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Paper summary
The paper introduces Ghost-LiRA, a per-sample membership inference attack that exploits the observation that privacy-vulnerable samples tend to be memorized later in training. Based on this observation, and assuming that an intermediate training checkpoint of the target model is available, the method leverages the gap between the intermediate and final checkpoints to identify training samples that were learned toward the end of the training process (hence more vulnerable to privacy attacks). The authors further suggest that Ghost-LiRA can be used by model owners to conduct privacy audits of their models and to evaluate the effectiveness of machine unlearning.
Critical strengths
Ghost-LiRA suggests a compelling per-sample MIA under limited computational budgets and with no required shadow model training, but under a strong assumption (availability of a training checkpoint of the target model being attacked).
The authors conducted extensive experiments across multiple datasets and model architectures that support their observation.
Critical weaknesses
The biggest drawback of the proposed approach is the assumption that an intermediate training checkpoint of the attacked target model is available to the attacker. If such a checkpoint is unavailable, the method becomes obsolete.
The methodological novelty of the paper is limited by prior works such as TrajectoryMIA and SeqMIA, which already exploit intermediate checkpoints for membership inference. In contrast to GhostLiRA, the previous methods did not assume availability of target checkpoints, but rather tried to estimate those. Hence, the comparison with SeqMIA in appendix H does not fully isolate the contribution of the respective attack mechanism. Ghost-LiRA uses the true intermediate checkpoints while SeqMIA is evaluated using approximated ones.
Questions for authors
Section 3 analyzes the limitations of population-based MIA. Mainly, it highlights the inversion of membership signals of valuable samples. However, previous works already well established the limitations of population-based MIA, and sample-based attacks are considered SoTA for a while. What new insight does Section 3 provide, and how is it relevant to the proposed method?
7 comments
Questions
Section 3's new insight and its relation to the proposed method. The limitations of population-based MIAs are known. What Section 3 adds is that the limitation is not merely a weak signal: on the most vulnerable samples, it can make leaking samples look safe.
Carlini et al. [A] report that the Loss attack falls below chance at low FPR on the whole population. Watson et al. [B] observe that uncalibrated attacks yield high FPR on easy non-members, but they also report results on the whole population. Neither work separately evaluates how population-based attacks behave on vulnerable samples. Meanwhile, unlearning evaluation has continued to rely on population-based attacks because of their low cost, a practice that treats their signal as weak but valid (Section 1). A weak signal would underestimate leakage while still pointing in the right direction. We address this gap by stratifying samples by privacy score and evaluating population-based attacks separately on the most vulnerable samples.
Aggregate metrics make the population-based signal look weak but valid. On the full CIFAR-10 forget set of the original model, Loss gives 1.14% TPR@1%FPR and 0.536 AUC, slightly above random. On the top-5% vulnerable subgroup of the same model, however, it gives 0.65% TPR@1%FPR and 0.441 AUC, ranking these vulnerable members below typical non-members (formerly Table 1, now Table 2). Our results thus show that on the most vulnerable samples, the population-based signal can be inverted. In unlearning, this difference changes the conclusion. After SCRUB, the aggregate Loss AUC is 0.417, which would conventionally read as successful forgetting. On the retrained model, which was never trained on the vulnerable samples of this forget set, Ghost-LiRA gives 0.06% TPR@1%FPR, the level expected when these samples are truly absent. After SCRUB, it gives 6.67% on the same samples, showing that Ghost-LiRA detects the residual leakage that the aggregate evaluation misses. An unlearning run that looks successful under aggregate population-based evaluation can therefore leave membership traces on vulnerable samples. On the other benchmarks and strata, population-based attacks likewise fall to or below random on the vulnerable subgroup (Figure 3b, Figures 7 and 8).
This diagnosis leads to the proposed method. If the final output alone cannot separate sample difficulty from membership, a per-sample reference is needed. Section 4 shows that, because vulnerable samples tend to be memorized late, intermediate checkpoints can provide this reference, and Ghost-LiRA subtracts it from the final output. On the same vulnerable subgroup of the original model, Ghost-LiRA reaches 30.32% TPR@1%FPR (formerly Table 1, now Table 2).
