- Rating
- 3
- Confidence
- 4
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 3
- Soundness
- 3
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Paper summary
The paper proposes the task of re-identification from anonymized text using AI agents with access to web search.
Specifically, they construct a synthetic interview dataset based on real world identifiers from public identities. First, they source public individuals from Reddit and use LLMs to extract personal attributes. Next, they derive questions from Anthropic's workforce interviews and generate synthetic interviews while incorporating certain attributes and redacting direct identifiers.
They then evaluate 15 model configurations in re-identifying individuals from the interviews. For 4 models, they explicitly compare the success with and without web search enabled.
They find that enabling web search increases precision and recall across setups, and that confidence reported by the model (e.g., "very high") can serve as an effective calibration for high precision and scalable re-identification;
They then analyse the range of strategies in search and retrieval by model, and evaluate the effectiveness of a range of mitigation strategies. Importantly, they find that providing privacy instructions in the system prompt as a mitigation technique does not suffice, as agents may re-identify people in their traces/retrievals while complying in their final answer.
Critical strengths
- The paper studies an important problem. Re-identification with auxiliary data used to be a very tedious and hard-to-evaluate engineering task that may or may not be possible, while AI agents enabled with web search redefine this landscape. This prompts a more thorough evaluation of agent's capabilities in this domain and of the risk and potential mitigations.
- The paper is well written.
- The paper is well positioned in related work.
- The quality checks and validation of the data generation is quite rigorous and compelling.
- The analysis of the search and retrieval strategies is rigorous and interesting.
- Authors discuss mitigations strategies at length, and the insight that mitigation "requires auditing what the agent retrieves and assembles, not only what it states" is useful for future work.
Critical weaknesses
- In a way I like the point about parametric knowledge being a re-identification risk, but as far as I understand it, this may be an artifact of how the data has been constructed, i.e., based on public identities. While the point remains valid for the data at hand, I wonder how generalizable these findings would be for individuals not exposing their identity on Reddit. The paper would benefit from making related claims a bit more nuanced.
- Generally, the data considered in this work remains synthetic and based on a biased set of individuals, so while I believe it would guide progress in this field, their results might not be very generalizable. Authors acknowledge this in the limitations, but it remains a weakness that (currently) refrains me from voting for clear accept.
- Small point, but I feel like Section 4.1 could start with an overview of the main results rather than diving directly into the self-reported confidence.
- Maybe in general, the results section would read more easily if the authors would refer to the results in the tables or figures. This made Section 4.3 tough to digest.
- Maybe the following pieces of related work might be relevant to cite:
Annamalai, M. S. M. S., De Cristofaro, E., & Kairouz, P. (2026). CLIOPATRA: Extracting Private Information from LLM Insights.
Krčo, N., Yao, Z., Meeus, M., & de Montjoye, Y. A. (2026). Rat-bench: A comprehensive benchmark for text anonymization.
Questions for authors
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Authors mention that different agents might use different strategies for re-identification, and have a different calibration of confidence. How could an attacker combine different model's re-identification attempts to come to a better score? This seems the most realistic threat model to me.
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Could authors provide a more detailed comparison between their contributions and the ones from Lermen et al. (2026)? I don't think there is a novelty issue, but I'd like to make sure I properly understand the differences.
4 comments
Part B: Q1 (Combining multiple models for re-identification), Q2 (Comparison with Lermen et al., 2026)
Q1 (Combining multiple models for re-identification)
We analyzed the union of correct identifications across all 15 model configurations, which covers 62.4% of interviews, compared with 48.3% for the strongest individual configuration. This shows substantial complementary identification capabilities across models and highlights how re-identification risks could be further amplified when multiple LLM agents leverage tools such as web search.
Q2 (Comparison with Lermen et al., 2026)
Lermen et al. (2026) demonstrate the feasibility and scalability of LLM-based deanonymization through their Extract-Search-Reason-Calibrate pipeline, including cross-platform identity matching and re-identification of 9 out of 33 scientists from the Anthropic Interviewer dataset.
