- Rating
- 4(+1)
- Confidence
- 2
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 3
- Soundness
- 2
Read review
Paper summary
The paper studies poisoning attacks in Vertical Federated Learning (VFL), aiming to degrade the whole model accuracy (i.e. over all samples). The attacker (called Party A) is assumed to know a small auxiliary dataset of the other party (called Server). The attack (called CCVS) consists of two phases: (1) cluster the embeddings based on feature similarity and on the auxiliary dataset (i.e. cluster similar data points with the same label) (2) report values but swap them in a cluster-level. The paper explains that cluster-level swap is essential to retain some malicious structure that the model can learn from. Moreover, for the cluster-level swap, they select the derangement that maximises the centroid distance.
The paper also proposes a defence (RGAR) that also assumes an auxiliary dataset. RGAR identifies cross-view pairs by calibrating on the auxiliary dataset. Then, during training, when a data point is provided, RGAR finds suspicious patterns by comparing the embeddings to the calibration. Using this comparison, RGAR can also repair the suspicious cross-view.
The authors evaluate on 6 datasets showing that CCVS degrades model accuracy and that their cluster-level swap technique is better than other conventional approaches. RGAR also improves model accuracy under a CCVS attack and reports high suspicion scores.
Critical strengths
-
The poisoning swaps all data points between clusters. This cluster-level swap is interesting because it creates a meaningful (yet poisonous) structure for the server model to learn.
-
Cluster swap is not random but it is specifically chosen to maximise their total distance, improving poisoning.
-
A defence for the attack is also provided that identifies malicious clients and tries to “reverse” the attack by repairing the maliciously reported values.
-
The paper is clear and well presented.
Critical weaknesses
-
CCVS and RGAR consider the classical shadow model assumption: typical in the literature but not modern.
-
For RGAR, this assumption is less practical. First, it has to assume an initially honest Party A or a third-party auditor. Then, attested execution is necessary to get the embeddings.
-
RGAR seems to be hand-crafted for the attack. Assuming (via the “security through obscurity” argument) that the defence is known to the attacker, it remains unclear how effective RGAR is to slight variations of CCVS.
Questions for authors
Questions:
-
How does the attack perform on datasets with bigger number of classes? For example, can you provide results with CIFAR100?
-
Regarding RGAR, if attested execution is required, why not use it to verify proper execution of VFL from Party A? For example, why can’t attested execution be used to bind each sample to its actual feature row, preventing swaps?
-
How effective is RGAR for variations of CCVS? In the Appendix G.7. this is considered part of future work but can you provide evidence that RGAR remains protective even against slight variations of CCVS (for example those described in lines 1023-1024)?
4 comments
Responses to Reviewer w6Wj (Part 2)
Q2. Regarding RGAR, if attested execution is required, why not use it to verify proper execution of VFL from Party A?
To clarify for this - Attestation can enforce computation and binding checks, provided the correct entity-row bindings are already available. RGAR requires authenticated inputs for a limited reference set; preventing every swap requires authoritative bindings throughout the training dataset.
1. Reference queries and training contributions have different input guarantees.
For reference queries, the server keeps an immutable, authenticated copy of A’s reference features and supplies these inputs for computation. Faithful execution therefore produces embeddings of the intended reference rows. The one-time trust step establishes reference authenticity and alignment; faithful computation remains necessary as embeddings are refreshed during training.
For ordinary training contributions, A supplies the feature row associated with each entity identifier. Suppose the encoder receives entity ’s genuine row under identifier . It can correctly compute while returning an embedding of the wrong entity. Because CCVS substitutes genuine local rows, checking feature validity or correct encoder execution alone cannot establish the intended correspondence.
Section 3.3 now makes these input guarantees explicit, and Appendix G.1 explains the associated trust boundary.
2. Preventing every swap requires an authoritative binding for every training row.
Such bindings require trusted source records, an authenticated snapshot, or an independently verified collection process. Two cases illustrate this requirement.
-
Verification by the server or an auditor. Checking all training associations requires trusted access to source records or a mechanism that certifies them. Direct server inspection would expose A’s full feature table; an auditor or privacy-preserving verification system could provide alternatives, with additional infrastructure and trust requirements. RGAR assumes this authentication for a limited reference subset.
-
A commitment to A’s table. A commitment, such as a Merkle root over identifier–row pairs, binds subsequent computation to a particular table. Its protection depends on that table’s correctness when committed. Under the training-snapshot or correspondence-connector compromise discussed in Appendix E.7, a commitment created after corruption can preserve the swapped associations. Attested execution would then faithfully enforce those incorrect bindings.
If an authenticated commitment to the correct training snapshot exists before compromise and its bindings are enforced on every contribution, we agree that CCVS can be prevented directly. Appendix G.1 explicitly acknowledges this condition. The distinction is whether trustworthy correspondence covers the complete training dataset or only the reference subset.
