LLM Anonymization Against Agentic Re-Identification

Agentic LLMs with web search change the threat model for text anonymization: weak contextual cues can become cross-referenceable evidence for re-identification, yet those same details also carry downstream analytic value of the text. Existing defenses either remove explicit identifiers, perturb text for formal privacy, or test rewritten text against non-web inference models, leaving underexplored the operating region between resistance to agentic web-search re-identification and utility retention. We introduce AURA (Anonymization with Utility-Retention Adaptation), an LLM-powered mask-reconstruct framework that decouples privacy localization from utility-preserving reconstruction and selects candidates with adversarial privacy and utility-retention checks. We evaluate AURA on real-user interview transcripts using re-identification attacks carried out by web-search agents, along with a utility evaluation based on interviewee-profile facts, codebook facts, and the joint contextual utility grid. Our results show that adaptive-scope AURA yields the lowest agentic re-identification counts under each of three attacker models among the non-DP methods, and that at matched scope and backbone, AURA's mask-reconstruct design retains more contextual utility than the prior LLM anonymizer (+6.4 pp unit-grid recovery) at comparable privacy Source Code: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/AURA-2AC1.