- Rating
- 2
- Confidence
- 4
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 2
- Soundness
- 2
Read review
Paper summary
The paper studies targeted-behavior adversarial attacks on cooperative MARL. Instead of just lowering team reward, the attacker tries to induce a specific collective behavior, such as dispersed formations in SMAC or traffic standstill in MetaDrive, by perturbing the observations of a subset of agents. MatBak extends RAT to the multi-agent setting by proposing 1. an attention-based victim-observation encoder selects the top-k agents to perturb, and 2. an adversary is trained to match the intention policy through a dually weighted KL loss. The authors report the highest attacker return in 26 of 27 settings and improved robustness when MatBak is used for adversarial training.
Critical strengths
- Problem framing. Targeted-behavior attacks on multi-agent systems are well motivated and safety-relevant.
- Agent selection. Adaptive victim selection is a natural multi-agent contribution and could be valuable on its own if properly validated.
- Eval. Experiments cover two benchmarks and three victim algorithms (MAT, MAPPO, QMIX), and report both attacker return and attack success rate.
- Paper is well written and relatively easy to follow
Critical weaknesses
-
Further validation of the agent-selection mechanism would strengthen the core contribution. Attention-based victim selection is arguably the paper’s most distinctive multi-agent contribution, so it would help to show clearly that it outperforms simpler alternatives. Natural comparisons include:
- attacking a fixed set of k agents throughout the episode;
- a RAT variant with consistent rather than random targets;
- gradient-saliency selection, which could be computed cheaply on the attacker’s own encoder. The observation that last-k outperforms random-k is interesting, and it suggests target consistency may account for part of the gain. Disentangling these effects would make the case for attention-based selection much more convincing.
-
The role of each component could be clarified. The framework combines several components, and the current ablations remove the state and individual weightings together, which makes it hard to see what each contributes. Ablating them separately, and comparing the bi-level outer loop against a simpler heuristic weighting such as advantage-based weights, would help justify the added complexity.
-
The relationship between attacker return and attack success could be discussed further. In the MAT-SCSC setting, MatBak achieves the best attacker return (Table 7) but a comparatively low success rate (Table 8, and Table 9 under noise). Since success rates are used to argue against reward hacking, an explanation of this case would be valuable. One possibility is that frequent changes in the selected agents prevent vehicles from being brought to a full stop. Per-episode analysis could shed light on this.
-
The statistical analysis could be strengthened. Some settings show high variance relative to the mean (e.g., QMIX-8m at 585.99 ± 229.58) with five seeds, and several differences from RAT fall within the reported standard deviations. Confidence intervals, significance tests, or per-seed results would help establish the reliability of the improvements. A discussion of why MatBak’s variance tends to exceed RAT’s would also help.
Questions for authors
- How does top-k attention selection compare to a fixed agent set, to RAT with consistent targets, and to gradient-based selection?
- How often does the selected set change within an episode? Does this churn correlate with success rate, especially on SCSC?
- What explains the return/ASR mismatch on MAT-SCSC? Can you report per-episode stopped-vehicle counts?
- What does each weighting contribute separately? How does the bi-level loop compare to a heuristic weighting, such as advantage-based weights?
- What are the training compute and victim query costs? Does the outer and inner loop cause high training computation? is it realistic in real world setting?
4 comments
Dear Reviewer J3tP,
Thank you for your thoughtful assessment and for acknowledging our strengths in problem framing, method design, experimental evaluaiton, and paper writing.
We have made every effort to address each of your concerns point by point. We believe these additions substantially strengthen the paper. Should these additions resolve the issues raised in your initial assessment, we would be very grateful if you could consider updating your score. If any concern remains, please let us know; we would welcome the opportunity to discuss it further and provide any clarification you need.
Dear Reviewer J3tP,
We hope this message finds you well. As the discussion period is nearing its end, we would be grateful if you could let us know whether our responses have addressed your concerns. If any concern remains, please let us know, and we would welcome the opportunity to discuss it further and provide any clarification you may need. Your comments have been very helpful to us, and we are eager to resolve any remaining issues to improve our work.
Thank you again for the time and effort you have devoted to reviewing our paper.
Best regards,
The Authors
Reply
Thank you for the reply. I am maintaining my current score. There are still concerns with the additional results. For instance, The fixed target attack assume random subset, however, the proper way is to select the optimal subset and keep it fix through out the episode.
We appreciate your time and effort in reviewing our work.
W1 & Q1: Agent-selection
As suggested, we add following comparisons:
① MatBak-fixed-k / RAT-fixed-k: attacking k agents which are randomly initialized and then fixed throughout the episode;
② MatBak-grad-k: attacking k agents selected by the top-k gradient norms of the encoder-fitted value function (Eq 4) w.r.t. local observations.
MatBak outperforms all baselines; MatBak-fixed-k underperforms MatBak, so the effect of target consistency is isolated.
W2 & Q4: Component effect
(1) As suggested, we ablate the two weighting components separately. Please see fAkQ (W2).
(2) We also replace the bi-level outer loop with heuristics: state weights set by the normalized joint advantage (adv-weight) and agent weights by the normalized local value (val-weight).
MatBak outperforms all variants, confirming each component’s isolated effect.
W3 & Q2 & Q3: Metric mismatch
(1) As the reviewer hypothesizes, ASR is a team-level threshold metric counting vehicles that reach a full stop, while attacker return is a dense signal crediting any speed reduction. Episodes that slow many vehicles without stopping them therefore earn high return but modest ASR, which explains the divergence in a few scenarios (e.g., SCSC).
(2) As suggested, we run a per-episode analysis on MAT-SCSC, reporting average vehicle counts over 60 test episodes:
① While PA-AD stops more vehicles, MatBak slows more vehicles and achieves a higher speed-reduction rate, which explains the metric mismatch.
② MatBak-fixed-k stops more vehicles but produces fewer slowed-down ones and a smaller speed reduction, so changes in the victim set may indeed prevent vehicles from reaching a full stop, as the reviewer hypothesized.
③ MatBak-fixed-k still stops fewer vehicles than PA-AD, so the mismatch mainly stems from the differing measures of attack effectiveness.
W4: Statistical reliability
(1) As suggested, we strengthen the statistical analysis by constructing one-sided 95% bootstrap percentile confidence intervals for the mean-attacker-return difference (Δ) between MatBak and RAT, and report the lower bounds (L95) on SMAC. Results:
Δ is statistically positive (L95 >0) in 75% of scenarios, supporting the reliability of our advantage.
(2) Why the variance of MatBak tends to exceed RAT has been discussed in the original paper (lines 376-379).
Q5: Training cost
(1) As suggested, we report the average policy update time (ms) and training RAM usage (GiB) on two SMAC maps, comparing MatBak with competitve baselines:
Attacker return performance:
We note that the cost metric alone is not comparable: random noise injection is cheapest yet rarely effective. While SARL and AMI cost less RAM, their return is evidently lower (<40%) and they incur $>3.5\times$ update latency. The training cost of MatBak grows moderately over RAT (<1.50×). We report victim query cost at matched performance to baselines:
Victim query modestly increases update time (<1.32×) while RAM usage remains comparable.
(2) Real-world feasibility also see 4taG (Q1).