3. RGAR provides a recovery mechanism where complete binding enforcement is unavailable.
An independently established reference set supplies a limited trust anchor. Reference rows collected during honest onboarding or under audit, and stored separately from the mutable training snapshot, can retain their integrity when the subsequent correspondence pipeline is compromised. This requires less authenticated data than verifying every training association, while retaining the reference-access assumption stated in the paper.
The reference controls quantify recovery under a smaller trust budget. Reducing the reference fraction from 10% to 1% gives recovery accuracies of 78.9% on MNIST and 68.9% on HAR, compared with undefended baselines of 33.3% and 15.5%. Table 6 separately evaluates partial reference corruption. These controls support recovery under the tested conditions, without establishing robustness to arbitrary reference poisoning.
Restoring the data pipeline after training also leaves a recovery problem. On MNIST, the same poisoned model achieves 96.96% on poisoned training inputs but only 31.39% on those same entities after alignment is restored (Appendix E.7). Correcting correspondence therefore does not automatically undo the learned parameters. RGAR intervenes during training through reference-guided scoring, attribution, and representation repair.
The limited trusted set follows the root-dataset principle of FLTrust (Cao et al., 2021), while RGAR additionally requires authenticated cross-view references.
These clarifications address Weakness 2 and scope RGAR’s practical role. Section 3.3 and Appendix G.1 state the reference and execution assumptions; Section 6.4 and Appendix H present repair as a recovery option whose benefit depends on the dataset and trusted information. Where authenticated full-dataset bindings are enforced, direct prevention is appropriate. Where only limited correspondence can be authenticated, RGAR provides an empirically evaluated mitigation.
Responses to Reviewer w6Wj (Part 3)
Q3. How effective is RGAR for variations of CCVS? In Appendix G.7, this is considered part of future work, but can you provide evidence that RGAR remains protective even against slight variations of CCVS, such as those described in lines 1023–1024?
We thank the reviewer for encouraging these experiments. We examined reference-preserving poisoning and added temporal variations on UCI-HAR, including alternating submissions and gradual onset. The results establish substantial recovery against persistent poisoning even when reference samples are spared, and clarify the accuracy tradeoff under intermittent attacks.
1. Recovery already holds when the attacker preserves the reference examples.
We verified that every reference row remains correctly aligned while all eligible non-reference rows are poisoned. This directly covers the reference-sparing strategy mentioned in Appendix G.7.
| Dataset | Undefended accuracy (%) | RGAR accuracy (%) | Paired recovery (pp) |
|---|---|---|---|
| MNIST | 31.22 ± 1.95 | 83.96 ± 0.94 | +52.74 ± 1.18 |
| UCI-HAR | 15.32 ± 1.94 | 89.15 ± 0.67 | +73.83 ± 2.36 |
These are three-seed results under the existing reference-preserving configuration, rather than an additional independent attack condition.
Sparing the trusted examples therefore leaves a strongly damaging attack outside the reference set, with substantial recovery under RGAR. The trusted examples supply cross-view relationships for constructing replacement representations; their value does not require the attacker to corrupt them.
2. Temporal variations reveal when replacement is beneficial.
On HAR, we evaluated 80-epoch schedules with five-epoch alternating blocks and gradual onset after 20 clean epochs. We tested both alternating phases so that training ends either clean or poisoned. The two alternating schedules each contain 40 poisoned epochs; static poisoning contains 80.
RGAR settings, Phase-I artifacts, donor assignments, reference sets, and training seeds are fixed across matched comparisons.
| Training condition | Undefended accuracy (%) | RGAR accuracy (%) |
|---|---|---|
| Clean | 97.43 ± 0.31 | 88.44 ± 2.42 |
| Static CCVS | 15.32 ± 1.94 | 89.15 ± 0.67 |
| Alternating, ending clean | 94.95 ± 0.34 | 89.19 ± 0.86 |
| Alternating, ending poisoned | 91.11 ± 0.40 | 88.44 ± 2.27 |
| Gradual onset | 93.76 ± 0.97 | 88.35 ± 2.20 |
Persistent CCVS produces an 82.11-point undefended loss, against which RGAR recovers 73.83 points. Alternating and gradual schedules produce smaller final losses, and their undefended accuracies exceed RGAR’s. For the alternating schedule ending with poisoning, the paired RGAR-minus-undefended difference is −2.68 ± 1.88 points.
The current HAR configuration gives substantial weight to reference-guided replacement throughout training. Its similar accuracy across schedules therefore characterizes this replacement operating point; these measurements do not establish selective adaptation to attack onset and cessation.
3. The temporal measurements substantiate the attack variation itself.
At equal cumulative exposure, ending with poisoning produces greater damage than ending clean: undefended accuracy is 91.11% versus 94.95%. Blockwise evaluation also records repeated deterioration during poisoned intervals.
After the first poisoned block, undefended accuracy falls from 94.91% to 83.17%, while RGAR achieves 87.96%, a 4.79-point advantage. At epoch 20, its advantage is 1.44 points. These intermediate diagnostics show an early protective benefit; the final results above establish that this benefit does not persist as a net accuracy advantage over the complete intermittent schedule.
