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- Confidence
- 3
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 3
- Soundness
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Paper summary
The paper proposes Surprise Masking (SM), a simple to prevent language models from learning private or unwanted content. Specifically, a public reference model is used to score token windows by their mean negative log-likelihood. Tokens with the score higher than a given threshold are masked out of the training loss but stay visible as context. Variants include global and local thresholds, prompted scoring, consensus voting, and duplicate propagation. The effectiveness of SM is empirically validated with comprehensive experiments on different datasets and tasks.
Critical strengths
The method is cheap, simple, and needs no trained detector. In the code settings it improves the privacy–utility tradeoff by a large margin, including on stylistic quirks that PII scrubbers cannot catch. The paper reports its failure cases honestly. The distributional AUROC analysis gives practitioners a concrete way to decide in advance whether SM will work.
Critical weaknesses
- The novelty of the paper is limited. Perplexity-based token masking and filtering already exist (Wu et al., 2025; DePA; Goldfish), so the contribution is mostly a new application and a broader evaluation.
- The experimental setup is narrow and artificial where the main results use synthetic data, a single coding library, small models or LoRA and a fairly specific prefix-completion attacker.
- The proposed method requires a chosen threshold and window length. To better choose those parameters, a labeled, in-distribution validation set are needed, which may not be practically available and threshold transfer across domains is inconsistent. SM gives no formal privacy guarantee.
Minor issues:
- There is a broken references (“??”) at line 272;
- A duplicated sentence is written in the Figure 3 caption.
Questions for authors
- How does SM differ conceptually from earlier perplexity-based token masking (Wu et al., 2025) and from DePA, beyond being applied to privacy? What part of the method do you consider new?
- In Code PII, each private value appears in 100 chats. How does SM perform when a secret appears only once or a few times, which is more common in practice? Have you tested SM on any real (non-synthetic) codebase?
- SM’s thresholds are tuned on a labeled, in-distribution validation set. How should practitioners build one when labels are not available? How well does SM work with a fixed default threshold or an unsupervised selection rule?