- Rating
- 1
- Confidence
- 4
- Informativeness
- 1
- Presentation
- 2
- Soundness
- 1
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Paper summary
This paper proposes IdentityMark, a source-side identity watermarking framework for face-swapping provenance. The method encodes a binary message into a facial identity representation, then optimizes a protected source portrait so that its machine-readable identity embedding moves toward a message-bearing pseudo-identity while the image remains visually close to the original. At test time, a suspicious face-swapped image is passed through a face identity encoder and a recovery head to decode the watermark. The paper evaluates bit accuracy on a single dataset, CelebA-HQ, using 29,000 training images and 500 test images at a single resolution of 256, across eight face-swapping methods and two cheapfake methods, and compares against four image watermarking baselines.
Critical strengths
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The paper identifies a meaningful problem setting: provenance when the protected image is the identity-providing source portrait rather than the target image. The distinction between target-side watermarking and source-side identity transfer is clearly motivated.
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The paper evaluates the proposed method on a relatively broad set of manipulation pipelines, including eight face-swapping methods and two cheapfake methods.
Critical weaknesses
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Incomplete novelty positioning against prior source-face protection work. The paper presents source-side identity watermarking as a new setting, but BiFPro: A Bidirectional Facial-data Protection Framework against DeepFake already includes a Face-Out setting for protecting the source face, where the protected face is used to replace other faces and its identity is transferred into fake images.
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Incomplete citation and weak baseline positioning. The paper uses LIDMark as a baseline but does not cite All in One: Unifying Deepfake Detection, Tampering Localization, and Source Tracing with a Robust Landmark-Identity Watermark. Moreover, most baselines are target-side watermarking methods, which the authors admit are designed for different settings. Thus, the experiments do not convincingly establish superiority in the source-side setting.
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Bit accuracy is insufficient for practical provenance. The paper reports only bit accuracy, with an average of 71.66% for a 32-bit watermark after face swapping. However, provenance requires reliable message-level identification: even one wrong bit may cause a database lookup failure or an incorrect identity match. The paper does not report exact message recovery, matching thresholds, false positives, false negatives, or retrieval accuracy over a realistic registered database.
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Unjustified payload design and poor visual quality. The paper does not justify why 32 bits is chosen as the main payload length, nor whether this capacity is sufficient for real-world provenance; the 64-bit and 128-bit variants are only briefly reported in an ablation. Meanwhile, Table 4 shows that IdentityMark uses a shorter payload than all baselines but has much worse visual quality: 31.96 dB PSNR for IdentityMark (32 b), versus 38.52 dB for SepMark-T (128 b), 37.71 dB for StableSignature (48 b), 41.80 dB for EditGuard (64 b), and 43.12 dB for LIDMark (152 b). A PSNR around 31.96 dB can introduce visible artifacts, which limits practical deployment. The paper does not explain why a shorter watermark causes larger distortion.
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Missing generalization evaluation. All experiments use only CelebA-HQ at a single 256 resolution, with 29,000 training images and 500 test images. The paper lacks generalization tests on other common face datasets such as LFW or FFHQ, and does not evaluate other resolutions such as 128 or 512. This weakens the real-world validity of the claimed provenance capability.
Questions for authors
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How is IdentityMark different from the Face-Out setting in BiFPro: A Bidirectional Facial-data Protection Framework against DeepFake? In both cases, the protected image is the source face whose identity is transferred into fake images.
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Why is LIDMark used as a baseline without citing All in One: Unifying Deepfake Detection, Tampering Localization, and Source Tracing with a Robust Landmark-Identity Watermark? In addition, why are most baselines target-side watermarking methods rather than source-side watermarking methods?
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Bit accuracy alone is insufficient to demonstrate provenance. Can the authors provide source-tracing or provenance accuracy, e.g., exact message recovery rate, database retrieval accuracy, false positive rate, and false negative rate?
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Why is 32 bits chosen as the main payload length, and is this capacity sufficient for real-world provenance? Also, why does IdentityMark have a much lower PSNR than baselines with longer payloads, such as SepMark-T (128 b), EditGuard (64 b), and LIDMark (152 b)? Does the reported PSNR of 31.96 dB introduce visible artifacts?
