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Paper summary
The paper introduces LAW, a training-free watermarking method for latent diffusion models. The initial latent vector is partitioned into encoding pairs, corresponding reference pairs, and an unmodified remainder. Each bit is embedded by rotating an encoding pair so that its signed angle relative to the corresponding reference pair is either +π/2 or −π/2. Following DDIM inversion, the bit is recovered from the sign of this relative angle. A variant, LAW-M, embeds bits in the pairs with the largest magnitudes and retains the per-image sorted indices as side information.
The paper proves that each coordinate of the watermarked latent vector has a standard normal marginal distribution, N(0,1), and derives a closed-form expression for its covariance matrix, with cross-covariance entries of ±π/4 between the relevant paired coordinates. It also establishes a first-order angular-error bound that scales inversely with the pair magnitude ρ.
Experiments use Stable Diffusion v2.1 with prompts from COCO and DiffusionDB and compare LAW against 12 baseline methods. The evaluation covers image quality, measured by FID, CLIP score, and IS; robustness to 11 post-processing and regeneration attacks; classifier-based watermark detectability; and runtime. Additional ablation studies examine the effects of model version, scheduler, inversion step count, and guidance scale.
Critical strengths
S1. Simple and efficient encoding with competitive empirical robustness. The method embeds watermarks through norm-preserving rotations of latent pairs and requires no training. The runtime results in Fig. 5 indicate that it is orders of magnitude faster than PRC under the evaluated settings. The closed-form covariance expression in Property 2 is correct. The results across 11 attacks and the ablation studies in Tables 3–6 suggest competitive robustness that is reasonably consistent across the tested configurations. In particular, LAW-M performs within approximately 1.5 percentage points of the best-performing baseline on 10 of the 11 attacks. These results constitute the paper’s principal strength, although they do not sufficiently address the concerns raised in W1 and W2.
Critical weaknesses
W1. The theory does not support the central stealthiness claim and reveals substantial distributional deviations. Property 1 establishes Gaussian one-dimensional marginals, not an i.i.d. Gaussian joint distribution. Eqs. (2)–(3) impose exact orthogonality between encoding and reference pairs; Property C.2 identifies a two-dimensional marginal with a zero-probability quadrant; and Property 2 gives correlations of magnitude . With and , 87.5% of latent coordinates participate in these dependencies. Covariance sparsity does not imply a small distributional deviation. The main formulation is keyless (App. I), and the experimental partition is fixed and identifiable by the attacker (App. G). An algorithm-aware adversary can therefore run the public extraction procedure. Moreover, the mean of is exactly zero for original watermarked latents but has expectation under i.i.d. Gaussian latents. Its effectiveness after inversion requires testing, but Fig. 3’s ResNet-18 and MLP results do not exclude such structure-aware detection. Public embedding also permits attempted chosen-message forgeries through inversion and regeneration, an authenticity limitation outside the stated threat model. App. I’s secret permutation hides the pairings without removing their dependencies. Reusing a key and message preserves signed correlations, potentially exposing pairings through covariance estimation. Balanced random messages cancel these correlations in expectation, but fourth-order dependencies remain: , versus for independent Gaussian coordinates. Neither attack is evaluated. Furthermore, if Spherical Watermark matches all joint moments through order three, it already matches covariance, making Sec. 1’s criticism misleading. These issues undermine a principal motivation and Table 1’s unqualified stealthiness claim. The current encoding does not preserve the joint Gaussian distribution; practical stealthiness requires evaluation against structure-aware detectors.
