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Paper summary
To address the question of whether a malicious collaborator can disrupt downstream path planning while maintaining a perception close to its normal behavior, this paper investigates a perception-stealthy path planning attack and proposes Stealthy Intent Planning Attack (SIPA). The key challenge lies in the attacker's inability to access or query the victim's planner or observe its private route intent. A core observation of this paper is that the victim's planning intent is not completely hidden. A path-planning-aware V2X protocol broadcasts a request map generated from temporary waypoints, the spatial structure of which retains a coarse representation of the vehicle's route intent. SIPA utilizes this protocol-visible side channel to conditionally configure an independently trained agent planner, derive the counter-intent direction, and locate the perturbation region of sparse request guidance. SIPA optimizes a control-aware planning objective for the trajectory derivatives used by the downstream controller while suppressing perception drift. In closed-loop Carla evaluation, SIPA reduces the driving score by 19.91 points while making the collaborative perception result close to the clean counterfactual result in the same frame.
Critical strengths
- The planning-aware request map introduced to improve communication efficiency can leak coarse proxy information about the vehicle's route intention through the protocol-visible side channel. Thus, this paper reveals a new V2X end-to-end attack surface, namely that a single malicious collaborator can severely disrupt the downstream planning process, while the collaborative awareness behavior remains close to normal.
- This paper proposes SIPA, which recovers the route intent without accessing the victim planner or its private route objective, and uses this intent to constrain an independently trained agent planner, locate a sparse request-guided perturbation region, and optimize a control-aware objective function on the trajectory-related quantities actually read by the deployed controller.
- In closed-loop Carla, SIPA significantly reduces downstream planning and closed-loop driving performance while retaining cooperative capabilities.
Critical weaknesses
- SIPA obtains planning gradients from an independently trained and frozen alternative planner. The authors do not clearly explain how this alternative planner was trained.
- In Section 3.1, the attacker can only control a single cooperative vehicle and has no access to the victim planner. However, it is also assumed that the attacker has access to the real Ego's perception input, as well as the context tensor required to run the proxy planner and perception filter. Is this a contradiction? Furthermore, how can the attacker, who controls the cooperative vehicle, obtain the real Ego's perception input and context tensor?
- In the results presented in Table 1, the SIPA method appears to be more balanced in terms of attack, but it does not achieve the best results in any metric, especially in the planning-related metrics, where it differs greatly from methods such as PGD. The authors sacrificed attack performance for stealth, which I believe is not an ideal outcome.
- This paper lists a large number of hyperparameters used in the appendix. How were these parameters determined? Were they determined through extensive experiments, or are they based on theoretical principles? It is recommended that the authors supplement the experiment with sensitivity analysis of the hyperparameters to better demonstrate the impact of each parameter on attack performance.
- The experiments in this paper are relatively weak. The ablation experiments did not ablate important modules, such as the Request Map. It is also recommended to supplement robustness and generalization experiments, such as the number of attackers, scenario types, different fusion models or planners, etc.
Questions for authors
Please refer to the Critical Weaknesses discussed above.
2 comments
W5 — Experiments are relatively weak; no Request Map ablation; add robustness/generalization
We strengthen the evaluation in several ways. (1) First, an ablation of the request map is in fact already included: the random-ROI (vs. request-guided ROI) comparison and the w/o-intent-conditioning setting isolate, respectively, the contributions of the request map's spatial request and of the recovered intent. Since this was not made sufficiently clear, we will revise the labeling and description so that these two are evident as a "Request Map ablation." (2) For generalization to another fusion model, we added results on V2X-ViT. As shown below, on V2X-ViT as well SIPA substantially degrades Driving Score (ΔDS −11.19) while largely preserving perception (ΔmAP −0.0156), showing that the attack is not confined to CoDriving's specific architecture and transfers to other cooperative-perception models.
| Metric | CoDriving (SIPA) | V2X-ViT (SIPA) |
|---|---|---|
| Clean attacked DS | 83.23 68.02 | 46.86 35.67 |
| DS | ||
| mAP |
We thank the reviewer for the comments. We respond to each weakness below.
W1 — The training of the surrogate planner is not clearly explained
We will specify the surrogate planner's training procedure in the main text (currently Appendix A.7). The surrogate is trained from random initialization on Towns 1–4 and 6, with Town05 held out, and it never loads the victim planner's checkpoint at any stage. As the reviewer notes, this explanation was in a less visible location, so we will move it to the main text and describe it more clearly.
W2 — Controlling only a single collaborative vehicle yet assuming access to the real ego's inputs seems contradictory
We apologize for the confusion. This is not a contradiction, because access is partitioned by module, not by vehicle—the perception stack is a shared implementation and can be reproduced by the attacker, whereas the victim planner is not accessible.
More fundamentally, we accepted the reviewer's point and made the threat model itself more realistic for re-evaluation. Previously we assumed the attacker could access the real ego's perception inputs and past historical values when evaluating SIPA and all baselines; agreeing with the reviewer, we re-evaluated SIPA and all baselines in a setting that does not use that information. Concretely, we use none of the real ego inputs or context tensors (including past temporal state), and we do not project the attacker's features into the victim frame to inject an estimated input. Whereas SIPA attains ΔDS −19.91 under the original setting, it is maintained with little change (ΔDS −14.90) under this setting. In other words, the very assumption of "how a collaborating-vehicle attacker obtains the real ego's perception inputs and context tensors" is not needed for the attack.
W3 — SIPA is not best on any metric and seems to sacrifice attack performance for stealth
We respectfully offer a slightly different interpretation. PGD* and SOMBRA* show larger raw ΔDS because they heavily corrupt perception, and as a result they are rejected by a perception-level defense on 71.3% and 61.4% of frames, respectively, so their effect is strongly limited on a defended system. In this light, SIPA's stealth is better viewed not as a mere sacrifice of attack performance but as the property that allows the attack to persist even in the presence of such a defense (rejection rate 18.4%, at or below the clean false-alarm rate of 19.2%). That is, the design targets effective threat under realistic, defended conditions rather than maximal harm under an idealized, undefended one.
W4 — How were the many hyperparameters determined? Sensitivity analysis is recommended
All hyperparameters of our method were set based on preliminary experiments and standard settings (the default configurations of the attack/defense frameworks we build on), and the full list and values are provided in the Appendix (ε, K, α, μ, λ, vmax, τR, τp, etc.). For the requested sensitivity analysis, we added a sweep over the perturbation budget ε, the single hyperparameter that most directly governs the balance between attack strength and stealthiness. As shown below, as ε increases the attack strength (ΔDS) grows monotonically, but perception preservation degrades sharply beyond ε≈6. Thus ε≈6 is the turning point that secures attack strength while preserving perception, and the ε=6 used in the paper is a reasonable point in this damage–stealth balance.