- Rating
- 1
- Confidence
- 3
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 2
- Soundness
- 1
Read review
Paper summary
The paper modifies a frozen DiffAE semantic code to produce a protected photograph and optimizes the identity retained by a downstream face-swap output. The intended use is to publish a usable photograph of the owner while reducing unauthorized identity reuse.
Critical strengths
The paper reports substantial robustness across post-processing, held-out target faces, independent recognition models, and a second face swapper. It also reports direct-recognition utility rather than only swap-output success.
Critical weaknesses
1. The central usable-photo requirement is not established.
The central use case is not convincingly satisfied: a photo owner wants to publish a usable photograph of themselves. Why would that owner publish the actual Protected x′ shown in Figure 2 (Ours row) as their own portrait? Its facial contour and eye/mouth regions change substantially relative to x; this is the published image itself, not the ×4 residual. If the owner must relinquish their original facial appearance, they could instead publish an unrelated generated face or replace their face with another identity. The paper needs to establish what useful protection it provides beyond that alternative. A low resemblance between the downstream swap and the original owner is insufficient when the identity-bearing content of the source photograph may already have been changed.
The baseline comparison must be interpreted in light of this use case. In Figure 2, Pixel-PGD and MIM appear primarily to add image-level perturbations, whereas Ours visibly changes facial geometry in this selected example. This is not proof of different human identity or population-wide failure. Table 4 actually reports higher direct ArcFace recognition failure for Pixel-PGD/MIM (100%) than Ours (61%); the corresponding failures are 81%/88% versus 15% for MobileFaceNet and 88%/92% versus 80% for MagFace. Thus, I am not claiming that the baselines have higher machine identity similarity. Their objectives explicitly attack recognition, so low x–x′ machine similarity can coexist with a photograph that remains recognizable to a human. Conversely, outperforming these baselines on that recognition-failure metric does not establish acceptable preservation of the owner's appearance. The paper should explain this distinction and assess the relevant utility directly.
Report original-to-protected identity-similarity distributions jointly with pose, expression, and human photo/identity-preservation judgments, on the same images used to measure swap defense. Use independent evaluators with clearly specified, calibrated criteria; report exact x–x′ comparisons rather than leaving cosFR's evaluation pairing/stage unclear. Table 3's PSNR 21.80, LPIPS 0.163 and other global image metrics do not resolve whether the identity-bearing face remains a usable portrait. The crucial result is defense conditioned on satisfying an original-identity and appearance-preservation requirement, together with a matched-utility comparison against the existing baselines.
2. The experiments do not isolate useful protection from source-appearance alteration.
The reported experiments do not rule out a simple alternative explanation: downstream identity suppression may be purchased by modifying the identity-bearing appearance of the source itself. Compare against the same DiffAE reconstruction without the protective modification and simple identity-altered/anonymized or face-replaced source controls at comparable photo utility. If those alternatives achieve the same effect at comparable cost, the practical benefit claimed here is not established. The present results do not prove that identity alteration explains all of the effect, but they fail to separate it from useful protection of the owner's photograph.
The different objectives used for Pixel-PGD/MIM and the proposed swap-output method further confound objective alignment, carrier choice and identity/appearance cost. Strong robustness under JPEG, resizing, blur or another swapper does not compensate for this unresolved central utility requirement.
Overall assessment. Reject. The paper does not convincingly establish its basic usable-photo protection objective. It must demonstrate a benefit over simply replacing or anonymizing the source face, while preserving the owner’s identity-bearing appearance. The reported robustness and relative machine-recognition utility do not resolve that central deficiency.
Questions for authors
- Who is the intended user of the published x′ in Figure 2, and why would they choose it over publishing a newly generated or face-replaced image if their original facial appearance need not be preserved? What concrete advantage is established under the same usable-photo requirement?
- On the same source images, can you report x–x′ identity-similarity distributions, head-pose and expression changes, and human identity/photo-utility assessments alongside swap defense? Please distinguish adversarial machine-recognition failure from visible identity change.
- Does the defense remain effective after restricting evaluation to x′ that satisfy a specified original-identity/appearance preservation requirement? Compare with the relevant baselines, reconstruction-only and simple identity-altered controls at matched utility.
- Please define Table 10's cosFR comparison pair, processing stage and evaluator precisely, and disentangle the downstream objective from the carrier under comparable preservation costs.