We believe this addresses the concerns raised, and would be glad to clarify any remaining point.
[A] N. Carlini et al. Membership inference attacks from first principles. (IEEE S&P 2022)
[B] L. Watson et al. On the importance of difficulty calibration in membership inference attacks. (ICLR 2022)
I thank the authors for their detailed response and revisions. I find the proposed idea interesting and potentially valuable, particularly the setting, which enables membership inference using a single independent reference model without requiring access to the target model's intermediate checkpoints. However, while is now presented as the paper's primary threat model, I believe its underlying mechanism and robustness warrant further investigation to support this more central role. A new approach of this kind requires a deeper empirical understanding of why it works, when it is effective, and where its limitations lie.
Some aspects that I believe remain insufficiently explored include:
1. Role of intermediate checkpoints. It remains unclear why intermediate checkpoints from an independent reference model should provide a better OUT reference than its final checkpoint, particularly for samples excluded from the reference model's training set.
2. Validity of the OUT approximation. The proxy-quality analysis in Appendix J considers only , leaving open whether the same approximation properties hold for an independently trained reference model ().
3. Performance relative to LiRA and RMIA. Ghost-LiRA () is promising and efficient, but its advantage varies across datasets, FPR thresholds, and shadow-model budgets. The conditions under which it outperforms existing attacks remain insufficiently characterized.
4. Robustness and limitations. The checkpoint-selection and sensitivity analyses also focus exclusively on , leaving the robustness of across checkpoint choices and training conditions insufficiently explored.
5. Scaling with additional reference models. It remains unclear how Ghost-LiRA would behave with multiple independent reference trajectories, whether additional reference models would improve its calibration, and how this would affect its performance–computation trade-off relative to LiRA and RMIA.
Overall, I appreciate the authors' efforts, the substantial experimental evaluation, and the improvements made during the rebuttal. My main reservation is not about the proposed idea, but about the gap between demonstrating that a new method works and developing a clear understanding of why and under what conditions it works. The points above illustrate aspects that remain insufficiently explored rather than a specific list of required experiments. Given the central role of in the revised paper, I believe this setting deserves a more thorough investigation. I therefore maintain my original score.
Thank you for recognizing per-sample MIA under a limited compute budget and our experiments across datasets and architectures. We have revised the PDF in response to your comments and list the revised locations below.
Weaknesses
1. Checkpoint assumption. The method remains applicable without target checkpoints. The original submission already described this setting in Section 5, where an adversary without the target's checkpoints trains a single model under the standard assumption of per-sample MIAs and uses its checkpoints as the OUT reference, and evaluated it in Appendix J.4. Since our main results used the target's intermediate checkpoints, the revision makes this setting, which does not use the target's checkpoints, the main threat model. The revisions are as follows, with locations referring to the revised PDF.
2. Novelty and comparison with TrajectoryMIA and SeqMIA. The asymmetry you describe was present in the submitted SeqMIA comparison. Both works assume the adversary sees only the target's outputs and approximate the trajectory by distillation, whereas the submitted Ghost-LiRA used the target's true intermediate checkpoints. To isolate this factor, we keep SeqMIA's setting unchanged and add to the same comparison table the Ghost-LiRA (N=1) result from Appendix J.4 of the submission. This variant does not use target checkpoints.
Our novelty does not lie in using intermediate states. We share with both works the intuition that the training process carries membership information. Both works start from the observation that member and non-member trajectories differ at the population level, feed the entire trajectory to a classifier, and leave it to classifier training to determine which state is informative for which sample. We start by answering that question directly, and the difference is twofold. (i) Rationale: we show experimentally that vulnerable samples tend to be memorized late in training (Section 4, Figure 2a), and this is our reason for using intermediate checkpoints. On the vulnerable subgroup, intermediate checkpoints lie closer to the true OUT mean than the final checkpoint does (Appendix J.1, formerly Table 10, now Table 11). (ii) Use: an intermediate checkpoint serves as each sample's OUT reference for per-sample calibration, and the resulting score is a monotone transform of the global-variance LiRA offline statistic (Appendix E). Both works apply a shared classifier to all samples and therefore have no per-sample calibration in this sense (Section 2).