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Paper summary
The paper studies how LLM-based search platforms shape competition among content publishers. It develops a game-theoretic model of publishers adapting content to gain citation exposure, analyzes the resulting dynamics under different attribution mechanisms, and uses simulations to examine stability and welfare.
Critical strengths
1 The model captures an interesting feedback loop: publishers’ content changes influence the generated response against which their exposure is evaluated. This offers a useful conceptual extension of competition in traditional search. 2 The paper examines both stability and welfare, showing that convergence need not imply better outcomes. This distinction provides useful insight into the trade-offs involved in attribution mechanism design.
Critical weaknesses
1 The practical relevance of the model is insufficiently established. The centroid-based generation function, attribution-based utility, and feedback needed for better-response learning lack adequate justification. Since the simulations retain these assumptions, they do not establish whether the findings extend beyond the proposed abstraction. 2 The interpretation and scope of the results require clarification. Convergence is a central objective, yet its practical value remains unclear when nonconvergent mechanisms can yield higher welfare. Publisher welfare also reduces to minimizing content drift, limiting its economic interpretation. Additionally, Theorem 2 needs clearer quantification: the case admits an exact potential function. These issues weaken the resulting mechanism-design conclusions.
Questions for authors
1 Model validation: What evidence supports the centroid-based generation function as an approximation of LLM-based search? Which main conclusions are expected to hold beyond this particular function? 2 Behavioral assumptions: Which publishers plausibly maximize attribution scores, and what feedback enables them to identify utility-improving content modifications? 3 Theorem clarification: Does Theorem 2 assert that every induced game is non-potential, or that softmax does not guarantee a potential game? How does the statement accommodate , where attribution scores are constant and an exact potential exists? 4 Practical significance: What costs of persistent content modification are omitted from the welfare measures, and why should convergence matter for mechanism selection when nonconvergent mechanisms can achieve higher welfare? 5 Welfare interpretation: Since total publisher welfare equals one minus aggregate content-drift costs, which findings provide insight beyond reduced content drift, and how should they inform claims about publisher welfare?
Summary of the Rebuttal and Discussion
Dear reviewers and area chair,
We thank the reviewers for their feedback. As the rebuttal period draws to a close, we summarize the main concerns raised by the reviewers and our responses.
Contribution and relation to prior work. We present a novel model for the emerging GenAI-based search ecosystem in which publishers compete for attribution-based exposure. Unlike prior models, ours includes a novel generation function which combines retrieved documents with the platform’s own knowledge (e.g., knowledge encoded in an LLM’s weights). Publishers’ actions (modifications) can therefore change the response against which their attribution score is determined. This feedback distinguishes our setting from fixed-query models of traditional search (e.g., Madmon et al., 2025). By studying the interplay between generation and attribution, we show that stability guarantees from these models need not carry over to GenAI-based search ecosystems. Under our model, we study the impact of content selection mechanisms on the ecosystem’s stability. Moreover, we analyze the effect of GenAI mechanisms on the users’ and publishers’ welfare and reveal new Phenomena.
Modeling assumptions. In GenAI-based search, platforms often ground their answers with attributed sources (e.g., in the form of citations). These attributions allow for a new visibility source for content creators. Thus, following a wide range of prior work on generative engine optimization (GEO; Aggarwal et al., 2024), we assume that the exposure of publishers is through attributions.
Additionally, we claim that the better-response behavioral model is, in fact, a relatively weak behavioral assumption on how publishers adapt over time. To see why, notice that, compared to, e.g., no-regret or best-response adaptations, better-response captures a very wide range of possible adaptation techniques: for the given utility model of our work, we only require that the adaptation introduces some myopic improvement (among many possible ones in the typical scenario)! We do not assume optimal response as in best-response or long-term minimization of cumulative regret. This behavioral model supports many different possible trajectories, under all of which stability is guaranteed. In particular, studying this general framework allows us to abstract away the fact that interactions are made in complex modalities (typically natural language) and study the interactions in the embedding space directly.
Simulation robustness. We conduct code-based empirical simulations for content optimization competitions, as suggested by prior work (Yao et al., 2023; Madmon et al., 2025). To check the validity of our empirical simulations, we sampled 100 additional directions at each final state. We found improvements above the tolerance in only 0.004% of the cases, each of which stopped after one additional move. The welfare measures were statistically indistinguishable from those at the original final states.
If the paper is accepted, we will highlight these points in the camera-ready version. Thank you for considering these clarifications.
References:
Madmon et al. The search for stability: Learning dynamics of strategic publishers with initial documents. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 2025.
Aggarwal et al. Geo: Generative engine optimization. KDD, 2024.
Yao et al. Rethinking incentives in recommender systems: Are monotone rewards always beneficial?. NeurIPS, 2023.