W2. The robustness claims exceed the evidence, and LAW-M requires a different verification setting. Contrary to the abstract and Sec. 4.2, LAW trails the best latent-domain baseline in all 11 attack columns and ROBIN in nine. LAW-M is strictly best only on Diff (96.74 versus 96.52). The concern is the claimed superiority, not the absence of uniformly state-of-the-art performance. LAW-M stores ordered indices from 8,192 pairs. At , straightforward storage requires 13,312 bits per image—about 38 times a 256-bit key plus 96-bit nonce, which the paper characterizes as substantial overhead for Gaussian Shading. Fig. 8 demonstrates dependence on this metadata, yet the paper does not explain how verifiers retrieve it for unknown images or control false positives when searching candidate records. LAW-M’s robustness and TPR at 1% FPR are therefore conditional on side information and are not directly comparable to blind verification without a common retrieval protocol. Finally, Sec. 4.1’s stated 512-bit payload conflicts with Table 1’s lower-capacity and zero-bit methods, while Table 2 does not clarify whether entries report bit accuracy or detection TPR. These ambiguities prevent a consistent comparison. Small FID differences (43.39, 43.55, and 44.36), without repeated-run variability, likewise do not establish a reliable fidelity advantage.
Questions for authors
Q1. Detection by an informed adversary. Please report image-level AUC and TPR@1%FPR using the extractor or mean to distinguish watermarked from clean images for (a) keyless LAW and (b) keyed LAW (App. I), after estimating the hidden pairing from images sharing a key and message, for several values of . Evaluate detection on held-out images. Near-perfect detection in (a) would undermine the stealthiness claims in Table 1 and Sec. 4.2 under Sec. 3.1’s algorithm-aware threat model.
Q2. LAW-M verification protocol. How does the verifier obtain for a query image? If verification searches stored index sets, please report the search cost, aggregate false-positive rate, and TPR at an aggregate FPR of 1%.
Q3. Interpretation of “0%” accuracy. Are App. G’s “0%” extraction accuracy and Sec. 4.3’s “nearly zero” LAW-M-D accuracy bit accuracies or detection TPRs? For binary messages, 0% bit accuracy implies complete inversion and permits exact recovery by flipping every bit. Please specify the adaptive attack’s coordinate modifications and regeneration procedure, including the prompt.
Q4. Source of LAW-M’s FID improvement. Sec. 4.2 attributes the improvement to , but LAW and LAW-M also differ in magnitude-based sorting. Please report LAW’s FID at to separate these effects.
4 comments
Response to Reviewer 3
For Q1: Regarding (a), we have already evaluated classifier indistinguishability in Section 4.2 (Main Results: Classifier Indistinguishability). Regarding (b), we have addressed the stealthiness concerns in our response to W1.
For Q2: We have addressed this concern in the Metadata Retrieval discussion of our response to W2. Notably, Gaussian Shading also relies on image-specific keys but does not specify how these keys are retrieved during verification. We consider this a database retrieval issue, where the computational cost, retrieval time, and retrieval accuracy depend on the database implementation rather than the watermarking method itself.
For Q3: The reported 0% accuracy refers to detection TPR, rather than bit accuracy. For the adaptive attack, we randomly select half of the encoding pairs and negate both elements in each selected pair, which means that their angles are rotated by 180°, thereby disrupting watermark extraction. To evaluate the worst-case scenario, we assume the attacker has access to the original prompt and uses the same prompt and Stable Diffusion configuration, including the guidance scale, for image regeneration. We will clarify these details in the revised manuscript.
For Q4: We acknowledge that the contributions of magnitude-based sorting and the repetition factor have not been sufficiently disentangled. We will include additional ablation experiments in the revised manuscript to independently evaluate their effects on FID.
We welcome any further questions from the reviewer and would be pleased to provide additional clarifications in further discussion.
Thank you for the clarifications on Q3, the Table 2 metric, the message lengths, and Spherical Watermark. My main concerns remain:
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Detection (W1, Q1). The main LAW has no key and a fixed partition, so under the algorithm-aware threat model of Sec. 3.1 the paper's own extractor can be applied to a single image; the many-images argument applies only to the keyed variant in App. I. Resistance to removal (App. G) is a separate property from indistinguishability, and the requested AUC and TPR@1%FPR are not provided in the response.
