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Paper summary
PatMask combines learned adversarial topology masks with random masking when training communication-based MARL policies. The generator maximizes TD error and is removed at execution. Experiments cover SMAC, SMACv2, LBF, and several communication backbones under different simulated failure patterns.
Critical strengths
The mechanism can be added to existing topology-aware learners without an extra execution-time module. The GAT, GCN, and TGCNET experiments support this practical flexibility.
Table 6 provides useful evidence beyond comparison with unaugmented baselines: hybrid masking improves over random-only masking by 10.4 and 11.8 percentage points on two challenging tasks.
Critical weaknesses
Adversarial edge selection is not fully separated from perturbation severity. Generated masks remove 57–77% of links, whereas Appendix C.1 uses 30% random dropout; the random-mask rate in Table 6 is unspecified.
The mask implementation needs clarification. As written, Eq. 6 does not match the stated survival-probability interpretation, and the gradient path from soft masks through the neighbor-based GAT equations is unclear. These details are central to reproducing the method.
Questions for authors
What random-mask rate is used in Table 6, and does the advantage persist when random and learned masks remove the same number of links?
Is Eq. 6 exactly the implemented sampler? Please specify how masks enter the attention computation and how gradients reach the generator.
2 comments
W2/Q2. Clarifying the implementation of Eq. 6: I clarify the questions about implementation details one by one.
- Is Eq. 6 the implemented sampler, and is it proper to interpret as a survival probability?
Yes, Eq. 6 describes the implemented sampler. However, we agree that ``survival probability'' was an inaccurate interpretation of . is a learned gating parameter, with larger values favoring link retention, but its numerical value is not the probability that the sampled binary mask retains the link. In the revision, we correct the interpretation of this terminology and explicitly distinguish the soft sample from the binary forward mask and its straight-through gradient estimator.
- How do masks enter attention computation?
During attention computation, removed links receive zero attention weight, and attention is normalized over the remaining neighbors. Masks remove inter-agent communication links while preserving each agent’s access to its own features.
- How do gradients reach the generator?
During the generator update, as illustrated by the red arrows in Figure 1, the TD-loss gradient propagates through the joint value, message aggregation, and attention computation to the generator via the differentiable mask relaxation. The learner’s parameters are held fixed, while gradients with respect to the mask inputs remain enabled.
Thanks very much for your valuable comments. Our responses and revisions are provided as follows. We hope that we have addressed all your concerns. We appreciate your dedicated work on the review and will be grateful if you could raise your rating in response to our rebuttal.
W1/Q1. 1) About dropout rate sensitivity for baselines: Thanks for your suggestion of the sensitivity study of the dropout rates for each baseline method. In the revision, we train the baselines with random communication masking under various link-drop probabilities and test them under various disconnection modes. The results are shown in Tables 7 and 8 and discussed in Section 5.5 “Ablation Study->Random training masking” in the main text. Table 7 shows the results of different baselines trained with different random link-drop rates and tested under the mixed disconnection. Training with random link drops can directly improve each baseline's performance, but the dropout rate does not ensure a consistent magnitude of the improvement. PatMask, which combines adversarial training with random masking, outperforms all baselines across various dropout rates. Comparing each baseline at its best tested rate, TGCNET, trained with a dropout rate of 0.5, is the strongest at 90.5%, while PatMask surpasses it by 4.7 pp, achieving 95.2%. We further compare PatMask with the baselines trained with a random link drop under different test-time disconnection modes, with results shown in Table 8. PatMask outperforms the baselines with random masking in all three disconnection modes. These results indicate the benefit of adversarial training in PatMask over the random dropout of links. The learned mask does not randomly drop links but identifies specific links to retain or drop during training to tolerate diverse communication disconnections during execution.
Table 7. Effect of random training mask on MMM2, varying the training link-drop rate. Results are test win rates (%) of training baselines with various random dropout rates (q) on the communication links on MMM2 and testing under the mixed disconnection with p=0.5 independently for nodes and links. q=0 disables link dropout during training and corresponds to the default baselines..
Table 8. Effect of random training mask on MMM2, varying the test communication disconnection modes. Results are test win rates (%) of training baselines with a random link-drop rate of 0.5 and testing under various disconnection modes on MMM2. Node-only and link-only disconnections each use a failure probability of p=0.5, and the mixed disconnection applies both failures independently.
2) Clarifying the random masking setting and its sensitivity in Table 6: Random training mask in Table 6 uses a link-drop probability of 0.5. Note that Table 6 was not mainly intended to compare the approaches with random masking and adversarial masking. We mainly aim to show the orchestration effect of both masking (Hybrid vs. other masking settings). As we can expect and the results show, random masking can directly improve performance (Random-only vs. No Masking). However, in practice, test-time disconnection probability is usually unknown in advance. Therefore, it can be common to use unaligned training-time and test-time dropout rates, especially when the test-time dropout rate may shift. We are pleased to see that the adversarial masking not only indicates a better replacement for random masking, but can also collaborate with random masking to further improve performance (Adversarial-only and Hybrid vs. Random-only). In the revision, we add clarification of the link-drop probability setting in the caption of Table 6 and this benefit of PatMask in Section 5.5.``Ablation Study->Masking Strategy''.
To better compare the influence of the dropout rate of random masking, we add a sensitivity study of the dropout rates of the random masking when it complements the baselines in Section 5.5."Ablation Study->Random Training Masking". Please refer to the above response to W1/Q1.1 "About dropout rate sensitivity for baselines''.