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Paper summary
This work proposes a method DUPLEX, two-party framework aims to improve the security of FFS-based private LLM inference. Existed FFS-based inference systems rely on a trusted dealer for key generation and distribution. Based on existed two-party FFS construction, DUPLEX builds a dealer-free private pipeline for LLM inference by proposing Secure Runtime, Cost-aware Compiler and PCG/VOLE Scheduler.
Critical strengths
DUPLEX extends existed two-party FFS construction into a complete Transformer inference pipeline and also introduce two optimizations (cost-aware compiler and preprocessing scheduler) to reduce the computational overhead.
Critical weaknesses
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DUPLEX’s security guarantees are mainly inherited from the verification core of previous work [1]. There are limited security analysis of the introduced public plan and the scheduler.
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The paper claims DUPLEX is an end-to-end secure LLM framework. However, deviation detection experiment (Table 5) are mainly conducted on three-layer MLP models rather than LLM models. Authors should provide empirical evaluations on different attacks to justify the security of DUPLEX.
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The readiness and the structure of this paper still have large space for improvement.
[1] Xue, Yujie, et al. "Actively Secure Two-Party Function Secret Sharing with Dynamic Cross-Phase Verification." Cryptology ePrint Archive (2026).
Questions for authors
What other non-trivial security issues are resolved by DUPLEX except the guarantees already provided by the verification core of [1]?
5 comments
Response to Reviewer Y7Kf: added guarantees and attack evidence (2/3)
2. Reviewer comment: Although DUPLEX is presented as an end-to-end secure LLM framework, its deviation-detection experiments (Table 5) primarily use a three-layer MLP instead of LLMs; empirical evaluations against diverse attacks are required to validate its security.
Response. We agree that the earlier attack evidence was too small in scale. We have consolidated it into a coverage table that states, for every scenario, where the deviation is injected, which layer detects it and what was measured, and we have strengthened the LLM-scale evidence to the extent the protocol allows:
(1) The gate-level injection campaign is expanded to 36 injections: six deviation classes (keys/payloads/masked opening/audit residual/commitment/transcript) × DPF/DCF × three trials. All 36 are detected (36/36), and 5/5 honest runs are accepted with the correct output. See Table 5 (p. 27) and its caption.
(2) Four end-to-end two-process scenarios run over a loopback TCP connection: the honest run returns RELEASED with the correct output; tampering with a released share (+7) yields ABORT; use-before-certify is refused at the certification barrier; and tampering with the certification transcript yields ABORT. See Table 5 (p. 27) and Table 8 (C1), p. 31.
(3) At LLM scale, every row we report is a two-process execution (two independent processes over TCP, GenTrace/GenCheck messages, fresh per-call certified keys, aggregated -MAC release), and the cross-process invariants are checked row by row (transcripts equal; byte/round/triple/key symmetry; both parties RELEASED). See §8 (pp. 8–9), Table 1 (p. 8) and the reproducibility claims of Table 9 (p. 33). The reuse surface of the batched path is covered by the per-coordinate batch keys and batched audit (p. 22).
(4) Formal counterpart: the abort predicate has exactly two exits — survive GenCheck (probability ) or survive the aggregated -MAC (); opened values are MAC-covered, so there is no third, silent exit. See the three-step proof sketch in Appendix H (p. 27).
Boundary, stated explicitly. We did not re-run the 36 injections for every LLM model. The injection campaign targets the same C++ gate/audit implementation and the same wire protocol that the LLM rows execute, and the LLM rows supply the scale-side evidence (cross-process invariants and the aggregated release check). This coverage relation is stated in the Table 5 caption and in Appendix H; we make no stronger claim.
3. Reviewer comment: Readability and structure can still be improved substantially.
Response. Without changing the section order or removing any of the original Figures 1–8 and Tables 1–12, we improved readability by adding pointers in the main text, moving detail to the appendix, and consolidating numbers into tables:
(1) A notation table (Table 3, p. 16, Appendix C) fixes the symbols (, , , , , , ) and prevents drift between the main text and the appendix.
