- Rating
- 2
- Confidence
- 4
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 3
- Soundness
- 2
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Paper summary
This paper addresses a forgery attack that passes the verification of the original watermark even after semantic editing. It analyzes the model mismatch issue in existing inversion-based attacks and applies an inversion-free editing procedure anchored to the source image. GS is evaluated across five victim models, PRC and Spherical across four models, and results on SemBind are also presented.
Critical strengths
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It experimentally demonstrates the limitations of inversion-based attacks caused by model mismatch. It reports higher retention performance compared to baseline attacks across multiple victims and watermarks, providing analyses of victim-side latent drift and BitAcc loss. This is useful for understanding the impact of attacker model selection on security evaluations.
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It shows that semantic editing and passing watermark verification coexist even in SemBind. Extending the evaluation to multiple base watermarks is also meaningful. As the paper acknowledges, this vulnerability is not unique to the proposed attack.
Critical weaknesses
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The contributions are not sufficiently distinguished from existing methods and prior observations. The core update in Algorithm 1 coincides with FlowEdit, and key FLUX settings are identical. While FlowEdit is cited, methodological differences beyond simple application remain unclear. Furthermore, The Semantic Imprinting Hypothesis: How Semantic Watermarks Survive Prompt-based Editing has already reported that high detection and user attribution performance of certain semantic watermarks are retained even after InfEdit. Therefore, the paper needs to disentangle its additional contributions—namely the forgery attack, model mismatch, and SemBind analysis—from existing observations regarding watermark preservation after inversion-free editing.
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The superior watermark retention is not sufficiently disentangled from differences in editing extent. The proposed method exhibits lower CLIP-T and higher source fidelity than baseline attacks, a trade-off that the authors also acknowledge. While qualitative examples are provided, there is no comparison aligned by target edit success rate or editing extent, making it ambiguous whether the higher Det/Trace signifies a more effective forgery. Although style changes are included in the evaluation, the absence of category-specific results makes it difficult to assess performance under global modifications. Additionally, while the phenomenon where a larger RMS drift coincides with smaller BitAcc loss is discussed, the reason why the proposed trajectory preserves favorable verification directions is not directly verified.
Questions for authors
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What novel elements are introduced in Algorithm 1 compared to FlowEdit? Please clarify the scope of application of the existing algorithm and explain the added contributions relative to the observations of preservation after inversion-free editing in the aforementioned workshop paper.
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Can you report both editing success rate and watermark retention while varying parameters such as guidance and the number of update steps? Specifically, it would be informative to see whether the Det/Trace advantage persists at comparable levels of editing success, and what proportion of cases satisfies both the target edit and successful verification.
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Can you provide concrete examples of the included style changes (type 9) along with category-specific performance? While the COCO-to-I2P comparison in SemBind is noted, the boundary at which verification fails depending on the edit scope and strength remains unclear. Results from sequential editing would also be helpful.
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What is the rationale for excluding frequency-based semantic watermarks? It is necessary to verify the generalizability of the conclusions through comparisons with other representative embedding schemes and additional editing/attacks under the same cover-free setting. Is it also feasible to include comparisons using SDEdit as well as more accurate inversion techniques?
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Beyond the analyses in Chapter 4.5 and Appendix D.5, can you provide direct evidence linking the discrepancy between RMS drift and BitAcc loss to the verifier’s sensitivity and displacement direction? Please also clarify the extent to which the controlled residual comparison in the current theory explains the observed differences across actual attacks.