- Rating
- 1
- Confidence
- 3
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 2
- Soundness
- 1
Read review
Paper summary
This paper aims to repair corrupted observations without changing the deployed driving policy. It identifies the attacked vehicle through comparisons across vehicles, then selects a small number of observation blocks and reconstructs them from other vehicles’ observation histories.
Critical strengths
The paper addresses a practical deployment problem without retraining the driving policy, and its closed loop experiments show a substantial reduction in collision rate under the tested attack.
Critical weaknesses
-
The AI generated figures appear insufficiently reviewed, with visible layout errors and a ranking formula in Fig. 2 that conflicts with Eq. 7.
-
The defense may not activate against background vehicle attacks permitted by its own threat model, and its effectiveness against adaptive attackers remains untested.
Questions for authors
-
I do not object to using AI tools to create figures, but the authors appear to have made no effort to review or revise the AI-generated images. The third panel of Fig. 2 has careless layout, with text extending beyond its boxes, overlapping components, and even garbled symbols. There are also unexplained gray dashed lines in the second panel of Fig. 1. More importantly, the ranking formula in the second panel of Fig. 2 is inconsistent with Eq. 7. In my view, figures of this quality do not meet the presentation standard expected of an ICLR submission.
-
Section 3 explicitly allows the attacker to modify only background-vehicle observation blocks, while Section 4.1 acknowledges that such modifications may leave the protected ego-anchor residuals unchanged. If the localizer abstains, no recovery query is issued. An attacker could therefore target background vehicles relevant to the driving decision while bypassing the entry point to the defense. The paper does not evaluate this attack, even though it falls within its stated threat model.
-
The experiments do not adequately test a white-box attacker targeting the defense itself. An attacker who knows the defense could avoid its anchor checks or keep important blocks out of the top recovery targets. The experiments therefore do not show whether MELAR can withstand an adaptive attack.
-
limits only the number of blocks selected for recovery at each step. The system makes a decision every 0.05 seconds and uses cross-view evidence delayed by 0.25 seconds, but the paper reports no runtime, missed deadlines, or time from attack onset to recovery.
-
The paper mainly reports final collision rates. It does not clearly report how often the detector locks onto the wrong vehicle without an attack, its localization accuracy and delay after an attack, what fraction of selected blocks were actually corrupted, or how often a recovery query results in a writeback.
-
I also have concerns about the writing. The paper does not clearly distinguish how it uses cooperative and collaborative. MAPPO and MARL should be expanded and briefly explained when they first appear in the problem formulation. Although symbols such as and are used, I still found it difficult to understand what they represent in concrete terms.