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- Informativeness
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- Presentation
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Paper summary
This paper studies timestamp attacks on event streams that preserve a coarse temporal representation exactly while causing errors in models using finer timing. It introduces Null, validates the vulnerability with an independent constrained optimizer, and shows that changing temporal observers can expose previously invisible perturbations.
Critical strengths
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Clearly distinguishes attack success, representation-level invisibility, and detector evasion.
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Evaluates multiple datasets and architectures that supports their performance.
Critical weaknesses
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The core invariance follows directly from within-window count preservation, and related work already studies count-preserving timestamp manipulation. The main contribution is limited.
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Incomplete baseline comparison: Existing attacks are evaluated against an exact-invariance constraint they were not designed to satisfy. Adapting them to the same feasible set would better establish the incremental contribution.
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Some models have low clean accuracy or use custom implementations, resulting in weak demonstration.
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Some related references [1, 2] are missing.
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The central idea is clear, but the presentation is repetitive, numerically dense, and places important qualifications in the appendix.
[1] Wang R, Guo Q, Li H, et al. Event trojan: Asynchronous event-based backdoor attacks[C]//European Conference on Computer Vision. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland, 2024: 315-332.
[2] Gao S, He W, Chang C H, et al. Spatiotemporal Trigger on Event Data for Backdoor Attack on Spiking Neural Networks[C]//2025 IEEE 7th International Conference on Artificial Intelligence Circuits and Systems (AICAS). IEEE, 2025: 1-5.
Questions for authors
No further questions.
6 comments
Response to Reviewer mrHv [2/4]
W2. Constraint-matched comparison with existing attacks. Our original comparison examined whether attacks optimized for their native objectives also remained invisible to a common temporal observer. This characterizes their observer-relative behavior. Following the reviewer's suggestion, we extended the evaluation to compare attacks explicitly optimized under the same preservation requirement.
We adapted the published Yu PIL- retiming attack of Yu et al., Time Is All It Takes (ICLR 2026), to enforce exact coarse-observer equality during attack generation. We compared the adapted Yu attack with Null and C-PGD using three DVS Gesture ConvSNN seeds, 709 initially correct seed-clip evaluations, and matched victim-gradient counts of 3, 6, and 12. All final attacks satisfy the same declared observer equality and original-event modification budget, .
| Method | G = 3 | G = 6 | G = 12 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Null | 81.41 ± 4.99% | 89.01 ± 2.45% | 91.55 ± 2.15% |
| C-PGD | 84.50 ± 2.52% | 88.73 ± 2.70% | 90.42 ± 1.83% |
| Adapted Yu PIL- | 6.92 ± 1.54% | 46.70 ± 3.62% | 87.61 ± 3.07% |
Three-seed mean ± SD of SC-ASR(0). Every final attack satisfies exact observer equality and the declared event-edit budget.
| Paired advantage over adapted Yu | G = 3 | G = 6 | G = 12 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Null | +74.47 pp | +42.31 pp | +3.95 pp |
| C-PGD | +77.57 pp | +42.03 pp | +2.82 pp |
Clip-clustered 95% confidence intervals at G3 are [69.83, 78.74] for Null and [73.15, 81.79] for C-PGD. At G12, they are [2.22, 5.96] and [1.42, 4.37].
The constraint-matched comparison shows that the observer's blind space is exploitable by an adapted published method, which achieves 87.61% SC-ASR(0) at G12. Our constrained search achieves high success with fewer gradient evaluations, with Null reaching 81.41% versus 6.92% for adapted Yu at G3. Null and C-PGD achieve higher success at all three evaluated budgets.
Yu is the closest published timestamp-retiming baseline. The other evaluated baselines use different event-edit mechanisms, so adapting them would require changing their original attack operations. We have added the adapted-Yu comparison alongside the original observer-relative evaluation in Section 5.
Continued in Part 3/4 below.
Response to Reviewer mrHv [3/4]
W3. Clean accuracy and official checkpoint validation. We agree that accurate models and independently released checkpoints strengthen the security evidence. Our submitted DVS Gesture evaluation already includes high-accuracy models.
| Model | Clean accuracy | Exact-observer result |
|---|---|---|
| Event Transformer | 93.69 ± 0.95% | 51.0% SC-ASR(0) vs. 1.1% random control |
| CoarseFrameFormer, protected consumer | 93.81 ± 0.22% | Bit-identical protected logits |
The Event Transformer comparison uses a displacement-matched random control under the 10% original-event modification budget. Lower-accuracy variants were identified as supporting evaluations.
