- Rating
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- Confidence
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- Informativeness
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- Presentation
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- Soundness
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Paper summary
This paper proposes cold-start regret attenuation (CSRA) to handle the case with dominated actions, which multiplies the first non-zero regret of each information set by a constant c ∈ (0, 1] at the moment it appears and leaves every later update verbatim. The first strategy update is unchanged, the reduction costs one additive constant in the regret bound, and a single reduction preserves the convergence rate of any base algorithm whose analysis is sequence-agnostic.
Critical strengths
This paper extends CFR to overcome the challenge of CFR in some games.
Critical weaknesses
- The novelty is limited, and this paper does not discuss the relation between CSRA and Weighted Averaging Schemes for CFR in Noam Brown and Tuomas Sandholm. Solving imperfect-information games via discounted regret minimization. In Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, volume 33, pp. 1829–1836, 2019a.
- CSRA seems a special case of Weighted Averaging Schemes for CFR. The current setting in CSRA is equivalent to a non-decreasing weight sequence shown in Brown and Sandholm (2019a): c,c,…,c,1,1,1,…; i.e., if one assigns weight c to the zero regrets before non-zero term.
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The theory only preserves the base rate; it does not prove faster convergence.
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The results in figures and tables show that the proposed CSRA does not consistently outperform the best baselines; in most games it is neutral or worse.
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Presentation should be improved:
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v(a), r_t(a) are undefined
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What is the meaning of the bound in Proposition 1?
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In addition, CSRA(c) is used in Proposition 1, but it has not been introduced before Proposition 1.
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The theoretical condition should be stated and defined clearly, but "the perturbation protocol of Appendix C.4" in Lemma 2 made it confusing.
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The size of the font in figures and tables is too small to read. The bold locations in Table 1 seem wrong.
Questions for authors
Because CSRA has nothing to remove at games whose equilibrium is close to uniform over the good actions. How to determine whether the equilibrium is close to uniform over the good actions or not before computing the equilibrium?