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Robustness (W2). In Table 2, LAW is below the best latent-domain baseline in all 11 reported columns, none of which is rotation (34.97 points on Drop, 11.27 on Diff), so "state-of-the-art excluding rotation" does not match the table. LAW is also below Gaussian Shading in 9 of the 11 columns.
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LAW-M verification (W2, Q2). Verification assumes the image identifier is available. For an image of unknown origin, such as a synthetic image of a public figure found online, the identifier must travel as strippable metadata or be embedded as another watermark, so LAW-M's TPR relies on side information that blind methods do not use.
The new FID runs cover only LAW and LAW-M, so the baselines are still single-run; Q4 is deferred to the revision.
I keep my score.
We thank the reviewer for their response. We would like to further clarify the following points.
1. Detection (W1, Q1).
We reiterate that we have already discussed the secret key for LAW and LAW-M in Appendix I, Discussion on Watermark Secret Key, of our original submission. Since introducing a secret key does not affect the core conclusions of this paper, we consider both LAW and LAW-M are equipped with a secret key by default.
Regarding Q1, (a) in practical deployment, a secret key shared across images can be introduced into LAW and LAW-M to randomly permute the encoding and reference regions. Consequently, an attacker cannot directly identify the encoding pairs and determine the presence of a watermark from a single image. (b) The proposed evaluation requires collecting multiple watermarked images sharing the same user, which contradicts our threat model.
In your response, you stated that "the many-images argument applies only to the keyed variant in App. I," which indicates that you have already acknowledged the stealthiness of both LAW and LAW-M when equipped with secret keys. Therefore, we believe that reporting AUC and TPR@1%FPR is unnecessary in this case.
2. Robustness (W2).
In the following two tables, we report the average TPR of each watermarking method across all 11 attacks, as well as the average TPR across the 10 attacks excluding random drop. We emphasize that, despite LAW-M's substantially weaker performance against the Drop attack compared with existing robust baselines, LAW-M still achieves highly competitive overall robustness among all latent-domain watermarking methods. Furthermore, LAW demonstrates superior robustness compared with all existing Gaussianity-preserving methods. Across the 10 attacks excluding random drop, LAW-M achieves state-of-the-art robustness among all latent-domain watermarking methods. We reiterate that, although LAW underperforms Gaussian Shading in 9 out of the 11 attacks, LAW still achieves higher average robustness than Gaussian Shading across all 11 attacks. We believe that the reviewer's expectation that our proposed method should outperform the strongest existing baseline under every individual attack is excessively demanding and overly critical.
Table2: Average Robustness Performance across 11 Attacks
| Method | Average (11 Attacks) |
|---|---|
| Tree-Ring | 63.45 |
| RingID | 97.26 |
| HSTR | 77.53 |
| HSQR | 97.44 |
| ROBIN | 98.47 |
| Gaussian Shading | 92.72 |
| PRC | 61.46 |
| Spherical Watermark | 83.17 |
| LAW | 93.43 |
| LAW-M | 96.11 |
Table3: Average Robustness Performance across 10 Attacks
| Method | Average (10 Attacks) |
|---|---|
| Tree-Ring | 67.40 |
| RingID | 98.11 |
| HSTR | 82.31 |
| HSQR | 98.52 |
| ROBIN | 98.53 |
| Gaussian Shading | 92.79 |
| PRC | 65.95 |
| Spherical Watermark | 85.23 |
| LAW | 96.48 |
| LAW-M | 98.86 |
3. LAW-M Verification (W2, Q2).
In LAW-M, the image identifier can be stored as image metadata for subsequent verification. We also emphasize that the retrieval of per-image information is primarily a database management and metadata robustness issue rather than an issue specific to the watermarking method itself. Similarly, Gaussian Shading also relies on per-image information for watermark decoding, yet its paper does not provide any algorithm for retrieving the corresponding secret keys. Nevertheless, Gaussian Shading was accepted at CVPR 2024.
4. FID Experiments and Q4.
We are currently conducting additional experiments and will include the results in the appendix before the final acceptance decision.
