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Paper summary
This paper presents -Steg, a diffusion‑based generative image steganography framework that unifies covert secret‑image communication and copyright watermarking within one end‑to‑end generative pipeline. A Theoretical Dual-Functional Unified Framework seamlessly unifies covert steganographic communication and robust copyright watermarking within a single learning paradigm, Error-bounded Semantic Steganography guarantees controllable semantic distortion and bounded extraction error for hidden messages under common perturbations, and Dual-key Decoupling separates the communication secret key and copyright verification key to support independent access control for message decoding and ownership authentication. Extensive validations are conducted across standard steganography and watermarking benchmarks under diverse realistic distortions including compression, noise addition and geometric transformations, where -Steg achieves competitive visual fidelity, high hidden-bit extraction accuracy and reliable copyright verification performance.
Critical strengths
- The Theoretical Dual-Functional Unified Framework together with Error-bounded Semantic Steganography and Dual-key Decoupling realizes joint covert communication and copyright authentication within a single diffusion pipeline, supporting deniable access via separated keys while bounding semantic distortion and extraction error. This is consequential because prior generative hiding systems mostly optimize steganography or watermarking in isolation, and this integrated security formulation fills a clear gap by enabling fine-grained, secure payload control that cannot be trivially obtained from existing decoupled designs.
- The validation spans diverse realistic distortions, standard benchmarks and targeted ablation studies. This is consequential because the empirical evidence systematically verifies not only the baseline performance advantage but also the core security property of dual-key separation, which builds credible support for the practical feasibility of the proposed dual-functional paradigm.
Critical weaknesses
- The deniability claim is confusing under standard cryptographic definitions in the paper. The proposed deniability comes from separated mask regions, where the fake key only accesses the watermark payload. This differs from canonical deniable primitives, where multiple plausible plaintexts can be decoded from the same stego object and the adversary cannot identify the true one. The threat model for coercion needs clarification. Besides, the cryptographic nature of the true key and fake key remains underspecified. It is unclear whether they form a public-private pair, independent secret seeds for mask generation or derived from a master key. The key generation algorithm, key space and whether one key can be derived from the other are not clarified.
- The error bound in Error-bounded Semantic Steganography is hard to interpret. The definition of semantic distortion and the metrics used to quantify semantic error are not well established. It remains unclear whether the theoretical bound accounts for inherent inversion error of diffusion models, and the empirical validation relies heavily on pixel-level metrics rather than semantic evaluation. Moreover, the security implication of non-overlapping masks is insufficiently analyzed. Partitioning the initial Gaussian noise into two fixed regions may introduce statistical artifacts that can be exploited by steganalyzers. This paper does not discuss steganographic security against detection, nor the failure mode when mask overlap occurs.
Questions for authors
- The authors describes the mapping that converts discrete semantic tokens into standard Gaussian noise in Section 3.3. Equation (14) characterizes the token recovery error probability after majority voting over R independent copies of semantic payloads. This work assumes identically and independently distributed errors across individual copies when deriving the binomial error expression and it remains unclear how the boundary terms and enter the computation of the single-copy base error . The redundancy introduced by these repeated copies may degrade the steganographic indistinguishability bound from Lemma 1 and weaken the hiding security.
- The proposed dual-key decoupling adopts true key and fake key to generate non-overlapping masks for payload partition. The two keys do not constitute a standard public-private key pair in asymmetric cryptography while both keys are kept secret, which deviates from the typical single-secret-key setting of symmetric cryptography. The formal cryptographic classification of this dual-key mechanism and the independence assumption between the true key and fake key in the security model remain unclear.
- This paper claims deniability property enabled by dual-key access separation. The realization differs from canonical deniable encryption, where multiple plausible plaintexts are decodable under the same key. The mask-based deniability needs to be distinguished from the deniability definition widely adopted in cryptography and the coercion threat model adopted for this formulation lacks explicit definition.
4 comments
Official Comment by Reviewer
Thanks for authors' response. I think the rigorous responses have not alleviated my concern about the watermark keys, especially for the failure modes in this paper. Therefore, I decide to maintain my rating score.
Dear Reviewer RUTn,
Thank you again for your insightful feedback on our submission and your careful re-evaluation. To better clarify the concerns regarding watermark keys and corresponding failure modes, could you kindly elaborate on the specific points that remain unclear or unsatisfactory?
We have tried our best to respond to your comments in the rebuttal document. Should you have any further questions or additional concerns, we are more than happy to provide further clarification. If additional experiments are needed, please note that they will require extra time to complete. We are willing to carry out such experiments if you believe they can help resolve your concerns.
We hope to clear up any potential misunderstandings and fully address your remaining doubts.
Thank you once again for your time and thoughtful consideration. We look forward to your response.
Sincerely,
Authors of Paper #13014
Response to the Comment on Watermark Key Failure Modes
The continued feedback from the reviewer is sincerely acknowledged and hope our response addresses your points.
The remaining concern regarding watermark key related failure modes is fully respected. To make the security boundaries transparent, all relevant failure modes analyzed in this work, their impact scopes, and the concrete revision plan are systematically summarized below.
First, it is clarified that all watermark key related failure scenarios have been quantitatively evaluated. None of them is found to lead to catastrophic or abrupt security breakdown. The security degradation is always bounded and gradual.
