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Withdrawn from ICLR 2027

Dynamics in Two-sided Attention Markets: A Non-Convex Optimization View

Withdrawn from ICLR 2027, so left out of the paper lists and the map.

Abstract

How do attention markets — where creators compete for engagement, users choose what to consume, and platforms mediate via recommender systems — behave in the long run? Existing theory addresses each side in isolation, leaving open whether the coupled dynamics of user choice, platform ranking and creator strategy converge to a coherent outcome at all. For a dynamic model of attention markets encompassing heterogeneous creator costs, multinomial logit user choice and a spectrum of ranking schemes, we show that this three-way feedback loop is equivalent to mirror descent or its delayed-gradient variant on a global potential function. This potential decomposes into four interpretable socioeconomic forces: content quality, fairness, production efficiency and diversity, whose balance is directly shaped by the platform's ranking policy. This characterization provides a theoretical foundation for designing healthier creator ecosystems by identifying key policy parameters that govern these trade-offs. Moreover, non-convexity of the potential, intensified by social influence and popularity-based ranking, explains the path-dependent and winner-take-all outcomes observed on real-world platforms.

Primary area:
other topics in machine learning (i.e., none of the above)
Keywords:
two-sided attention markets, mirror descent, non-convex optimization

Reviews

Among:
Shape:
1234this paper, Bottom 2%
Figure 1. Mean review rating of the reviewed papers at ICLR 2027. This paper averages 1.33 over 3 reviews, above 2% of the others.
Reviewer_vSNNOpenReview ↗
Rating
1
Confidence
4
Informativeness
1
Presentation
2
Soundness
1
Read review
Paper summary

This paper develops a dynamic model of two-sided attention markets involving creators, users, and recommender systems, and establishes an equivalence between the market dynamics and mirror descent (or its delayed-gradient variant, PIAG) on a global potential function. The potential is decomposed into four interpretable socioeconomic components. The paper provides global convergence results under convexity and local convergence results for non-convex landscapes, with visualizations from a three-creator simulation.

I would reconsider my score if the authors can provide (a) empirical validation beyond the 3-creator toy simulation—ideally with real data or at least a systematic simulation study with parameter sweeps and baseline comparisons, and (b) a clear discussion of which modeling assumptions are essential to the mirror descent equivalence and which can be relaxed. The theoretical direction has potential, but the current submission lacks the empirical grounding expected at ICLR.

Critical strengths

The core idea—extending the user-platform mirror descent framework of Zhu et al. (2023) by incorporating creator best-response dynamics—identifies a meaningful extension direction. The potential function decomposition into four socioeconomic terms (Equation 10) provides a conceptual framework for reasoning about the interplay between quality, fairness, diversity, and production cost in attention markets.

Critical weaknesses
  1. Absence of meaningful empirical validation: The only "experiments" in the main text are deterministic simulations with three creators and hand-picked parameters. These are more accurately described as numerical visualizations of the authors' own equations rather than scientific validation. There are no comparisons with real platform data, no baseline methods, and no discussion of whether the modeling assumptions are reasonable in practice. Given that the paper repeatedly invokes YouTube, Spotify, and TikTok as motivation, the lack of any contact with actual data—even qualitative analysis on public datasets—is a significant gap. The paper's writing also leans toward emphasizing motivation and high-level narrative over substantive technical exposition, and some core theorem statements are distributed across multiple locations in the text.

  2. Limited incremental contribution and unexamined cost of the PIAG fallback: The core insight—that market dynamics are equivalent to optimization—was already established in the convex setting by Zhu et al. (2023). The extension to non-convexity through creator best-response is a natural step but does not bring a conceptual breakthrough. Table 1 does mark its boundaries carefully: two of the sixteen cells—ER paired with best-responders under α-quality or (α,β)-mixed ranking—are covered only through the PIAG equivalence of Remark 1 rather than by mirror descent itself, and the remark is explicit about the substitution. What the paper never states is what the substitution costs. PIAG carries a weaker guarantee, and it is not said whether the four-term reading of the potential survives the lag correction or whether Theorem 5's local rate carries over to those two cells. The modeling assumptions are also highly simplified (one piece of content per creator, one-dimensional quality, multinomial logit choice, a specific ranking parameterization), with almost no discussion of whether the equivalence survives their relaxation. Additionally, the AI Use Statement indicates that tools were used to assist with derivations and proofs; greater clarity on which results were derived without such assistance, and how the assisted steps were verified, would be helpful.

Questions for authors
  1. If the assumptions of "one piece of content per creator" or "one-dimensional quality" are relaxed, does the mirror descent equivalence still hold? If not, how broadly applicable is this framework?

  2. For the two cells covered through Remark 1 rather than Theorem 3, does the four-term decomposition of the potential in Equation (10) retain its interpretation under the lag correction, and does Theorem 5 apply to them as stated?

  3. Have you considered calibrating model parameters using actual user behavior data from a public dataset, and testing whether the model reproduces the observed concentration pattern?

