- Rating
- 3
- Confidence
- 3
- Informativeness
- 1
- Presentation
- 2
- Soundness
- 2
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Paper summary
The paper proposes a defense against privacy leakage in text corpora. The author propose PrivMask, which mitigates privacy leakage in text corpora via adaptive masking and contextual reconstruction, while preserving task-relevant semantics and downstream utility. Extensive experiments across diverse domains show that PrivMask outperforms existing methods, achieving high accuracy while preserving semantic coherence.
Critical strengths
- The work first proposes a category-aware sensitive proportion masking mechanism that adaptively masks sensitive content by modeling category-level sensitivity and contextual risk.
- The context-aware reconstruction model retains task-relevant semantics without leaking the original private data, achieving a robust privacy-utility trade-off.
Critical weaknesses
- The implementation and training complexity of this method are relatively high.
- The evaluation is limited to text and does not account for multimodal scenarios.
- Which specific llm served as the evaluating attackers in the experiments related to Table 2? For strategies involving prompt optimization and iterative feedback, the paper could consider introducing TRACE-RPTS [1] as a baseline.
[1] Stop Tracking Me! Proactive Defense Against Attribute Inference Attack in LLMs. In Proc. ICLR, 2026.
Questions for authors
Please refer to the weaknesses detailed above.
3 comments
Dear Reviewer,
We would like to express our sincere appreciation for your constructive feedback and recognition of our work. Your suggestions have been particularly valuable in strengthening the experimental evaluation of PrivMask.
In response to your concerns, we have clarified the implementation complexity, multimodal scope, and evaluation attacker configuration. More importantly, following your recommendation, we have implemented TRACE-RPS and conducted additional experiments across all three datasets, providing further evidence of PrivMask's effectiveness in balancing privacy and utility.
We hope you have had an opportunity to review our responses and the new experimental results. We would greatly appreciate any further feedback you may have. If these additional results and clarifications have strengthened your assessment of our work, we would be grateful if you could consider updating your score accordingly.
Thank you again for your time, thoughtful suggestions, and continued consideration.
Thank you for the detailed responses. I will maintain my positive score.
Clarifications on Implementation, Evaluation Scope, and Additional TRACE-RPS Experiments
Q: Implementation and Training Complexity
A: We appreciate this concern. While PrivMask requires an initial training phase, this is a one-time cost. Once trained, PrivMask enables efficient sanitization without repeated attacker–defender interactions or iterative API calls. To further demonstrate this advantage, we measured end-to-end (E2E) latency across three datasets. PrivMask achieves mean E2E latencies of 1.92/31.35/31.43s/sample, compared with 7.41/53.56/56.32s/sample for fine-tuned Gemma3-4B and 71.85/125.15/155.18s/sample for AF. These results demonstrate PrivMask's favorable inference efficiency and deployment potential.
Q: Text-Only Evaluation and Multimodal Scope
A: We thank the review for this valueable comment. PrivMask currently focuses on privacy protection in text corpora, covering general, legal, and medical domains. Text anonymization is itself an independent and widely studied task, and it is the modality in which most privacy regulations (e.g., GDPR, HIPAA) are operationalized and most existing anonymization benchmarks are defined. Extending PrivMask to multimodal scenarios (e.g., scanned documents with embedded text, or image-text pairs) would require OCR, cross-modal entity linking, and PII detection over visual and layout cues, which involve distinct technical challenges beyond the scope of this paper. We therefore leave multimodal anonymization to future work.
Q: Evaluation Attacker for Table 2
A: We thank the review for pointing this out. We employ GPT-5.5 as the evaluation attacker for the ASR results in Table 2. The attack prompts and parameter settings follow the free-text inference attack paradigm (Staab et al., 2024), in which the attacker is allowed to generate unrestricted natural-language responses to infer hidden sensitive information from the sanitized context.
Q: Additional TRACE-RPS Baseline
A: We sincerely appreciate the reviewer for recommending TRACE-RPS (ICLR 2026), which provides a valuable approach to privacy protection through adversarial feedback and attention-guided sanitization. We have carefully considered this strong baseline and conducted additional experiments using the following configurations:
These adaptations allow the baseline to address the multi-category privacy characteristics of our datasets while preserving its core adversarial feedback mechanism.
Additional utility results for TRACE-RPS (2026):
Additional privacy results for TRACE-RPS (2026):
These results highlight TRACE-RPS's strong privacy protection and semantic preservation and confirm that PrivMask remains competitive across both utility and privacy metrics. Further results are provided in the revised main text and appendix.