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Does the method generalize beyond CelebA-HQ at a single 256 resolution? Please provide additional generalization experiments on common face datasets such as LFW or FFHQ, and at other resolutions such as 128 and 512.
3 comments
Thank you for your rebuttal. After reviewing the authors’ response, I still find their arguments insufficient and unconvincing. The core limitations remain unresolved. Furthermore, the method exhibits poor performance and is not suitable for real-world deployment. I retain my score.
We would like to thank the reviewer for taking the time to reconsider our work and provide additional feedback. We respect your assessment and appreciate these suggestions, they will help us improve the method in future revisions.
Question 1
We thank the reviewer for pointing out BiFPro and acknowledge that source side Face Out protection has been studied previously. However, our work addresses a different objective. In BiFPro's Face Out setting, the watermark is intentionally destroyed after face swapping, and its absence is used for forgery detection. In contrast, IdentityMark aims to preserve and recover a registered watermark message after face swapping, enabling source tracing verification.
Moreover, the absence of a watermark alone does not necessarily distinguish a manipulated protected image from an image that was never watermarked. BiFPro's Face Out evaluation does not explicitly examine this distinction. Our results also show that conventional image watermarks generally fail to survive under faceswapping, highlighting the challenge of preserving recoverable information under this transformation.
Question 2
Thank you for pointing out the missing LIDMark citation, which we will add.
Regarding baseline comparisons, we acknowledge that these methods were primarily designed for different settings. However, to our knowledge, no existing method directly addresses recoverable source side watermarking under uncontrolled face swapping. Our comparisons are therefore intended to highlight the difficulty of preserving watermark information through identity transfer, rather than claim superiority in the baselines' original settings. Their near random recovery accuracy under the same source side protocol further illustrates this challenge.
Question 3
We agree that bit accuracy alone is insufficient to fully evaluate source attribution. We therefore conducted additional verification experiments using 32-bit and 128-bit watermarks across all 10 manipulation methods.
For more detail please refer to Our answer for Weakness 2 of Reviewer 1
Question 4
We acknowledge that selecting 32 bits as the main configuration was not sufficiently justified. Our initial evaluation focused on bit accuracy and robustness across different face swapping methods. However, we agree that longer payloads are more suitable for provenance verification. We have therefore extended our 128-bit evaluation to all 10 manipulation methods, including message-level verification and source retrieval experiments.
Regarding visual quality, the lower PSNR does not necessarily indicate visible artifacts. Unlike conventional watermarking methods that primarily introduce pixel level perturbations, our method intentionally modifies subtle facial features to shift the machine readable identity representation while preserving visual appearance. Similar trade-offs have been explored in DeepProtect (CVPR 2026), which reports 35.89 dB PSNR and 0.944 SSIM, and Machine Pareidolia (AAAI 2026), which reports 29.07 dB PSNR and 0.876 SSIM. However, we acknowledge that on FFHQ, few protected images may have artifacts because the Diffusion model we used is trained on CelebA.
We acknowledge that the reason for why a shorter watermark causes larger distortion is unclear. Our interpretation for this is that image distortion is not determined solely by payload length, but also by the identity optimization process.
Question 5
We appreciate the reviewer's suggestion. We conducted additional experiments on FFHQ using the pretrained Diffusion model trained on CelebAHQ. With 128-bit watermarks, IdentityMark achieves 97.66% clean bit accuracy, 92.91% under conventional attacks, PSNR 31.38 dB, and 65.41% across five face-swapping methods, demonstrating cross dataset generalization although with some degradation.
FFHQ Face-Swap Evaluation (128-bit)
Regarding resolution, the current 256×256 setting is constrained by the pretrained DiffusionCLIP backbone. Native resolution source protection requires a compatible diffusion model (or latent diffusion model), which may require training on face image, whereas recovery at different face-swapped output resolutions can be evaluated independently. We would like to be clarified and do more evaluation if needed.