Overall, we would like to reiterate that our claims regarding stealthiness and robustness remain valid, as does the use of per-image information in LAW-M.
Response to Reviewer 3
We thank the reviewer for the helpful suggestions.
For W1:
Regarding watermark removal attacks, in Section 4.2 (Main Results: Classifier Indistinguishability), we empirically demonstrate that watermarked and non-watermarked samples cannot be distinguished by the classifiers, making classifier-based surrogate attacks practically infeasible. Furthermore, in Appendix G (Adaptive Attack), we show that an attacker with full knowledge of the LAW watermarking algorithm cannot successfully remove the watermark without significantly degrading visual fidelity.
Regarding stealthiness, we acknowledge that our method does not preserve the joint Gaussian distribution. However, distributional deviations do not necessarily imply a lack of practical stealthiness. Detecting such higher-order statistical dependencies or distributional deviations may require collecting a substantial number of generated images, which can be challenging in realistic scenarios. We have therefore refined our threat model and narrowed our stealthiness claims to scenarios where attackers cannot collect a large number of watermarked images. Moreover, even with sufficient watermarked images to detect the watermark, an attacker cannot remove it without significantly degrading image quality, as shown in Appendix G. Notably, Spherical Watermark only establishes the preservation of joint moments up to the third order, meaning that higher-order statistical deviations may still be exploited for detection.
Perfectly preserving the joint Gaussian distribution is inherently challenging, as watermarked latents would be statistically indistinguishable from randomly sampled Gaussian latents. Although Gaussian Shading preserves Gaussianity, it essentially stores watermark evidence in image-specific keys, making practical deployment difficult.
Regarding forgery attacks, we acknowledge this limitation of LAW, which is also a broader challenge for latent-domain watermarking. We will discuss this limitation and potential defenses inspired by SEAL in the revised manuscript.
Regarding the covariance properties of Spherical Watermark, we acknowledge the error and will correct the corresponding discussion in the revised manuscript.
For W2:
Regarding robustness, we acknowledge that LAW performs slightly worse than RingID, HSQR, and ROBIN under some of the 12 evaluated attacks, although the performance gaps are small. We will revise our claims of state-of-the-art robustness accordingly. Notably, LAW achieves state-of-the-art robustness among Gaussianity-preserving watermarkings. Moreover, its primary limitation lies in rotation robustness. Excluding rotation attacks, LAW achieves state-of-the-art performance among the evaluated latent-domain watermarkings. Rotation robustness could be further improved by embedding watermarks in symmetric patterns, such as rings.
Regarding storage overhead, we acknowledge that LAW-M requires more per-image storage than Gaussian Shading. However, as stated in the original manuscript, LAW-M is designed "for high-stakes scenarios to protect important single images, such as those of public figures." Such scenarios typically involve relatively few images, whereas Gaussian Shading requires storing an image-specific key for every generated image. Therefore, considering their different application scenarios, we believe our characterization of storage overhead is reasonable.
Regarding metadata retrieval, during embedding, the selected indices (K) can be stored in a server-side database and associated with a unique image identifier. During extraction, these indices can be retrieved using the identifier to reconstruct the original encoding and reference pairs. Thus, assuming the image identifier is available, verification does not require searching through candidate records, avoiding additional false positives caused by such searches. We will clarify this verification setting in the revised manuscript.
Regarding watermark capacity, the 11-bit, 72-bit, and 256-bit capacities in Table 1 correspond to the original configurations of RingID, HSQR, and Gaussian Shading, respectively. For fair comparison, we standardized the watermark length to 512 bits in our main experiments. We will clarify this distinction in the revised manuscript. Table 2 reports detection TPR, which will also be clearly stated in the revised manuscript.
Regarding FID, we agree that repeated-run variability should be reported to establish the reliability of fidelity comparisons. We have therefore additionally evaluated the FID of LAW and LAW-M across three different random seeds in the next table.
Table1: FID results across three random seeds.