- Rating
- 2
- Confidence
- 3
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 2
- Soundness
- 2
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Paper summary
The paper introduces studies the pointwise maximal cost (PMC) notion in the ridge regression setting. It uses PMC to evaluate the inherent privacy of the dataset itself. This paper applies it to the ridge regression setting, defines the corresponding terms, and compares with the standard differential privacy notion on simulated data sets.
A big difference between PMC and differential privacy is that PMC requires an underlying model, and DP guarantees the privacy whatever the dataset is. The current matching between the two notions are not persuasive.
Critical strengths
Strength: considers the inherent privacy of a dataset, and studies a notion other than the standard differential privacy. I think this diversity is good for the community.
Critical weaknesses
- The discussion of PMC (or the inherent privacy) is quite rare. With this new notion, I would wonder
- What is the new understanding of the privacy problem?
- How does the new notion connect with the classical differential privacy? For example, the new notion requires model assumptions while differential privacy does not need it, then how this difference affects the final result? To find , how the definition of DP affects this matching? What is the fair part and what is the unfair part? For the unfair part, how do we visualize it in the comparisons?
- Now it requries model assumptions. How do we solve this problem in real data applications?
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Limited numerical analysis, especially on the real datasets.
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Theoretical results are not very deep (not critical).
Questions for authors
See the weakness.
8 comments
Responses to the remaining points
Response to the third bullet point: We thank the reviewer for raising this practical limitation. Although our primary experiments assume a known Gaussian feature distribution, the general characterization is not restricted to Gaussian populations, as the secret-conditioning procedure only requires i.i.d. features. To illustrate this flexibility, Section 6.3 already considers a non-Gaussian feature population constructed from real-world measurements in the WDBC dataset, where the same qualitative privacy behavior is observed.
In practical applications, one could estimate the feature distribution using representative data and evaluate PMC under this estimated population model. However, the resulting privacy assessment would be conditional on the accuracy of that estimate, and lack of distribution specification could affect the calculated leakage. Developing robust PMC guarantees that account explicitly for uncertainty in the underlying distribution is therefore an interesting direction for future work.
Response to comments on numerical analysis and theoretical depth: We thank the reviewer for these comments. Regarding the numerical analysis, we would like to emphasize that our experiments cover a range of settings, including different training sample sizes, feature dimensions, membership priors, and protected target locations. In addition to the synthetic Gaussian experiments, Section 6.3 investigates a non-Gaussian feature distribution derived from the real-world WDBC dataset, where we observe similar privacy behavior. Further experimental results and numerical analyses are provided in Appendix D.
Regarding the theoretical contribution, we respectfully point the reviewer to the detailed proofs in Appendix B, which establish the exact conditional distribution of the ridge estimator, characterize the feature distributions under proximity membership and non-membership, and derive the corresponding secret-conditioned output distributions. These results require careful probabilistic conditioning and integration over the possible training datasets, rather than simply applying the definition of PMC. We believe that the technical derivations and the resulting exact characterization provide a meaningful theoretical foundation for evaluating the inherent privacy of ridge regression.
Thank you for the response. The current response is consistent with the paper's tune, but it does not address my concerns.
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PMC itself, raises another notion of privacy. However, this notion is not from the current paper. Hence, what is the new discovery in this paper? The current statement is quite general, like "how much observing a released model improves an adversary's inference about a protected secret". What is the general understanding of this problem? How does this work pushes this understanding to its boundary?
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The narrower scope of PMC is a big concern in the concept of DP. I don't think real data aligns with such a good model. Under this narrower assumption, do we really get new guidance on privacy?
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While this reponse aims to respond for the first two bullets, it only discusses Bullet 1. Still, there is limited data analysis.
Responses to the first two bullet points
Response to the first bullet point: We thank the reviewer for this question. The central insight of our work is that privacy need not be viewed exclusively as a property enforced by modifying a learning algorithm; it can also be evaluated for an individual model, trained via a standard noise-free training mechanism. Using PMC, we quantify how much observing a released model improves an adversary's inference about a protected secret, independently of any particular attack strategy. Our results demonstrate that ordinary ridge regression can exhibit relatively small privacy leakage even without any explicit privatization, with leakage varying across released models, protected targets, and training sample sizes.
This perspective is motivated by potential application in privacy certification of models (not of training algorithms), where a specific model trained inside a secure enclave is evaluated to determine whether it is safe to release from that enclave. We believe our framework provides a useful foundation for future investigations into the inherent privacy of other machine learning models.
Response to the second bullet point: We thank the reviewer for these helpful questions. PMC and DP provide different types of privacy guarantees. PMC measures the information disclosed by a particular trained model about a specified secret under an assumed data distribution, whereas DP provides a uniform guarantee over neighboring datasets without requiring assumptions about the data distribution. The narrower scope of PMC allows us to evaluate the inherent privacy of an unmodified model, potentially certifying it as sufficiently private, or "safe to release," without introducing additional noise. In contrast, we are not aware of any DP guarantees which can be made without introducing additional noise. As our experiments illustrate, avoiding such noise preserves substantially greater predictive utility.
Our choice of ϵmatch follows from the connection between PMC and log-likelihood ratios established in Section 5.2 and Appendix A.4. We first measure the privacy leakage of a released ridge regression model using PMC. We then determine the value of ϵmatch for which the upper bound on PMC implied by a symmetric log-likelihood-ratio constraint equals the observed leakage. We use ϵmatch in (ϵmatch,δ)-DP algorithms when comparing predictive utility, which guarantees an identical bound on log likelihood, as shown in the standard lemma (see response to reviewer 1) which we have included in a revision of the manuscript. This provides a principled way of comparing DP and PMC using identical bounds on the log likelihood, despite the fact that these are vastly different notions. Moreover, our approach to PMC does not involve any noise during training, and hence does not guarantee any form of DP.
We acknowledge that the comparison does not establish equivalent privacy protection. The comparable aspect is the predictive utility of the algorithms evaluated at privacy parameters which establish a common likelihood-ratio interpretation. The difference is that DP provides a broader, distribution-independent guarantee, whereas our PMC evaluation concerns a specific secret, population, and realized model. Another crucial difference is that PMC establishes guarantees for a single realized model trained without any privatization mechanism, whereas to the best of our knowledge such guarantees cannot be made via DP. We have made this distinction clearer in the revised manuscript and explicitly identified the scope of each guarantee when presenting the experimental comparisons.