- Rating
- 1
- Confidence
- 4
- Informativeness
- 1
- Presentation
- 3
- Soundness
- 3
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Paper summary
The paper proposes an attack against autonomous vehicle perception (3D object detection). The attack adds a camouflage (i.e., a large patch) to a vehicle in order to create a displacement of the 3d bbox. The authors worked on getting a more "robust" attack success by optimizing the patch/camouflage to be viewing-angle invariant. It means that the perturbation should remain effective even when the victim vehicle approaches the attacker. Experimental results show some attack success rate from 50% to 87% depending on the scenario. The victim displacement is less than a meter but triggers braking at ~3.5 m/s2 (which is a moderate braking like when you are catching a changing yellow light).
Critical strengths
The paper is well-written and easy to follow. The authors said they used AI to assist, but it felt good to read a paper that isn't straight output of coding agent :-)
The authors have done a lot of work in testing the validity of their camouflage attack and I applaud their thoroughness.
Critical weaknesses
The idea of adding perturbations onto object to fool object detector is not novel. The problem of finding the static camouflage is exactly the same as for generating effective adversarial patches. An attacker must optimize the right perturbation that would resist expectations over transformation (angle, environmental condition, speed, size, color). The difference here is that this is 3D, but 3D adversarial perturbations have been also well-studied (see CVPR publications). Moreover, optimizing for viewing-angle invariance is similar (the same?) to EoT. Though, the authors acknowledged EoT in Section 4.4, and uses similar loss objectives. So novelty-wise, this is weak.
But overall, my issue is that I didn't learn anything from the paper. We already new the limited effects of adversarial patches (and can't explain why they sometimes transfer to other object detectors).
Attacker model and attack parameters: - What is the size of the camouflage (i.e., adversarial patch)? You only said that this is attached to the body frame, but it doesn't say how much area is required to get an effective attack. - Why a white-box access? The transfer attack you suggest is more realistic as we often don't know what OEM's vision model are (nor we can easily get access to it).
Experiments - Why K=3 (number of frames during which the perturbations should be effective)? This sounds too low of a bar. - Results Table 2: could you explain how we get a lower ASR for SUV-R-S BEVDet (compared to BEVDepth) while the d1, d2, d3 are higher (displacement)? - Section 5.2, I don't understand why the "cross-scenario training" is discussed here. Reading it from the start, I didn't see anything about training. So, it looks like I missed something or you forgot to explain properly what this is and how it related to the ASR (or displacement). - The attacks has a similar effect across the scenario. It would be worth adding a couple of sentences about the differences between these scenarios. As is, I don't know the difference and hence can't say how "generalizable" is the attack success. - Section 5.3 "factor effects": I like that you studied the sensitivity to different factors. But the conclusion is underwhelming. It is obvious that the closer the victim (camera) is to the camouflage, the larger it perceives the perturbation and hence it more affected (this is the same things as the size of the adversarial patch). So, as we don't actually learn anything from this experiment, I suggest moving it to the Appendix. - Section 5.4 "cross vehicle type": what is the actual size difference between SUV and Sedan? You need to study the mesh differences to demonstrate that this transferability is meaningful. As is, SUV and Sedan are very much the same shape, so I wouldn't expect much difference in the optimal camouflage, which would explain the "transferability". - Section 5.6: you are showing the 3d bbox displacement, but do you also have the results for the tracker? I am curious if the tracking algorithm thinks the vehicle is exiting the parking space, or if there is no movement "detected" (hence the braking is due to "object close to the victim vehicle"). In Figure 6, we see the red BEV planning, so it seems you have the trajectory prediction. How consistent is this prediction? Any sudden changes would raise concerns of being a noisy measurement/prediction.
- Editorial comments • Table 1: to me the "viewing-angle dependency" X means "no dependency" but that isn't what is meant here. Might be worth changing to "no viewing-angle dependency". • Figure 2 would benefit to be bigger. • Would be worth explaining the targeted 3D bbox algorithms (maybe just FastBEV++) and how the camouflage affects it.
Questions for authors
- Section 5.4 "transferability": here again you are facing the exact same results as what was shown by previous studies on adversarial patch. Transferability to multiple detector is not easy, and ensemble learning helps sometimes, but we don't understand fundamentally why. I would hope that you dig deeper in the theoretical reasons of why transferability works or doesn't. At least that would be a significant contribution.
Dear Reviewer,
As the interactive rebuttal period is nearing its end, we sincerely hope that our clarifications have addressed your questions, and look forward to your feedback.
We sincerely appreciate your time and consideration :-)
The Authors