(2) An appendix-overview paragraph (p. 14) maps Appendices A–L to the main-text sections and states that Appendices C–H and K reproduce deferred passages verbatim, so the main text can be read on its own.
(3) The main text adds pointers rather than moving content: §7 (p. 7) enumerates where , the MAC algebra, opened-value coverage, reduction-stage security, C2/C3 and the three-step sketch are formalized; §8 (pp. 8–9) states precisely what the two-process runs do and do not cover.
(4) Numbers that were scattered in prose are consolidated into tables: Table 4 (gate-domain stage costs, p. 21), Table 5 (attack coverage, p. 27) and Table 16 (downstream utility, p. 40, with column meanings in the caption); units are unified to minutes, GB, and in the captions of Tables 1, 12, 13 and 14 (pp. 8, 35–36, 38).
(5) Proof readability: a three-step proof sketch in Appendix H (p. 27) separates the offline simulation, the online masked openings and the two bad events; the full proof remains in Appendix I.
(6) The downstream evidence now has its own reading entry: Appendix L.5 “Downstream utility” (p. 37, 40) and one summarizing sentence in the abstract (p. 1).
Response to Reviewer Y7Kf: added guarantees and attack evidence (3/3)
4. Reviewer question: Beyond the guarantees already provided by the verification core [1], which other non-trivial security problems does DUPLEX solve?
Response. DUPLEX adds and formalizes six non-trivial guarantees beyond the core. All are marked in blue in the revised manuscript and are backed by executed evidence:
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Session-level composition and state machine. The one-way state machine OPEN→PLANNED→PRODUCING→CERTIFIED→ONLINE→RELEASED binds generation, certification, evaluation and release into one session object, so that consuming an uncertified key or releasing an unauthenticated output becomes structurally impossible; use-before-certify is refused at the barrier (one of the executed scenarios). §5 (p. 6); Appendix F; Table 5 (p. 27).
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Transcript binding. The digest chain binds the plan, per-bundle verdicts, the certification barrier, the release event and queue entries to sid; cross-phase substitution (certifying one set and consuming another) aborts on a digest mismatch. §5 (p. 6); Appendix F.
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Plan and scheduler secret-independence. The cost-aware plan is a deterministic function of the public architecture and budget , fixed in the PLANNED state; the six queue invariants make refill, dispatch and release points depend only on public counters; and the GPU kernels are bit-exact against the CPU. §7 (p. 7); Appendix H (p. 26); Proposition 1 (Appendix G, p. 23).
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Session isolation and crash recovery. Nonces are namespaced by sid and cannot be observed or consumed across sessions; after a crash, log replay discards uncertified in-flight bundles and does not revive consumed correlations. §6; Appendix G.
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End-to-end composition theorem. With the new ideal functionality as the reference, DUPLEX securely realizes it in the -hybrid model against one statically corrupted, rushing, malicious party with abort, with advantage . Multi-query composition uses a fresh session per query, leaks only correctly released outputs, and has independent error across queries. §7, Theorem 1 (p. 7); Appendix H (p. 26); Appendix I.
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Newly formalized arguments. (a) The definition of (Appendix H, p. 26). (b) Opened values (the masked opening and the Beaver differences) are authenticated and enter the aggregated release MAC check, which is made explicit both at the release barrier and in the proof steps. (c) The two-plane MAC algebra and its detection probability: ring MACs ( per opening) and -tags () joined by Aggregate. (d) Security of the reduction stages: clamp comparisons, MSB scans and wrap-bit comparisons are authenticated affine gates of the lifting catalogue; the stage sequence depends only on public grid widths and the uniform masked value, and the stage costs are measured (the BERT erf-GELU plan is a 12-bit plan served by an authenticated affine identity tail). §7 (p. 7); §4 (p. 6); Table 4 (p. 21); Appendices H and I.