Reviewer_9mFuOpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
3
Informativeness
1
Presentation
2
Soundness
2
Read review
Paper summary

The paper studies long-run dynamics in an attention market where users generate popularity, platforms update visibility, and creators adapt content quality. It shows that these coupled updates can be represented as mirror descent or a delayed Bregman/PIAG method, with convergence guarantees under convexity and suitable local conditions.

Critical strengths
  • The framework unifies multiple user-response models, creator-quality settings, and ranking policies.
  • The theoretical analysis is technically nontrivial, especially the delayed Bregman analysis for mixed-ranking ER.
Critical weaknesses
  1. The discussion of recent work could be strengthened, particularly through comparisons with:
  • [1] Madmon, Omer, et al. "On the convergence of no-regret dynamics in information retrieval games with proportional ranking functions." International Conference on Learning Representations. 2025.

  • [2] Wei, Xiukun, et al. "Market Games for Generative Models: Equilibria, Welfare, and Strategic Entry." International Conference on Learning Representations. 2026.

  • [3] Yao, Fan, et al. "Unveiling user satisfaction and creator productivity trade-offs in recommendation platforms." Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems. 2024.

  • [4] Lin, Tao, et al. "User-creator feature polarization in recommender systems with dual influence." Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems. 2024.

The comparison with Kiyohara et al. [5] is also unconvincing. The paper argues that [5] relies on “aggregated update rules rather than utility-grounded behavior.” However, is the current paper fundamentally different? It also uses a prescribed user response and an aggregate power-law ranking rule. Only creators explicitly maximize utility. In what sense is this model more “utility-grounded” than prior aggregate dynamic models?

  1. The paper asks where the “self-interested actions of creators, users, and platforms” collectively converge. However, only creators are explicitly modeled as self-interested agents. Users follow a stochastic response rule, while the platform follows a fixed ranking formula. Thus, 2SAME is a fixed point of the update rules, rather than a three-player strategic equilibrium.

  2. The timing assumption is crucial but weakly justified. The platform sets vt+1v^{t+1} using the old quality qtq^t, after which creators observe the resulting visibility and choose qt+1q^{t+1}. This makes the creator response separable. If current quality affected current ranking, creators would also influence their own exposure, and the potential-function structure might no longer hold. What real platform setting does this timing represent? What happens under the alternative setting in which creators first produce new content, and the platform then estimates its quality and assigns visibility?

  3. The paper provides a representation, but offers few surprising or actionable insights. What concrete lessons does the model provide? For example, how should it guide ranking design? How should the platform choose α\alpha, β\beta, or μ\mu to manage the relevant trade-offs? There are also deeper questions. For mixed-ranking ER, the state includes (st,st−1)(s^t,s^{t-1}), so faster convergence may not be explained only by a larger step size. Similarly, what does non-convexity reveal beyond making the convergence analysis harder?

  4. The empirical evaluation is limited to synthetic simulations

Questions for authors

Please refer to the questions in the Weaknesses

Reviewer_BWnmOpenReview ↗
Rating
1
Confidence
2
Informativeness
1
Presentation
1
Soundness
2
Read review
Paper summary

The authors are interested in understanding how the dynamics of recommender systems play out. They introduce a stylized version of the problem, characterizing creator behavior in terms of best-response strategies that respond to the amount of user engagement provided by the recommender system, and show playing this game is equivalent to mirror descent on an objective function that can be decomposed and analyzed in terms of various components that trade off.

Critical strengths
  • The authors discuss an important topic: characterizing the dynamics of recommender systems that dynamically serve content to large user bases
  • In the stylized setting they work with, they appear to establish an equivalency of the user/creators dynamics to mirror descent.
Critical weaknesses

As the author describe, the key contribution is showing that there is more to meets the eye when it comes to the type of recommender dynamics described in Figure [L044]. However I remain skeptical of the practical relevance of this setup. The formalism seems quite simplistic. It doesn't examine an actually-existing recommender system, but rather models the recommender as a vector of item rankings for each creator. Similarly, content providers are assumed to exist as scalars in [0, 1] differentiated by "quality" without discussing what content they post, or how it interacts with user interests.

While the setting is overly simplistic, the theoretical results are very dense and not especially human-readable. The paper is quite dense and hard to follow, and I found myeslf unclear as to the payoff for demonstrating the mirror descent equivalence. Game theoretic appraoches to characterizing learning/recommender systems are certainly at home in a conference like ICLR, but I would expect to see more empirical work and a convincing argument that the theoretical results cover reasonably realistic use cases. Absent that type of evidence, I would suggest trying for a different venue (maybe Economics and Computation?).

Overall I feel the submission as-is is well under the quality needed for publication.

Questions for authors

The end of the abstract implies the theoretical results help explain outcomes observed in real systems. Can you elaborate?

From OpenReview, CC BY 4.0. Authors as signed there; shown unedited.

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