- Rating
- 4
- Confidence
- 3
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 3
- Soundness
- 2
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Paper summary
The author(s) propose differentially private attributes of groups (DPAG) as a framework to ensure group-level privacy that directly bounds the contribution of each client-group pair towards training of machine learning models. DPAG avoids the disadvantage of extending individual-level DP to group privacy, where the privacy parameter scales with the number of individuals in the group. It is primarily intended to improve the group-level privacy–utility trade-off in cross-silo federated learning, but can also be extended to centralized learning settings. It achieves this by regarding the client–group pair as the atomic unit of privacy, bounding its contribution, and calibrating noise accordingly. Tables 1 and 2 demonstrate utility benefits on the evaluated tasks: DPAG avoids the ineffective group-privacy conversion (as in the case of standard individual-level DP) in the centralized setting and achieves substantially higher utility than client-level DP at matching (cell-level) privacy budgets in the FL setting.
Critical strengths
- The theory part of the paper is relatively straightforward. The author(s) primarily change the atomic unit of privacy from an individual to a cell, where a cell represents a client–group pair protected under DP, and subsequently develop contribution-bounding and noise-calibration mechanisms for this privacy unit.
- In the federated setting, DPAG avoids the group-size penalty of lifting standard individual-level DP to group privacy (the privacy budget scales by the number of individuals in the group). For a fixed clipping bound, DPAG reduces sensitivity by a factor of compared with client-level DP, where is the number of predefined groups.
- The cell-based privacy audit using a group-level analogue of membership inference (Appendix A.6) strengthens the paper's position. DPAG does preserve utility at the risk of higher attack AUC but client-level DP can severely impact the utility to preserve privacy. This is a candid analysis undertaken by the author(s) rather than trying to embellish the paper with selective (positive) results in favor of DPAG.
Critical weaknesses
- In the FL setting, the paper assumes roughly equal group sizes/ distribution among clients. It does not systematically investigate how group-size imbalance across clients affects utility, particularly for small groups. The authors acknowledge the related challenge of learning from smaller group-specific datasets in lines 472–474 (Section 6; Limitations).
Questions for authors
Suggestions
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Neither the abstract nor the contributions mention any results which quantify the advantage of using DPAG over the direct cell-level standard DP or group privacy algorithms. This is needed to put into perspective the gain one should expect if they switch to DPAG as opposed to the other alternatives.
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With the contributions listed in Page 2, also mention the sections in the paper corresponding to them. This enhances readability of the paper.
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The wrapfigure for Figure 1 needs to be corrected. Blank space below it is leaking into Page 6.
5 comments
Follow-up
Dear Reviewer XARi,
Thank you again for the positive assessment and constructive suggestions. We have now added the direct cell-level DP-FedAvg comparison, clarified the existing group-size imbalance, and incorporated the presentation changes you suggested.
The new matched-granularity experiment further strengthens the empirical case for DPAG. Please let us know if any questions remain.
Discussion period ends today
Dear Reviewer XARi,
As the author discussion period ends today, we just wanted to briefly follow up and thank you again for your positive assessment and constructive suggestions.
We have incorporated the requested matched cell-level comparison and presentation clarifications. Please let us know if any questions remain before the discussion closes.
Direct Cell-Level Comparison and Imbalanced-Group Analysis Strengthen the Empirical Evaluation
Thank you for the positive assessment and for highlighting the practical relevance of the privacy objective, the 1/∣G∣ sensitivity reduction in the federated mechanism, and the complete-cell replacement audit. We agree that the two points you raise can make the empirical contribution substantially clearer, we address them below.
Group-size imbalance - To clarify, the real-world imaging experiment in fact already operates in a strongly imbalanced regime. The ten group slots per hospital are fixed and public, but only 91 of the 100 possible hospital-group cells are non-empty. Among non-empty cells, the median size is 3 patients and the maximum is 33, with several hospitals missing particular groups entirely. The formal sensitivity result is independent of these counts because every public slot receives the same fixed weight 1/∣G∣. We agree with your broader point that very small groups can still reduce utility because their cell-specific trajectories must be estimated from little data. We will make this distinction clearer in the discussion.
Direct cell-level DP comparison - We also followed your suggestion to quantify the benefit relative to a standard mechanism operating at exactly the same privacy granularity. We implemented DP-FedAvg in which every hospital-group cell is treated as an independent virtual user, while matching DPAG's protected cells, contribution cap, clipping norm, fixed aggregation weights, privacy budgets, model, and optimization.
At ϵ=8,16,32, this direct cell-level baseline obtains Dice
0.186\pm0.091,\quad 0.230\pm0.185,$$ whereas DPAG obtains $$0.631\pm0.030,\quad 0.692\pm0.043,\quad 0.730\pm0.030.$$ This comparison shows the benefit of the federated construction on top of changing the privacy unit. If the $HG$ cells are privatized independently before server aggregation, the aggregate Gaussian noise scale is $2Sz/\sqrt{HG}$. DPAG instead first bounds and aggregates the $G$ cell contributions within each institution and privatizes one institutional message with cell-replacement sensitivity $2S/G$, yielding aggregate noise $2Sz/$G\sqrt H\$\$. Hence DPAG reduces the aggregate noise by a factor $\sqrt G$ with $G=10$ in our experiments. With the existing client-update comparison, this shows that protecting the whole institution is unnecessarily costly when the sensitive object is one hospital-group cell. Privatizing every cell separately also loses utility because it fails to exploit the nested cross-silo structure. DPAG, on the other hand, retains substantially higher utility while preserving the same formal cell-level adjacency. We will add this quantitative comparison to the abstract and contribution discussion. We will also add section references to the contribution bullets and correct the Figure 1 wrapping issue as suggested. We appreciate that the review identified the cell-replacement audit as a strength. We will retain its current cautious interpretation in that it provides empirical evidence complementary to the formal guarantee, while the formal privacy claim continues to come from the DP mechanism itself.