- Rating
- 3
- Confidence
- 4
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 3
- Soundness
- 2
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Paper summary
The paper first finds through causal interventions that optimization-based jailbreaking methods tend to rely on a small set of localized attack representations, which directly results in poor transferability of these generated attacks to other models for which these attack representations don't activate as strongly. To mitigate this issue, the paper proposes CR, a regularization term for use during optimization-based jailbreaking, which aims to more evenly distribute attack contributions throughout the model representations. The paper provides strong evidence for the first attack localization claim, and CR also improves the transferability of attacks like GCG and AutoDAN to new model families.
Critical strengths
- The causal intervention analysis motivating CR is very intuitive, convincing and well-presented. The authors are able to show clear evidence of strong localization of attack representations in source models, which do not transfer well to target models.
- CR itself is a plug and play approach that can improve the robustness of most optimization-based jailbreaking methods, albeit marginally as per the results in the paper. It also proves to reduce the detectability of GCG attacks via perplexity-based methods. Ablations also show that CR substantially reduces the localization of attack representations when used during training.
Critical weaknesses
- The primary weakness of the paper lies in the relatively marginal empirical gains driven by CR. Evaluation on more contemporary methods and jailbreaking datasets would also build more confidence in the method.
- CR is also weakened by the absence of an analysis of the computational overhead incurred by including it as a loss term during training, as compared to the standard loss terms for methods like GCG and AutoDAN. This limits it's practical utility.
- I also believe that the causal analysis should control for the magnitude of the affirmative response probabilities. It is possible that the causal effect is smaller on target models because the base probability of the generations is also inherently lower.
Questions for authors
- It would be good to clarify what "transfer", "source" and "target" models mean earlier in the introduction.
- Is the locations of the sensitive region the same across prompts and models? Some analysis here could be interesting, and suggest approaches to defend against these optimization-based jailbreak attacks.
- Small error in Table 2: Sonnet 4.6 row and GCG column reports an increase from 0 to 0.2 as a 19.2% improvement.
4 comments
Response to Reviewer ri9Y (Part 2/2)
Base Probability and Target Causal Effect (W3)
Thank you for raising this thoughtful point regarding the magnitude of affirmative response probabilities. In fact, the smaller causal effects on the target side stem from cross-model transfer rather than an inherently lower base probability on the target model. To verify this directly, we conduct a bidirectional comparison between DeepSeek and Mistral using all 40 prompts from Section 3.2, measuring causal effects under both in-domain optimisation and cross-model transfer.
| Suffix Optimization Model | Effect Measurement Model | Mean Causal Effect (μ) |
|---|---|---|
| DeepSeek | DeepSeek | 0.0338 |
| Mistral | Mistral | 0.1781 |
| DeepSeek | Mistral | 6.41 × 10⁻⁴ |
| Mistral | DeepSeek | 5.79 × 10⁻³ |
As shown in the first two rows (in-domain optimisation), Mistral exhibits a mean causal effect of the same order of magnitude as, and even higher than, DeepSeek, contradicting the hypothesis that the smaller target-side causal effects arise from inherently low affirmative response probabilities. More importantly, the last two rows reveal a consistent pattern in both transfer directions: causal effects decrease substantially when suffixes are transferred across models, regardless of which model serves as the target. These findings suggest that the reduced causal effects are primarily associated with cross-model transfer rather than an inherent limitation of either target model, further supporting our findings in Section 3.2.
Clarifying Source, Target, and Transfer in the Introduction (Q1)
Thank you very much for this helpful suggestion. We agree that the initial transition among these concepts could be clearer to a first-time reader, and we have revised Section 1 (lines 40 and 44) in the updated manuscript to make their relationship clearer.
Distribution of Sensitive Regions and Potential Defences (Q2)
Thank you for this insightful question. As illustrated in Figures 2 and 3, while sensitive regions generally concentrate in early and middle layers, their precise locations vary across attacks, with individual attacks relying on a few highly influential local representations (Figure 2) and their aggregation across 20 attacks revealing a broader distribution (Figure 3). This is because optimisation-based attacks exploit vulnerabilities in a high-dimensional space, which may correspond to different token positions when projected onto the layer-token space.
From a defensive perspective, our causal intervention framework could also serve as a diagnostic tool to identify which internal representations are most sensitive to different attacks. By comparing these regions across attacks, defenders could identify potential shared vulnerabilities and develop more targeted defensive strategies.
Correction in Table 2 (Q3)
Thank you very much for your careful reading and for pointing this out. In the revised manuscript, we have corrected this typo in the Sonnet 4.6 row of Table 2 in the revised version.
If you have any further questions or concerns, please feel free to reach out.
References
[1] Huang, Yangsibo, et al. "Catastrophic jailbreak of open-source llms via exploiting generation." International Conference on Learning Representations. Vol. 2024. 2024.
I thank the authors for the transparency in their response regarding the performance of CR. I retain my score, but lean more strongly towards acceptance after this rebuttal.
Thank you for your prompt response, and we are glad that our additional experiments and clarifications addressed your concerns. We truly appreciate your positive support and will make sure to include all these updates in the next version of the paper.
Best regards,
The Authors
Response to Reviewer ri9Y (Part 1/2)
We sincerely appreciate your time and effort in reviewing our manuscript. Below are our responses to your valuable comments.
Thank you for your valuable comment. We understand your concern regarding the gap between relative and absolute gains across different settings. In fact, CR operates as a plug-in regularisation module rather than a standalone attack, so its absolute ASR naturally depends on the strength of the underlying baseline. For commercial models such as Sonnet 4.6, GPT-6 Astra, and Luna, GCG-family attacks already stay near zero ASR, making substantial absolute improvements particularly challenging. Nevertheless, CR consistently delivers meaningful relative improvements even in these challenging settings. Meanwhile, when combined with a stronger baseline such as AutoDAN, CR delivers clear absolute improvements. Consistently improving transferability across baselines of varying strengths demonstrates the broad effectiveness and universality of our causal perspective and CR method.
To further expand our dataset coverage beyond HarmBench and AdvBench, we additionally evaluate CR on MaliciousInstruct [1] using Qwen-3-8B as the source model under the same fixed regularisation configurations. We have incorporated these additional benchmark results into Appendix F of our revised manuscript.
Transfer ASR (%) on MaliciousInstruct using Qwen-3-8B as the source model.
Thank you for raising this practical point regarding the computational overhead and utility of CR. We evaluate the runtime and memory costs of incorporating CR into GCG and AutoDAN using DeepSeek-LLM-7B-Chat as the source model on HarmBench, with experiments conducted on an AMD Instinct MI250X (1 GCD).
GCG vs. CR-GCG
AutoDAN vs. CR-AutoDAN
As shown in the tables above, incorporating CR indeed introduces non-negligible computational overhead, increasing the total attack generation time by approximately 5.62× for GCG and 6.30× for AutoDAN. However, we would like to emphasise that our primary objective is to generate transferable jailbreak attacks that can assess the vulnerabilities of multiple LLMs through a single attack generation process, which is inherently more time-efficient than crafting separate attacks for each model. Moreover, the memory overhead remains relatively modest, increasing by only 1.40× for GCG and 1.22× for AutoDAN. These runtime and memory evaluations have also been included in Appendix C of our revised manuscript.