Empirical support. The 36-injection campaign (six classes × DPF/DCF × three trials; 36/36 rejected, 5/5 honest accepted) and the four two-process scenarios (honest RELEASED; tamper ABORT; use-before-certify refused; cert-tamper ABORT) are summarized in the attack–detection coverage table (Table 5, p. 27, Appendix H.1).
Readability revisions. A notation table in Appendix C (p. 16); the two-process execution boundary in §8 (p. 9); and a three-step proof overview in Appendix H.1 (p. 27).
All items above can be located at the cited pages. We are pleased to provide the corresponding source code, attack-injection logs, and raw JSON data from the two-process runs within the artifacts to be posted at a later time. Further discussions are welcome.
References:
[1] Xue, Yujie, et al. "Actively Secure Two-Party Function Secret Sharing with Dynamic Cross-Phase Verification." Cryptology ePrint Archive (2026).
Response to Reviewer Y7Kf: added guarantees and attack evidence (1/3)
We thank the reviewer for the constructive assessment. All additions described below are marked in blue in the revised manuscript and enhanced artifacts, which will be posted at a later time; page numbers refer to the revised PDF. The original section order, Figures 1-8 and Tables 1-12 are preserved, and new material is placed in the appendices unless otherwise noted. Below are the relevant details for this response.
1. Reviewer comment: DUPLEX’s security guarantees mostly inherit from the prior-work verification core [1], with limited security analysis for its newly introduced public plan and scheduler.
Response. We agree, and we have made the division of labour explicit: what is inherited, what is added, and why the additions cannot weaken the inherited guarantee. Concretely:
(1) Session-level composition. The core certifies individual gates; DUPLEX binds generation, certification, evaluation and release into one session object through the one-way state machine OPEN→PLANNED→PRODUCING→CERTIFIED→ONLINE→RELEASED, and the digest chain ht=H(ht−1∥mt) binds the plan, per-bundle verdicts, the certification barrier, the release event and queue entries to sid. Consuming an uncertified key, releasing an unauthenticated output and substituting material across phases are therefore structurally impossible. See §5 (p. 6) and Appendix F.
(2) The public plan (C2) leaks nothing extra. The cost-aware plan is a deterministic function of the public architecture and budget δ; it is fixed in the PLANNED state before any key request is issued, so the plan reflects only information that is already public. See Appendix H, “The approximation plan is public (C2)” (p. 25).
(3) The scheduler (C3) introduces no secret-dependent behaviour. The six queue invariants (Proposition 1) make refill, dispatch and release points functions of public counters; Half-Tree replaces only the offline key representation under one stated assumption; and the CUDA/CUTLASS kernels are deterministic and bit-exact against the CPU reference. Hence C2/C3 neither change the secret-dependent distribution of transcripts nor add adversarial capability. See Appendix H, “Scheduling adds no secret-dependent behaviour (C3)” and the blue paragraph “Compiler and scheduler add nothing (C2/C3)” (p. 26), and Proposition 1 (queue invariants, Appendix G, p. 23).
(4) End-to-end composition. We define the ideal inference functionality Finf(M,δ) and prove, in the (Fprep,Fcoin)-hybrid model, that the full runtime securely realizes it with abort against one statically corrupted, rushing, malicious party, with distinguishing advantage ≤m⋅ϵgen+ϵrep+negl(λ) (ϵgen≈2n/∣E∣, ϵrep≤2/∣E∣), and we add a three-step proof sketch (offline simulation, online masked openings, two bad events). See §7, Theorem 1 (p. 7); Appendix H.1 (Finf definition and sketch, p. 26); Appendix I (full proof).
(5) A genuine system-level leak, found and fixed during this revision, shows that the analysis is not vacuous: the early batch design shared one scalar key mask per layer, which permits a cell-difference leak of plaintext activations. It is replaced by per-coordinate vector-offset batch keys with a batched coordinate audit (6m residuals, one challenge), which covers exactly the reuse surface that batching introduces. See §5 and Appendix F (p. 22); inherited assumptions and trust boundaries are stated explicitly in Appendix H, “Additional assumptions and trust boundaries” (p. 25).