These findings refine the scope of the mitigation contribution. RGAR provides substantial recovery against persistent, reference-preserving correspondence poisoning, using authenticated relationships without requiring the attacker’s cluster mapping or donor assignments. The temporal experiments identify conditions where the accuracy cost of replacement outweighs the attack damage.
This follows the conditional recovery claims in Section 6.4 and Appendix H. Selective intervention under changing attack intensity and optimized defense-aware attacks remain in our future work.
We hope these additional experiments and clarifications address your concerns and strengthen your confidence in the paper’s contributions. We would be grateful if you would consider revisiting your score in light of the expanded evidence and revised scope.
Follow-up with Reviewer w6Wj
We appreciate the time you’ve taken to consider our work and the strengths you recognized in our work. Your words motivated us to work with the remaining concerns. With the discussion period coming to a close, we hope our responses and the additional experiments have helped address the points you raised. We apologize for being a bit late in the responses. But if there is anything you would like us to explain further, we would be happy to do so while the discussion is still open.
Based on our revisions of the paper and the additional results from the new experiments we conducted, we would be very grateful if you would consider raising the score if you find our explanations satisfactory. Thank you again for your time and consideration.
Responses to Reviewer w6Wj (Part 1)
Thank you very much for your thoughtful and encouraging review. We are grateful for your recognition of the structured poisoning mechanism, the distance-guided cluster selection, and the clarity of the presentation, as well as your interest in the proposed mitigation.
Your questions helped us strengthen the evaluation and clarify the assumptions. In revised manuscript and below, we present the CIFAR-100 results and address your concerns about auxiliary-data access, attested execution, and RGAR’s effectiveness.
We hope the additional evidence and explanations address your concerns and we would be very grateful if you would consider revisiting your score. Please let us know if anything remains unclear; we would be happy to elaborate.
Clarifying the shadow-model assumption in Weakness 1
We appreciate the reviewer’s concern about the auxiliary information required by CCVS and RGAR. We distinguish their assumptions from victim-model replication while acknowledging their dependence on suitable auxiliary data.
CCVS uses limited labeled examples from A’s own feature view. Its Phase-I encoder learns local structure without access to B’s features, the server’s prediction head, or the joint model’s parameters. Thus, it does not require constructing a shadow copy of the victim VFL system. The auxiliary labels provide supervision for identifying donor regions rather than reproducing the victim’s predictions.
Nevertheless, the availability and representativeness of these labels are genuine assumptions. We make their source and budget explicit and evaluate sensitivity to the label fraction.
RGAR makes a separate assumption: A trusted-reference access to authenticated, aligned reference examples rather than victim-model replication, but it restricts the deployments in which RGAR is applicable. We acknowledge that restriction and scope its recovery claims accordingly.
We therefore agree that auxiliary-data requirements deserve explicit scrutiny. Our clarification is that CCVS requires limited local supervision, whereas RGAR requires authenticated cross-view references; neither assumes a replicated victim model. We state these distinct requirements in Section 3.3 and examine their practical implications through the auxiliary-label and reference-set controls.
Q1. How does the attack perform on datasets with more classes? Can you provide results on CIFAR-100?
We thank the reviewer for recommending this extension. We evaluated CCVS on CIFAR-100, increasing the label space tenfold to 100 classes. The results show that CCVS retains a substantial effect: accuracy falls by 16.9 percentage points, exceeding the reduction from the strongest comparison attack by 9.0 points.
1. Configuration and Phase-I quality
We use a vertical split analogous to CIFAR-10, a 5% auxiliary-label budget, 100 latent clusters, and top-k donor scope 5. Clean and attacked conditions share the feature partition, architecture, and training schedule. Downstream results use three training seeds.
Phase I operates exclusively on A’s feature view and the auxiliary labels:
A 5% budget provides 2,500 labeled examples, averaging 25 per class, to support structure recovery across 100 classes from a partial feature view.
CCVS can use the recovered structure without perfectly separating every class. Its donor construction exploits distances between latent regions and sample-level dissimilarity within destination cores. The downstream results demonstrate that these signals remain useful for poisoning in the larger label space.
2. Attack effectiveness
The following results report correctly aligned clean-test accuracy after training. All attacks use the same coverage, architecture, and training budget.
Despite the 100-class setting, CCVS reduces accuracy from 84.1% to 67.2%, more than doubling test error from 15.9% to 32.8%. Its 16.9-point reduction is more than twice the 7.9-point reduction produced by Random Cluster, the strongest comparison attack.
The reduction is smaller than on CIFAR-10. Fine-grained class distinctions, fewer auxiliary examples per class, and the restricted feature view make this a more demanding setting for recovering class-related donor regions.
The larger label space attenuates, rather than eliminates, the attack. CCVS retains a clear advantage over the comparison strategies, demonstrating effectiveness beyond tasks with few classes. The matched clean-to-attacked reduction separates this poisoning effect from CIFAR-100’s baseline task difficulty.