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Imperfect diffusion inversion
Security degradation is smooth and bounded with no abrupt failure. Even with relative inversion error, deniability remains valid, with KS test p value and steganalysis accuracy . The error upper bound is formally characterized by the TV distance in Theorem 1 rather than being treated as an unquantified risk. -
Cryptographic implementation flaws
Mask generation is built on standardized SHA256 and cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator primitives instead of custom cryptographic designs. Mask uniformity has been validated across three independent standard library implementations, and no detectable statistical bias is observed. Routine implementation imperfections will not break security. Only full disclosure of the key can compromise confidentiality, which is a fundamental property of all symmetric key systems rather than a design flaw of this work. -
Accidental mask overlap
Under the standard algorithmic procedure, the two masks are generated from strictly disjoint candidate pools, so overlap cannot occur in normal deployment. For the extreme case of artificially forced overlap, the failure is strictly local. Only tokens at overlapping positions are corrupted, and performance degradation scales linearly with the overlap ratio. No global secret leakage or complete deniability breakdown occurs. -
Partition detection under public scheme
When the dual key design is known to the adversary and spatial nonstationarity across partitions is tested, all statistical tests, including KS, mean, and variance tests, fail to distinguish the two subspaces. Binary detection accuracy is close to random guess. This attack vector does not constitute an effective threat to deniability. -
Watermark key leakage
The two keys are independently sampled and cannot be derived from each other under the SHA256 preimage resistance assumption. Leakage of the watermark key reveals no information about the secret key and causes no compromise of steganographic secrecy. This is the core security guarantee of the dual key decoupling design.
It is acknowledged that the original manuscript did not organize these analyses into a dedicated failure mode section, which may have created the perception that some edge cases were untested. This is a presentation gap rather than a methodological deficiency.
The comment is highly valued. It is hoped that this systematic clarification and the supplementary content in the final revision will further alleviate the reviewer’s concern and improve the rigor of the work.
Payload-Level Key-Scope Deniability with Disjoint Dual-Key Masks, Formal Security Model, Semantic Fidelity, and i.i.d. Error Bounds
We appreciate your feedback and hope our response addresses your points.
W1 Deniability Canonical deniable encryption concerns one ciphertext with multiple explanations. Here payload-level deniability is claimed: the stego image carries secret and watermark on disjoint coordinates. With the watermark key, a verifiable watermark is obtained while the secret remains undetectable. Multiple-secret decodability is not claimed, only inaccessibility under a given key.
Key System. Keys ks,kw are independent 256-bit seeds, not a key pair, not derived from a master key. Key generation is k←{0,1}256. MaskGen(k,n,Ωpool) uses SHA−256(k) as cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator seed and outputs an ordered duplicate-free coordinate set by rejection sampling. Key space is 2256, and preimage resistance gives cost ≥2256 to derive ks from kw. Disjoint pools Ωsec,Ωwm make masks statistically independent given one key.
W2 Semantic Fidelity. Ours improves all metrics over CRoSS and DiffStega on UniStega.
The odd-even split only pre-partitions pools, and positions are cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator sampled within each pool. No significant deviation from pure Gaussian is detected.
Semantic distortion is token-sequence Hamming distance, and each VQGAN entry is an independent local primitive. Inversion error is included in Eq. (9): dTV(P^,Q)≤Nhδtoken+εinv. Overall error thus covers prior deviation and inversion error, with no omission.
Failure modes Pre-partitioned pools guarantee disjoint mask spaces. Malicious overlap causes only local token errors, without global leakage.
Q1 i.i.d. assumption. i.i.d. holds by construction: Us,r∼Uniform(s/K,(s+1)/K),zs,r=Φ−1(Us,r). The channel is memoryless, so per-copy errors are i.i.d.
The boundary terms. Eq. (13) includes both boundary terms: Pe(s)=∫Isϕ(z)[Q(σbs+−z)+Q(σz−bs−)]dz, with bs−=Φ−1(s/K),bs+=Φ−1((s+1)/K), which are Gaussian tail probabilities.
Redundancy vs indistinguishability. Uniform prior gives δtoken=0 and zero TV independent of R. Non-uniform prior gives conservative Nhδtoken, but Pinsker gives dTV(P⊗Nh,Q⊗Nh)≤21NhKL(Pz∥Qz)=O(Nhδtoken), so distinguishability grows as Nh, not Nh. Gains saturate at R=5. Detection in Table 5 is near random (SRNet 50.62%, XuNet 50.96%, YeNet 51.07%).
Q2 Cryptographic classification. The scheme is a symmetric multi-key scheme with disjoint key domains, described by (K,Ω,Partition,MaskGen), with K={0,1}256 and Ωsec∪Ωwm=Ω. Deniability arises from disjoint domains, not multi-plaintext decodability.
Independence. Keys satisfy I(ks;kw)=0, and conditional independence holds: Pr[Mwm=M∣ks]=(n∣Ωwm∣)−1, so H(Mwm∣ks)=H(Mwm).
The security model. In ExpA,Πdeny(λ), xst is given, at most one key query is allowed, and a guess b′ is output. Payload-level deniability holds if Pr[ExpA,Πdeny(λ)=1]≤21+negl(λ). This parallels IND-CPA, with ciphertext replaced by stego image and plaintext by payload existence.
Q3 Key-Scope Deniability vs Canonical. Canonical deniable encryption requires random coins with Enc(m0;r0)=Enc(m1;r1)=c, so one ciphertext opens to multiple messages. Here multi-plaintext decodability is not claimed. Under single-key disclosure, the secret is inaccessible and the watermark is genuine. In Exp^{ks\text{-}deny}_{\mathcal{A},\Pi}(\lambda)$, (ks,kw) are sampled, the scheme and partition are published, b←{0,1} is sampled, both payloads are embedded if b=0 and only the watermark if b=1, xst is given to A, at most one key query with disclosure {kw} is allowed, and b′ is output with advantage Adv=∣Pr[b′=b]−21∣. Key-scope deniability holds if Adv≤negl(λ), and it fails if both keys are coerced. Deniability is access-control-based, not equivocation-based, which is weaker than canonical deniable encryption but matches copyright coercion.