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- Confidence
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- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
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- Soundness
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Paper summary
This paper introduces TSDETECTOR, a defense against model poisoning in federated learning that jointly inspects spatial and temporal signals. On the spatial side, it analyzes pairwise update distances and discrepancies among client representations within a round; on the temporal side, it models how each client's updates evolve over rounds. Anomaly scores from both views are combined to filter suspicious updates before aggregation. Experiments on five datasets against five attacks report strong detection and defense performance, and component ablations assess the individual contribution of the spatial and temporal modules.
Critical strengths
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Jointly leveraging within-round client relationships and cross-round client histories is a sensible and appealing design. The two views are sensitive to different attack behaviors, and the ablations provide evidence that they are complementary rather than redundant.
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The evaluation spans multiple datasets, attack types, and levels of data heterogeneity. Across the settings tested, the results indicate that the combined detector offers effective protection.
Critical weaknesses
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The paper never reports how TSDETECTOR behaves when no malicious clients are present. The no-attack FedAvg number serves only as a reference and does not show whether turning the defense on degrades normal training. This matters because benign updates under non-IID data can look anomalous. To quantify this cost, the paper should report clean accuracy and the rate at which benign clients are rejected, across different degrees of heterogeneity.
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The ablation discussion contains numbers that do not match Table 2. The text gives full-model FNRs of 4.33% for PoisonedFL and 1.00% for LIE, while Table 2 lists 3.16% and 3.00%. The authors should state which values are correct and fix the inconsistency.
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The submitted PDF repeatedly points to appendices that are not included: C.2 for dataset and model details, C.3–C.4 for attack and defense configurations, and C.5 for hyperparameters. Without them, the experimental setup cannot be fully assessed and reproducibility is limited.
Questions for authors
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When there are no malicious clients, how does TSDETECTOR compare to FedAvg in terms of accuracy and benign-client rejection rate under varying non-IID settings?
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For the full model under PoisonedFL and LIE, which FNR values are correct — those in Table 2 or those in the surrounding text?
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Where are the referenced appendices (C.2–C.5)? Please supply the missing experimental details.
2 comments
Anticipating Your Reply as Discussion Deadline Approaching
We would like to express our sincere gratitude for dedicating time to review our paper. We have carefully responded to your questions and made revisions accordingly. As the discussion deadline approaches, we would like to inquire if our responses have adequately addressed your questions and concerns. We are more than willing to address any concerns to ensure a comprehensive resolution and potentially promote your evaluation. Thank you for your time and expertise.
We greatly appreciate your expert feedback and your insightful concerns. Your concerns and questions are responded as follows:
We thank the reviewer for highlighting the importance of attack-free evaluation. We conducted paired comparisons between TSDetector and FedAvg with 100 benign clients under different degrees of data heterogeneity. Accuracy and FPR are reported in %.
Across these five settings, TSDetector achieves an average FPR of 1.72%, with an average accuracy reduction of only 0.505% relative to FedAvg. Even under strongest heterogeneity setting, α=0.1, the FPR is 3.16%, while accuracy decreases by just 0.339%. These results demonstrate TSDetector's strong performance during attack-free training, preserving accuracy close to FedAvg while maintaining low false-positive rates under heterogeneous data distributions.
We will include these attack-free results in the revision, reporting both accuracy and benign update rejection rates to directly quantify the defense's practical effect on normal training.
We thank the reviewer for identifying this inconsistency and sincerely apologize for our oversight. Table 2 reports the correct FNRs under the final experimental configuration: 3.16% for PoisonedFL and 3.00% for LIE. After updating the table, we inadvertently retained the earlier values of 4.33% and 1.00% in the text. This reporting error does not affect the final results or the conclusion regarding component complementarity. We will correct the text and verify consistency throughout the revised manuscript.
Appendices were submitted with the original submission in the separate supplementary file Appendix.pdf. We sincerely apologize for the unclear location and the resulting inconvenience during review. In the revised manuscript, we will append these materials directly after the main text in a single PDF and verify all cross-references to facilitate access and reproducibility.