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- 2
- Confidence
- 3
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 2
- Soundness
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Paper summary
This paper proposes COMPASS, an untargeted model poisoning attack against robust federated learning. It estimates a dominant training direction and important parameters from early global model updates, constructs an attack direction orthogonal to the estimated direction, and maintains it between refresh events. A small probe is embedded in malicious updates, and its correlation with subsequent global updates, together with local validation accuracy, guides adaptation of the attack magnitude. The evaluation covers six datasets, nine baseline attacks, and 15 aggregation rules, and reports a larger average accuracy reduction than the evaluated attacks.
Critical strengths
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The paper studies a relevant security problem: model poisoning without access to benign clients' updates or knowledge of the server's aggregation rule. Exploiting information exposed through global model broadcasts is a meaningful attack setting.
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The evaluation covers multiple datasets and aggregation mechanisms. The reported improvements over the attack baselines are substantial in several settings, and the appendix includes analyses of probe transmission and feedback control.
Critical weaknesses
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The positioning relative to PoisonedFL [1] is unclear. Section 3 defines a feedback-guided attack as one that dynamically adjusts its strategy based on global models, but Table 1 marks PoisonedFL as not feedback-guided. PoisonedFL already uses historical global model changes and its own submitted updates to adapt attack magnitudes. The authors should correct Table 1 and explain precisely what information or capability their feedback mechanism adds.
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The additional insight beyond existing attack designs is not sufficiently established. FedIMP [2] already identifies important parameters using Fisher information and selectively poisons them in an untargeted attack. Neurotoxin [3] exploits the coordinate structure of benign updates to improve attack persistence, while PoisonedFL combines cross-round consistency with dynamic magnitude adjustment. The authors should explain what new insight follows from this combination beyond these existing principles.
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The breadth of the defense evaluation does not establish sufficiently representative coverage of recent, relevant defenses. Most evaluated methods date from 2017–2022, and the 15 aggregation rules include non-robust Mean. LASA (2025) is an important exception, but COMPASS reduces its accuracy by less than two percentage points on four of the six datasets in Tables 4–9. This limits the conclusion that the attack consistently defeats stronger defenses.
[1] Xie et al. Model Poisoning Attacks to Federated Learning via Multi-Round Consistency. CVPR 2025. [2] Li et al. FedIMP: Parameter Importance-based Model Poisoning Attack against Federated Learning System. Computers & Security, 2024. [3] Zhang et al. Neurotoxin: Durable Backdoors in Federated Learning. ICML 2022.
Questions for authors
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Why is PoisonedFL classified as not feedback-guided in Table 1? What capability does COMPASS's feedback provide beyond PoisonedFL's use of historical global model changes?
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What is the main additional insight beyond importance-based poisoning, update-structure-aware persistence, and adaptive magnitude control?
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Why does COMPASS have limited impact against LASA on four datasets?
Clarifying COMPASS’s Novelty, Feedback Mechanism, and Experimental Comparisons
The central insight. COMPASS uses broadcast trajectories to construct a persistent lateral attack direction, then uses a matched-filter probe and local validation accuracy (LVA) to adapt attack strength. These observations address where to push the model and whether the push remains visible. All additions and revisions in the manuscript are highlighted in blue.
1. What differs from PoisonedFL? Our PoisonedFL baseline retains its original hypothesis test and adaptive magnitude adjustment (see
attackers/poisonedfl.py). PoisonedFL tests whether 50 rounds of global-model changes align with a fixed random direction. It holds the scaling factor on success and multiplies it by 0.7 on failure, subject to a lower bound. Thus, its feedback supports holding or shrinking magnitude.COMPASS instead embeds a small, known signed probe and correlates it with the next global-model change. Its matched filter score (MFS) indicates probe visibility in aggregation, while LVA measures attack effectiveness. Together, they enable increasing, decreasing, or holding magnitude.
2. How do the two signals control magnitude? COMPASS compares feedback trends rather than treating MFS as a binary filtering decision:
Thus, identical LVA trends can trigger opposite adjustments depending on MFS. Appendix F validates this feedback: counterfactual probe transmission strongly correlates with aggregation acceptance (ρ=0.987, 64 runs). MFS therefore provides an indication of malicious influence in aggregation.
3. How does COMPASS differ from FedIMP? FedIMP identifies important parameters using Fisher information, which measures loss sensitivity. COMPASS instead uses temporal variance across broadcast global models to identify actively changing parameters that may be effective targets for disrupting convergence. This requires no access to benign clients' updates.
In the new Appendix D (Impact of Attack Target Selection), replacing temporal-variance selection with Fisher-based selection within COMPASS reduces the number of defenses with final accuracy below 20% from 14/14 to 11/14 on MNIST.
Across six datasets and 16 aggregation rules (Tables 2 and 4–11), COMPASS achieves 1.95× the average accuracy impact of FedIMP. This reflects the combined contributions of trajectory-based target selection, orthogonal perturbation, matched-filter feedback, and adaptive magnitude control. The ablation isolates target selection, while the broader comparison evaluates the complete framework.
4. How does COMPASS differ from Neurotoxin? Neurotoxin targets less frequently updated parameters for backdoor persistence, whereas COMPASS selects high-temporal-variance parameters and applies persistent orthogonal perturbations. Neurotoxin is a backdoor attack, while COMPASS is an untargeted model poisoning attack. Given their different objectives, Neurotoxin is outside our experimental scope.
5. Why does COMPASS have limited impact against LASA? LASA retains the Top-k coordinates with the largest absolute magnitudes, making COMPASS's amplified weights more likely to survive sparsification. However, LASA then applies layer-wise norm and sign filtering. COMPASS amplifies important weights while slightly reducing others to control overall magnitude. If amplified coordinates cause abnormal layer norms, LASA may exclude their malicious contribution. This trade-off helps explain the limited impact on four datasets.
6. How are recent attacks and defenses covered? We thank the reviewer for this suggestion. We added FedIMP (Computers & Security, 2024) as an attack baseline and FoundationFL (NDSS 2025) and ARC (ICLR 2025) as defenses. All three are evaluated across six datasets alongside existing baselines (Tables 2 and 4–9).