- Rating
- 2
- Confidence
- 3
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 3
- Soundness
- 2
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Paper summary
This paper presents COMBAT for transferring refusal and harm-detection directions across aligned LLMs. It extracts directions from a source model, maps them to a target model through ridge-regression bridges, and uses CSTU to select intervention configurations while limiting changes to harmless-prompt behavior. The evaluation covers 20 ordered pairs of five 7–8B models across six safety benchmarks. COMBAT achieves a reported 96.2% ASR, compared with 88.7% for target-native directions under the same configured search budget. The paper also includes ablations and analyses of transferability, bridge quality, and intervention sensitivity.
Critical strengths
The paper addresses an interesting question about whether safety-related directions can transfer across models. I particularly appreciate the motivation drawn from the Platonic Representation Hypothesis, which provides an intuitive and compelling basis for exploring cross-model transferability. The evaluation is comprehensive, covering all 20 source–target pairs. COMBAT consistently outperforms target-native directions under the same configured budget, suggesting potential benefits from cross-model transfer. The randomized bridge and direction controls further support the role of learned cross-model correspondence rather than arbitrary activation perturbations.
Critical weaknesses
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The practical motivation for white-box cross-model transfer is unclear. COMBAT requires access to the target model's internal representations and activations. Given such access, an attacker could directly optimize attacks against the target rather than transfer directions from another model. Moreover, COMBAT cannot directly support white-box-to-black-box transfer, where transferability would be more practically relevant. This raises concerns about the significance of the proposed threat model.
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Several baselines consider white-box-to-black-box transfer, where attackers have no internal access to the target model. In contrast, COMBAT requires white-box access to both models, including target-side activation intervention. These methods operate under substantially different threat models and attacker capabilities, making direct ASR comparisons unfair. The reported superiority over these baselines therefore does not convincingly establish COMBAT's advantage.
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The evaluation is limited to white-box interventions on 7–8B open-weight models. While this is a reasonable setting for studying activation-level attacks, it remains unclear how well the findings generalize to larger models or different alignment procedures. The target models also differ considerably in their initial vulnerability, making aggregate ASR less informative without considering individual targets.
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The paper demonstrates that transferred directions can weaken safety behavior, but offers limited discussion or evidence of how these findings could inform defensive auditing or mitigation. This mainly limits the scope and significance of the contribution.
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The comparison with target-native directions is not fully convincing from a computational-cost perspective. The matched budget appears to cover configuration search, while COMBAT additionally requires source-side direction extraction and bridge fitting. Although some of these costs can be amortized, the current results do not establish an advantage under equal end-to-end compute.
Questions for authors
- What practical scenario motivates white-box cross-model transfer when the attacker can directly attack the target model? What advantage does COMBAT offer over target-specific activation attacks?
- Several baselines assume black-box target access, while COMBAT requires white-box access. How do the authors justify comparing attack success rates under different attacker capabilities?
- Does the equal-budget comparison account for direction extraction and bridge fitting, or only configuration search? Would COMBAT retain its advantage under equal end-to-end computation?
- Why do target-native directions perform substantially worse than mapped directions in the anchor-matched analysis (Appendix E.1)? Is this due to configuration constraints, direction scaling, or intrinsic differences?
- Does harmless-prompt next-token KL reliably reflect downstream utility? Can the authors provide generation-level or benign-task evaluations to support this claim?
- To what extent do the findings extend beyond 7–8B open-weight models, particularly to larger models and different alignment procedures?
Response to Reviewer 7xp2
We agree that target access, practical auditing value and transfer beyond the original scale should be stated more explicitly.
Q1. Target access. COMBAT audits open-weight targets with white-box access. The source is another open-weight model supplying refusal/harm-detection directions; target-layer-specific ridge bridges map them into the target space. Full COMBAT uses both mapped directions. Target Native extracts both directions directly from the target and independently selects its intervention configuration. It is the primary access-matched comparator; black-box input-space attacks are contextual references under different target-access assumptions.
Q2. Auditing value. ASR-GPT counts a response as successful when the GPT judge finds harmful content matching the requested objective. Across 18,925 paired audits with identical benchmark items and prompt identifiers, COMBAT has 17,141 successes versus 16,943 for equal-budget Target Native. Both succeed on 15,985 prompts; COMBAT succeeds on 1,156 prompts where Target Native does not. COMBAT-only successes account for 6.4% of all prompts on which either method succeeds. These 1,156 prompt identifiers and fixed settings form a target-specific regression set for checking whether the same successful jailbreaks persist after mitigation or safety fine-tuning.
Q3. Forward budget. COMBAT preprocessing uses 1,536 source + 512 target model–prompt forwards and 32–48 closed-form ridge fits, with no LLM backward pass. Raw Target Native uses 1,024 target forwards; forward-budget-matched Native gets 1,024 extra target forwards as 16 development-only candidates on the same 64 prompts. Preprocessing plus proxy search totals 102,400–604,160 forwards for each method. Each confirms its own top 96 candidates with matched confirmation counts, target-generation budgets and test sets. COMBAT reaches 88.1% ASR-GPT versus 83.6% (+4.5 pp).
Q4. Direction quality. To separate direction quality from deployment choices and intervention strength, the control fixes the same central target layer, seven-layer triangular window, three intervention sites and α/β strengths for both methods; only mapped versus target-extracted refusal/harm-detection directions change. Across 25 paired runs (five pairs × five seeds), mapped directions improve mean ASR-GPT by +2.5 pp, win on 80.0% of pairs and improve the mean on all five benchmarks. A separate target-native self-ridge control applies ridge filtering using target information only: Full COMBAT reaches 91.7% versus 89.0% ASR-GPT (+2.7 pp), winning on 80.0% of pairs.
Gains vary by target: +5.6 pp for Llama→Qwen, +4.7 pp for Qwen→InternLM and +3.3 pp for Mistral→Llama. Two leave-one-out analyses select methods without the held-out result. Holding out one seed, selection between COMBAT and Target Native uses the other four seeds for that pair and beats always choosing either method. Holding out one benchmark, source-model selection uses the other four benchmarks, adding 16 successes (+0.4 pp) over the paper's fixed cyclic source assignment.
Q5. Benign utility. Against independently selected equal-budget Target Native, Full COMBAT's harmless-prompt KL is 1.6% lower. Downstream tasks complement next-token KL's local distribution measure; the five-target results are:
Q6. Cross-size transfer. For Qwen-0.6B (28L)→Vicuna-13B (40L), depth interpolation gives ASR-GPT of 96.0/89.4/88.0/86.0/87.4% on AdvBench/HarmBench/JailbreakBench/MaliciousInstruct/WildJailbreak-AH, respectively. The benign-task results above are a separate five-target evaluation.
The added Qwen3 transfers use 0.6B/1.7B sources (28L) and 4B/8B targets (36L). Interpolation mixes the source layers adjacent to the target's relative-depth position; same index uses the same absolute layer; Hard relative-depth assignment rounds to the nearest source layer. Each cell below lists ASR-GPT (%) in the same five-benchmark order.
Interpolation ranks first among these rules, supporting the paper default in the evaluated cross-scale settings.