We trained the original architecture variants using shared dataset-specific preprocessing to enable controlled comparisons across models and temporal observers. Following the reviewer's suggestion, we additionally evaluated the officially released Event-SSM small checkpoint, retaining its pretrained weights and native asynchronous-event processing without retraining. We obtained 98.11% clean accuracy (259/264 recordings).
| Event-SSM clean accuracy | Null G3 SC-ASR(0) | Null G12 SC-ASR(0) | Protected observer exact |
|---|---|---|---|
| 98.11% (259/264) | 19.31% (50/259) | 30.50% (79/259) | 100% |
At G3, four-query black-box search achieves 1.16% (3/259), giving Null a paired advantage of +18.15 percentage points (95% CI [13.51, 22.78]). These results establish successful exactly observer-preserving attacks on an independently released, 98%-accurate model processing native asynchronous events.
We also realized the submitted ConvSNN attacks as timestamp modifications on recorded raw DVS Gesture streams, covering all 709 initially correct seed-clip evaluations.
| Raw-to-tensor parity | Coarse representation exact | Protected logits identical | Fine-time misclassification | Outcome agreement |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 709/709 | 709/709 | 709/709 | 578/709 (81.5%) | 709/709 |
(The replay reproduces all submitted attack outcomes, including 578 flips and 131 nonflips. Three-seed mean 81.56 ± 5.81%, pooled rate 81.5%.)
The official checkpoint extends the validation to a high-accuracy released model, while the raw-event replay confirms the submitted attack outcomes on recorded event streams. The submitted Null result (81.56%), matched-gradient comparison (81.41%), and observer-intersection experiment (81.70%) are separate runs and are reported accordingly. We have included the additional validation in Section 5.
W4. Missing related work. We thank the reviewer for identifying Wang et al., Event Trojan (ECCV 2024), and Gao et al., Spatiotemporal Trigger on Event Data for Backdoor Attack on Spiking Neural Networks (AICAS 2025). We have expanded the Related Work discussion in Section 2 to include both studies and clarify their relationship to our work, and we added them to the event-security comparison table in Appendix B.1.
Our work addresses a distinct security problem. Event Trojan and Gao et al. study backdoor attacks, which require influence over training to implant a trigger that a compromised model later responds to. Our attack instead targets fixed, unmodified victim models at test time and only retimes existing events, so event identities, locations, polarities and counts are unchanged. Stealth in backdoor work means the trigger is inconspicuous to a human or a defense. Here it is an exact, measurable relation, for a named observer , and we show that the same perturbation can be invisible to one observer and visible to another.
Continued in Part 4/4 below.
Response to Reviewer mrHv [1/4]
We thank the reviewer for the careful review and for recognizing the distinction between attack success, representation invisibility, and detector evasion. The comments motivated additional experiments and a clearer presentation of our contributions.
W1. Contribution beyond count-preserving retiming. We agree that count-preserving retiming has precedents, including Yu et al., Time Is All It Takes: Spike-Retiming Attacks on Event-Driven Spiking Neural Networks (ICLR 2026), and Riaño et al., Temporal Poisoning: Clean-Label Backdoors via Event Redistribution in SNNs (arXiv 2026), both discussed in our submission. Our contribution is to formulate stealth relative to a specified observer and establish the security consequences of this relationship. For a clean event stream X, attacked stream X′, and observer R, exact stealth holds when R(X′)=R(X). We characterize the observer's temporal blind space, demonstrate that it contains adversarially effective perturbations, and examine how changing the observer changes their visibility.
First, we demonstrate observer-dependent stealth using fixed attacks. On DVS Gesture, we generated phase-0-preserving attacks and evaluated the same 709 attacked seed-clip streams under three observers. Each coarse window accumulates eight of 160 fine bins. Phases 2 and 4 shift the accumulation boundaries by two and four bins.
The attacked streams and victim predictions remain fixed. Changing only the observer changes whether the same perturbations are visible. This directly demonstrates why stealth is a relation rather than a property.
Second, we connect the observer's blind space to attack feasibility and effectiveness. We independently optimized attacks under increasingly restrictive observer configurations.
SC-ASR(0) measures attack success under exact preservation of every protected observer. Values are three-seed means.
Even when all three observers are preserved exactly, attacks successfully change 43.05% of initially correct predictions. Together, these experiments establish observer-dependent visibility and effective attacks within intersecting blind spaces. We have clarified these contributions in Sections 1 and 3 and added the observer analyses to Section 5.
Continued in Part 2/4 below.