acceptodds
Under review as a conference paper at ICLR 2027

Choice Overlap and Reputation Feedback in Creator-Brand Matching

Abstract

Content platforms create reputation feedback when past bookings improve creators' rankings for future paid promotions. We study how the alternatives available to different brands shape the stability of this feedback and creators' access to bookings. At any positive fixed point, a normalized choice-overlap matrix determines the local stability threshold of the mean booking dynamics. Markets with identical creator positions and effective choice can lie on opposite sides of this threshold. A separate reinforcement threshold governs attraction toward monopoly allocations, allowing stable interior and monopoly states to coexist. We derive a sharp constraint linking effective choice to admissible reinforcement, so choice expansion and reputation weighting must be evaluated jointly. Finite-sample spectral bounds support policy selection under explicit calibration assumptions. Uniform exploration removes boundary equilibria and provides a finite-window access bound, although small exploration shares can still sustain concentrated interior states. Controlled simulations test the stability thresholds, spectral bounds, and event-level access. Among booked creators, offline estimates associate a one-standard-deviation increase in booking evenness with a 7.13% higher audience-tier advancement probability relative to the sample mean; a reported 60-day online comparison shows a 3.4% increase in gross promotion transaction value (GMV). The framework distinguishes creator variety, brand-facing choice, and sustained access as separate design objectives.

Primary area:
learning theory
Keywords:
Creator Economy, Two-Sided Matching, Recommendation Systems, Market Design

Reviews

Among:
Shape:
1234this paper, Bottom 10%
Figure 1. Mean review rating of the reviewed papers at ICLR 2027. This paper averages 1.67 over 3 reviews, above 10% of the others.
Reviewer_1eeeOpenReview ↗
Rating
1
Confidence
2
Informativeness
1
Presentation
1
Soundness
1
Read review
Paper summary

The paper studies reputation feedback in creator–brand matching platforms, where creators receiving more bookings become more likely to receive future bookings. Matching is modeled using a multinomial-logit choice rule with reputation-driven reinforcement. The paper characterizes the local stability of the resulting mean dynamics.

Critical strengths

Reputation-driven reinforcement of monopolies, and interventions that mitigate them, seems to be an important concern in creator-brand markets. So the topic has economic value.

Critical weaknesses
  1. The paper is completely impenetrable due to AI-editing that has resulted in extreme conciseness. Here is an example excerpt: "A certificate for a single pre-treatment policy cannot justify changing its retrieval rule or clipping α\alpha to an uncertified value. Use either a uniform certificate over the contemplated parameter range or simultaneous certificates for a prespecified finite family. The worst-case U=1 is valid without calibration. An adjustment to ε\varepsilon changes both β\beta and the choice matrix, so an exploration-temperature adjustment also requires recertification."

The paper in its current form is unfit for human reading. Since AI reading is disallowed for reviewing, I am unable to fully comprehend and evaluate the contribution of this paper.

  1. In addition to the writing concerns, I think that this paper is not a good fit to the conference and it belongs to a more economics-oriented venue. There is nothing in the contribution particularly relating to AI/ML and their applications.
Questions for authors

Could you explain your rationale for the fit to this conference?

Reviewer_cMXwOpenReview ↗
Rating
3
Confidence
3
Informativeness
2
Presentation
2
Soundness
2
Read review
Paper summary

This paper studies reputation feedback in creator–brand allocation, with reputation updated through depreciation and new bookings. It separates creator coverage, effective choice, and overlap-sensitive stability. The analysis characterizes local stability, boundary attraction, spectral certification, and exploration-based access guarantees, supported by controlled simulations and platform diagnostics.

Critical strengths
  1. Insightful conceptual distinction. The construction of markets with identical coverage and effective choice but different local stability of the mean dynamics demonstrates why diversity measures alone are insufficient.

  2. Coherent theoretical framework. The paper carefully separates local stability, monopoly attraction, and persistent access. The overlap-based threshold and choice–reinforcement constraint provide useful design insights within the stated assumptions.

  3. Well-aligned controlled validation. Simulations test the theoretical predictions and expose their limitations. The paper explicitly demonstrates that local stability does not guarantee sustained access.

Critical weaknesses
  1. Real-world estimation remains unvalidated. The available booking logs lack candidate slates and cannot identify the overlap matrix. While the paper validates fitted-score workflows in synthetic settings, obtaining informative data-driven certificates beyond the universal conservative cap requires calibrated choice probabilities, policy-specific fixed-point shares, and control of model and fixed-point error. These requirements remain unvalidated on platform data. The observational advancement results provide context but do not test the overlap-based mechanism.

  2. Incomplete online evidence. The reported 60-day comparison lacks documented assignment, treatment implementation, and uncertainty estimates. The paper explicitly acknowledges these omissions; nevertheless, the reported 3.4% GMV increase cannot establish treatment effectiveness or validate the proposed policy mechanism. The online results therefore add limited evidential support beyond descriptive context.

  3. Robustness beyond the specified model remains unclear. The controlled simulations examine several parameter regimes, but sensitivity to alternative reputation-dependent choice rules, changing retrieval and eligibility, and endogenous creator behavior remains insufficiently explored. In particular, the access guarantee assumes a fixed, always-eligible pool, while the main choice-expansion simulations vary probabilities within that pool. These scope restrictions limit the direct applicability of the policy recommendations to dynamic platform settings.

Questions for authors

See the weakness

Reviewer_BQynOpenReview ↗
Rating
1
Confidence
2
Informativeness
1
Presentation
1
Soundness
1
Read review
Paper summary

This paper tackles the problem of how choice overlapping and reputation feedback will influence the stability of paid promotion on brand matching, a common problem in recommender systems. The authors formulates the creator-brand matching as a feedback-driven allocation problem in the argument that the past bookings and the brand promotion needs together shape the future opportunity. The paper introduces a set of techniques, such as overlapping-sensitivity threshold, boundary classification, reinforcement of sharp-choice, finite-sample policy bound.

Critical strengths

This paper tackles the problem of how choice overlapping and reputation feedback will influence the stability of paid promotion on brand matching, a common problem in recommender systems.

The authors formulates the creator-brand matching as a feedback-driven allocation problem in the argument that the past bookings and the brand promotion needs together shape the future opportunity.

The paper introduces a set of techniques, such as overlapping-sensitivity threshold, boundary classification, reinforcement of sharp-choice, finite-sample policy bound.

Critical weaknesses

(-) The paper is poorly written and hard to read. The problem statement is vague and it is unclear and unconvincing what the problems the paper aims to address and why the proposed set of concepts/techniques can work together and what problems they together solve.

(-) The experiments are limited with no comparison to existing work on feedback-driven allocation problem.

(-) Why the experiments choose to measure the given four policies compared to the baseline.

(-) From Table 1, Choice expansion and Based line are identical. So what is your baseline here.

(-) How reputation is computed and used in the proposed approach?

(-) What types of the feedback-driven allocation problems are you tackling?

Questions for authors

Would appreciate your answers to the weakness points raised.

From OpenReview, CC BY 4.0. Authors as signed there; shown unedited.

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