AGENTDOXX addresses the complementary research question: how web search amplifies re-identification risk, what drives re-identification, and how effectively different defenses mitigate these risks. Our contributions differ in three key aspects:
- Controlled evaluation: We construct a known-identity evaluation suite of multi-round anonymized interview transcripts, enabling systematic analysis of re-identification rate, search behavior, and defenses across model configurations.
- Mechanism analysis: Through search/no-search and reasoning-effort ablations and retrieval-trajectory analysis, we examine the roles of parametric knowledge and web retrieval, including whether search discovers an identity or corroborates an existing candidate.
- Mitigation evaluation: We evaluate text-level anonymization and agent-level privacy safeguards, revealing how identifying information can remain exposed during retrieval even when final responses withhold identities. We further explore using attack trajectories to localize identifying spans for more targeted anonymization.
While Lermen et al. establish the practical feasibility and scalability of LLM-based deanonymization, AGENTDOXX systematically evaluates the mechanisms driving re-identification and the effectiveness of privacy protections across different stages of agent execution.
We hope these clarifications address the reviewer's concerns and thank the reviewer for the valuable feedback. We are more than happy to provide additional details if any further questions remain.
Response to rebuttal
Many thanks for the detailed response, which answers most of my concerns. I keep my current (positive) score.
Thank you for your reply! We're happy that our responses have been helpful in addressing your concerns.
Part A: W1 (Parametric knowledge and public identities), W2 (Synthetic data bias and generalizability), W3, W4, W5 (Clarity and organization)
We thank the reviewer for the detailed feedback. We address each point below:
W1 (Parametric knowledge and public identities)
AGENTDOXX uses individuals with publicly verifiable identities to enable reliable measurement of re-identification outcomes. We exclude r/IAmA search results from the agents' retrieved evidence, so successful identification does not depend on directly retrieving the original identity-disclosing Reddit posts. Our evaluation allows us to investigate how model knowledge and web retrieval contribute to identification.
To further characterize the role of public identity information, we added occupation-level analyses across 822 individuals spanning 183 occupation categories, revealing substantial variation in re-identification risk within this population. Professors have a mean high-confidence recall of 0.51, compared with 0.06 for actors. This finding highlights how distinctive combinations of publicly searchable attributes, such as institutional affiliation, research area, and publications, shape re-identification risk beyond public prominence alone.
Relevant sections: Agentic Search and Retrieval Strategies (Section 4.2); Occupation-Level Analyses (Appendix C.3, C.4).
W2 (Synthetic data bias and generalizability)
We examined all 1250 real Anthropic Interviewer transcripts and identified 43 verified matches (3.4%), providing evidence of re-identification risks in authentic anonymized conversations. To evaluate these risks systematically, we constructed AGENTDOXX with known ground-truth identities, enabling reliable measurement of re-identification outcomes. We also assessed the realism of our synthetic interviews, our generation procedure incorporates identifying attributes naturally across conversational turns rather than forcing all source attributes into the transcripts. In our human study, 30 evaluators made 300 judgments and achieved 49.3% overall accuracy in distinguishing synthetic from real interviews, close to the 50% chance baseline.
AGENTDOXX is designed to evaluate re-identification mechanisms rather than estimate population-level risk. Its controlled setting allows us to compare 15 model configurations, isolate the contributions of web search and reasoning effort, analyze retrieval trajectories, and evaluate mitigation effectiveness. While the synthetic data and selected population limit the generalizability of measured success rates, the findings establish the practical relevance of the threat, and our controlled evaluation provides empirical insights into the mechanisms underlying re-identification.
Relevant sections: Motivating Study (Appendix A); Synthetic Data Validation (Section 3.2); Re-identification Experiments (Section 4).
W3, W4, W5 (Clarity and organization)
We revised Section 4.1 to improve readability and make the supporting evidence easier to locate. Throughout the results section, we also strengthened references to figures and tables, and we expanded Appendix C with supporting analyses and visualizations.
We appreciate the suggestions of CLIOPATRA and Rat-bench and will review these works and cite them where appropriate in a subsequent revision.