independent reference set and apply the same calibration procedure to both classes.

Questions for authors

See W1-W4.

Reviewer_q2BVOpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
4
Informativeness
2
Presentation
3
Soundness
3
Read review
Paper summary

This paper proposes RouteMIA, a membership inference attack targeting fine-tuned Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) language models. The key observation is that fine-tuning induces larger changes in expert routing for training members than for non-members. Based on this observation, the authors measure the Jaccard distance between expert sets selected by a public base model and its fine-tuned counterpart. To reduce membership-independent variations, the method further calibrates routing differences based on token identity and routing margins using non-member reference data. Experiments across three MoE architectures and four datasets demonstrate the existence of routing-based membership leakage, achieving an average AUROC of 0.606 after three fine-tuning epochs.

Critical strengths

Novel Perspective on Membership Leakage. The paper identifies expert routing as a previously underexplored source of membership leakage in MoE models. This provides an interesting perspective beyond conventional loss-based or output-based membership inference attacks.

Simple and Interpretable Methodology. The proposed approach is straightforward and interpretable, combining Jaccard distance with token-identity and routing-margin calibration. The experiments across three MoE architectures and four datasets provide initial evidence supporting the proposed leakage mechanism.

Critical weaknesses

Restrictive and Questioable Threat Model. The attack assumes that adversaries can execute a co-located process on the same physical machine as the victim model. This is a rather restrictive assumption that does not reflect typical LLM API deployment scenarios. The practical relevance of the proposed attack is therefore limited to a narrow class of deployment environments.

Lack of End-to-End Side-Channel Validation. The paper relies on existing side-channel techniques to justify access to expert routing information, but does not demonstrate their integration with RouteMIA. In particular, it remains unclear whether per-token, per-layer expert identities can be recovered with sufficient accuracy. The absence of experiments accounting for side-channel recovery errors makes the reported attack effectiveness difficult to interpret in realistic settings.

Limited Experimental Generalizability Although three MoE architectures are evaluated, the main experiments exclusively consider expert-only LoRA fine-tuning with frozen routers and attention layers. Other common adaptation strategies, including full-parameter fine-tuning and broader LoRA configurations, are not systematically investigated. Consequently, it remains unclear whether the observed routing-based membership leakage generalizes beyond the specific fine-tuning setting considered in this paper.

Questions for authors

see weaknesses

Reviewer_Xt9GOpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
4
Informativeness
2
Presentation
2
Soundness
2
Read review
Paper summary

The paper proposes RouteMIA, a membership inference attack on fine-tuned MoE LLMs that does not need log-probabilities. The setting is an organization that LoRA-fine-tunes the expert FFNs of a public MoE model and self-hosts it. A co-located attacker recovers the target's per-token expert selections through a side channel, and runs the public base model locally.

The key observation is that, with the router frozen, fine-tuning shifts members' hidden states more than non-members'. This pushes more tokens across the top-k routing boundary. The attack scores a sample by the Jaccard distance between the base and fine-tuned expert sets, averaged over the last five MoE layers. It then calibrates out token-identity and routing-margin effects using a same-domain non-member reference set.

On OLMoE, Qwen1.5-MoE and DeepSeek-V2-Lite across four datasets, the attack reaches an average AUROC of 0.606 at 3 epochs, rising to about 0.70 at 5 epochs. It beats four text-only black-box attacks in most settings.

Critical strengths
  1. Routing as a membership signal is a new and MoE-specific observation. Given that expert activity can leak through side channels, it is a realistic attack surface for self-hosted MoE deployments. The mechanism is simple and convincing: a frozen router, hidden-state drift, and top-k flips. It is backed by the HSD-JD correlations and the layer-wise analysis.

  2. The token and margin calibration is cheap and well motivated by the analysis in Sec. 4.4. It improves AUROC in 34 of 36 settings, and the token-filtering controls support the claim that much of the raw routing change is unrelated to membership.

Critical weaknesses
  1. The evaluation does not show how strong the signal is, and does not support the claim that it beats the baselines.

The average TPR@1%FPR at E=3 is 2.0%, which is close to chance in the regime that matters most for MIA (Carlini et al., 2022). TPR@1%FPR for the baselines is not reported, so the comparison is AUROC-only.

The baselines also use only generated text, while RouteMIA sees internal routing and uses the base model as a reference. A win over them mostly reflects this difference in access. To place the result, I would want reference points such as:

  • a loss or Min-K% score;
  • a base-referenced likelihood ratio, log p_ft(x) - log p_base(x), which is the probability-space analogue of what RouteMIA does in routing space;
  • the white-box hidden-state score (0.755), placed next to RouteMIA in the main text. These need not be beaten. They would show how much of the available membership signal routing actually preserves. The PPL numbers already exist (Appendix D.2), so this should be cheap.

Finally, each setting uses a single fine-tuning run with 1,000 samples per class and no confidence intervals. The margins over PETAL (0.01-0.04 AUROC) are within about one standard error, so "best in 9/12" is not established.

  1. The fine-tuning setup is narrow, and it favors the method.

LoRA is applied only to the expert FFNs, with both the router and attention frozen, and the analysis in Sec. 4.3 relies on the frozen router. In practice, LoRA is most often applied to the attention projections. Appendix D.4 covers router training only together with load-balancing regularization.

The shortest training run is also 3 epochs, which is already a clearly over-fitted regime. Without results for attention LoRA and for a single epoch, it is hard to tell whether the leakage exists in typical fine-tuning or mainly in this configuration.

Minor:

  • Sec. 1: "reduce the membership-dependent component" should presumably read "membership-independent".
  • Typos: "direclty", "and and", "micro-architectual", "with which from the Mft".
  • Routing is essentially a discretized view of hidden-state drift, and the observation that members drift more is already used by internal-state MIAs (LUMIA, memTrace). It would help to frame the contribution as the observability of this signal rather than the signal itself. Proposition 1 is fairly elementary.
  • The mitigation section would be stronger with at least one DP fine-tuning result.
Questions for authors

Q1. Members and non-members come from a contiguous document split. For CC-News, Reddit and Amazon this may introduce temporal or topical shift, which is known to inflate LLM MIA results (Duan et al., 2024; Das et al., 2024). Did you check this, for example with a blind baseline that uses only base-model quantities, or with a random split?

Q2. The main results use the last five MoE layers, and the layer-wise analysis (Fig. 2) is computed on the same evaluation blocks. Was the choice of layers fixed in advance or tuned on held-out data?

Q3. How large does the reference set need to be, and how sensitive is the calibration to a domain mismatch between the reference set and the private data?

Q4. How does AUROC change if LoRA is also applied to the attention projections, or if the model is fine-tuned for one epoch?

Q5. The abstract says the attack uses "only the number of tokens routed to each expert", but Eq. (2) needs per-token, per-layer expert sets. Which does the attack actually require? Roughly how many queries per candidate sample does the prefix-caching recovery need?

From OpenReview, CC BY 4.0. Authors as signed there; shown unedited.

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