- Rating
- 2
- Confidence
- 4
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 3
- Soundness
- 2
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Paper summary
This paper proposes SENTINELMARK-MoE, a secret-challenge mechanism for auditing MoE route execution. It combines keyed route selection with an anytime-valid statistical detector to identify routing manipulation while preserving the selected sampling distribution.
Critical strengths
1.The problem is meaningful, and the secret-challenge design is interesting. 2.The theoretical analysis is solid, including routing distribution preservation and false-alarm guarantees. 3.The evaluation is extensive, covering multiple MoE models, attack types, and serving conditions.
Critical weaknesses
Unclear advantage over direct verification. Given the same trusted observer, an authenticated digest of the expected route can detect observable mismatches immediately, without secret route selection or statistical evidence accumulation. The paper's own experiments show that direct verification detects all tested view-changing attacks with substantially shorter delays. Table 8 also suggests that the metadata savings of SentinelMark can be very small under batching. The practical necessity of the proposed mechanism is therefore not convincing.
Significant serving overhead. SentinelMark retains only about 59–63% of native throughput at load 32. This is a substantial overhead for an online auditing system. A full end-to-end comparison against direct authenticated verification is missing.
Limited practical validation. The method assumes a trusted selector and an independent trusted observation channel, while the live pilot relies on an in-process software observer. The experiments do not establish the security and practicality of this trust boundary in a real distributed deployment.
Limited detection under sparse attacks. At 5% rerouting, detection power is only about 21% after 2,048 active challenges. Moreover, a large number of raw routing decisions may be required to obtain these active challenges, particularly for Mixtral.
Questions for authors
1.What realistic deployment scenario makes SentinelMark preferable to direct authenticated route verification, considering metadata, latency, and computation costs? 2.Can the authors provide an end-to-end comparison with direct verification, including throughput and communication overhead? 3.How would the trusted observation channel be implemented and protected against a malicious backend in practice?
2 comments
Follow up on Reviewer 5cGa's Comment
Dear Reviewer 5cGa,
With the discussion period underway, we wanted to follow up to see if our response and the updated manuscript (Appendix A.6) have addressed your questions.
In summary:
- End-to-End Serving Benchmark (Q2 / Appendix A.6, Table 10): Our new matched serving benchmark on OLMoE-1B-7B shows that SentinelMark retains 95%–97% of direct verification throughput across batch sizes 1, 8, and 32, with the prototype's earlier slowdown explained by high-level Python hooks rather than the core CUDA algorithm (which processes 3.65B decisions/s).
- Realistic Deployment Setting (Q1): Direct verification requires disclosing internal per-token routing decisions, which cloud providers cannot stream to third-party clients without leaking proprietary router weights and sensitive prompt activations.
Please let us know if any further details or clarifications would be helpful. If our answers have resolved your concerns, we respectfully hope you might consider updating your scores.
Thank you again for your expert and rigorous review!
Response to reviewer 5cGa
We thank Reviewer 5cGa for the rigorous review. We address the questions below. Please also refer to the revised PDF (Section 4.2, Appendix A.2, Table 6, and Appendix A.6) for more details.
1. Detection Delay and Sparse Attacks (5% Rerouting)
Collision-Gated, 6.05% and 18.20%) by +75.5 percentage points while false alarms remain bounded below α=10−3.2. What realistic deployment scenario makes SentinelMark preferable to direct authenticated route verification (Q1)
We argue that direct verification (comparing an exact route hash) requires the auditor to know the intended route for every token. This cannot apply in the cloud serving regimes we target:
3. Can the authors provide an end-to-end comparison with direct verification, including throughput and communication overhead? (Q2)
Table R1: Throughput Comparison (OLMoE-1B-7B, Table 10 in Appendix A.6)
4. How would the trusted observation channel be implemented and protected against a malicious backend in practice? (Q3)
Protecting the observer against a malicious host is directly supported by standard cloud hardware primitives, made especially lightweight because SentinelMark requires observing only coarse routing summaries (ϕ(A)) rather than full activations or weights. On modern accelerators such as NVIDIA Confidential Computing and AMD SEV-SNP, the observer runs within a hardware-isolated environment, reading GPU dispatch descriptors directly while isolated from root-level host OS tampering.