- Rating
- 1
- Confidence
- 4
- Informativeness
- 1
- Presentation
- 1
- Soundness
- 1
Read review
Paper summary
The paper proposes to train a model to be robust even when one of its modality is masked. It is tested on nuScene and CARLA to demonstrate the performance of AV when using this newly trained model.
Critical strengths
The idea of training a model to be robust even when one of its modality is masked is not novel, but interesting. Especially, the authors wanted to look at the effect of masking on the overall system, i.e., does it affect safety.
Critical weaknesses
The paper is VERY hard to read and follow. A complete rewrite is warranted.
Related work: explain differences with • Chen, Liu, and Pei, “Cross-Modal Matching CNN for Autonomous Driving Sensor Data Monitoring,” ICCV Workshops 2021. This work explicitly assumes that overlapping camera and LiDAR observations should be consistent under normal operation and detects anomalies, including sensor mis-synchronization, by matching the two modalities. It also evaluates sensor fault detection and point-cloud quality assessment on KITTI. • Cao, Liu, and Li, “Leveraging Cross-Modal Consistency for Sensor Fault Detection in Autonomous Driving,” IEEE IV 2026. This paper explicitly models cross-modal consistency among cameras and LiDAR, trains modality-specific VAEs on fault-free data, and uses deviations in the joint latent space to detect and classify sensor faults.
Use of AI: - The long sentence " This is a design correspondence, not a theorem. Note where the shift enters: the masked pass sees [MASK] in place of modality k plus the uncompromised sensors, exactly its training input, so it is not shifted at deployment; the reference pass producing the target does see the corrupted tokens, which is why a score trained only on normal data can flag attacked frames at all." seems to be 100% from AI. "[MASK]" has never been specified. - Clearly the analysis (see page 7) is all written by AI. - If you are honest with yourself, you cannot understand what is written by AI. You have a responsibility to write for other humans to understand. I appreciate your "AI Use statement" but read the paper please.
Need serious improvement in writing • I would up Figure 1 as this is core of the paper. I would also improve the writing by changing the structure and ordering of the paper. Until page 5, the reader has no idea what is happening. This reads as complicated sentences for no good reason. • What does "0.9.15 episodes" mean? • "Nine methods across five paradigms" the reader doesn't even know what methods is referred to here. The writing is very clunky and not intuitive. • Attacks aren't described beside the threat model give in Section 3, which states the level of access the attacker has. We need a proper Attacker model section with the detail on what exactly is modified by the attacker. Section 4.1 has the FPR@95%TPR and AUROC per attack, but we don't know what are the attacks. Later we see "physics-grounded" and "weakly cross-modal" but never described! • You shouldn't have content in Appendix that are "the most important". For example, Section 4.3, you mentioned about Table 4 that is in Appendix B.
Random comments:
- "Problem formulation" is not a contribution
- Line 138 what is DVS? Later in Figure 1, we see that this is linked to event camera, but at no point do you explain it. You need to assume folks aren't familiar with the domain.
- From Proposition 1, I don't understand what you are trying to do here. Are you training a model to get it to predict what the "removed modality" would see, or the error it would have? How do you do that? How much information about the modality do you need? Honestly I would remove Section 3.1.
- Section 4.6, what are the safety impact e.g., collision rate?
Questions for authors
I do not have questions that answers would materially affect my assessment. Just need a full rewrite.
5 comments
Thank you for providing additional details. I still believe that the Section 3.1, paragraph "Threat model" does not detail the attacks. If this is an attack paper, you must describe it fully. See how this is done in security conferences if needed. Re related work, could you demonstrate how the related work wouldn't be effective against the attacks?
Both points are already addressed in the revised PDF.
Attacks. The revision added Table R1 to Section 4.1 (main text), which states what each attack modifies. Table 26 gives exact parameters and real-world references. Section 3.1 now also states the attacker's goal and lists every attack:
- GPS spoofing, drift and constant offset (up to ≈111 m);
- 500 phantom LiDAR points;
- RGB and DVS noise;
- depth rescaling;
- RGB+LiDAR denial of service;
- replay of clean recordings;
- a white-box GPS attacker (App. D.5).
The access model is in Definition 2 and the threat-model paragraph: the attacker can replace one sensor's output arbitrarily. SensorAD is a defense, and these attacks are its evaluation.
Related work. The revision already distinguishes both works in Section 2. Both monitor camera–LiDAR consistency only, for benign faults. Four of our eight attacks (GPS spoofing, drift, static offset and DVS noise) alter sensors those methods do not observe, so they cannot detect them by construction. Restricting SensorAD itself to camera and LiDAR lowers its overall AUROC across all attacks from 0.737 to 0.644 (Table 23). Our coordinated, spatially aligned and white-box attackers (Sec. 4.4, Table 7) target exactly the cross-sensor consistency such methods depend on.
Response to Reviewer 4Wbo
We thank the reviewer for their time. The review's summary describes a different method, so we first restate what SensorAD does and then answer each point. Line numbers refer to the submitted version; since the current PDF is the revision, we also give its locations.
What SensorAD is. SensorAD is not trained to be robust to a missing modality. It is an attack detector: each modality is masked so it can be predicted from the others, and the prediction error is the anomaly score (Eq. 2). This is stated in the abstract (l. 016–019) and on page 2 (l. 063–066).
Each point, and what the revision now does:
Proposition 1: what is predicted, and how much information is needed. The model predicts the hidden modality's features from the other sensors; the error is the score. At test time nothing from the hidden modality is used: one learned [MASK] token replaces it. Proposition 1 states what is needed instead: an attack is separable in expectation once its feature-space perturbation exceeds 2√ε_normal, where ε_normal is the remaining sensors' prediction error on normal data. Better cross-modal prediction therefore lowers the size of detectable attacks.
The quoted sentence (l. 179–182), in plain terms: with one sensor hidden, the model sees the same kind of input as in training, so its prediction stays reliable during an attack; the attacked sensor's data is used only as the comparison target, so an attack appears as a large gap.
Attacker model. Section 3.1 gives the attacker's access (Definition 2, l. 140–142; "Threat model", l. 147–151), and Table 26 gives exactly what each attack modifies; Table R1 now summarizes it in the main text.
Safety impact. Section 4.6 and Table 19 quantify each attack's damage (e.g., 18.3 m ego-pose error under GPS spoofing; −8.7 3D mAP under LiDAR tampering). Collision rate depends on the planner and controller, outside the scope of a sensor-level detector.
Related work. Like SensorAD, Chen et al. (2021) and Cao et al. (IV 2026) use cross-modal consistency to detect sensor faults on KITTI. Neither addresses adversarial attacks, GPS/IMU ego-motion consistency, leave-one-modality-out prediction, or label-free sensor attribution. Both are now cited and distinguished in Section 2.
On authorship. Our AI Use Statement discloses LLM assistance for copy-editing and for coding support; LLMs were not used to generate the idea, design the method or protocol, or produce or analyse results. Remarks about the authors' honesty and competence are not an assessment of the work.
We have raised our remaining concerns with the AC.