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Paper summary
This paper proposes a representation-level jailbreaking method based on PCA and Gaussian Optimal Transport (OT). Unlike previous refusal ablation methods that primarily manipulate a single refusal direction, the proposed approach models harmful and harmless activations as Gaussian distributions and learns an affine transformation to align their means and covariance structures. PCA is introduced to reduce computational complexity, while layer-selective intervention is employed to improve attack effectiveness and preserve model utility.
Experiments on six LLMs from the Llama and Qwen families show improvements over RFA and AcT in attack success rate (ASR), with varying effects on generation quality.
Critical strengths
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Clear presentation. The paper is well-structured and easy to follow. The motivation, mathematical formulation, and implementation are clearly presented.
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Practical implementation. The proposed method combines PCA with closed-form Gaussian OT, providing a computationally tractable approach to activation manipulation. The experiments cover multiple model families and include ablations on intervention layers and PCA dimensionality.
Critical weaknesses
1. Limited methodological novelty and insufficient justification of the distributional assumption.
The main contribution is to extend one-dimensional refusal ablation to multidimensional distribution matching using Gaussian OT. However, previous studies have already investigated the multidimensional structure of safety representations, and the proposed transformation remains an affine mapping. It is therefore unclear what fundamentally new insight this formulation provides beyond existing representation-level methods.
Moreover, the Gaussian assumption is not sufficiently validated. Although the paper provides PCA visualizations, these do not establish that the high-dimensional activation distributions are adequately modeled by Gaussians, or that covariance matching is essential to the observed improvements.
2. Insufficient comparison with recent work and stronger safety defenses.
The experiments primarily compare against RFA and AcT, without adequately considering more recent research on latent-space attacks and safety robustness, such as Gao et al. (ACL 2025) and Gu et al. (ACL 2026). While the paper includes a layer-matched comparison, its scope is limited.
Furthermore, the evaluation does not investigate the proposed attack against stronger adversarially trained models, such as those obtained through CAT or MixAT. Although these are defense methods rather than directly comparable attack baselines, evaluating against such models would provide important evidence regarding the effectiveness and generalizability of the proposed attack.
Consequently, the current experiments are insufficient to demonstrate a substantial advance over recent developments in representation-level jailbreaking.
3. Limited reliability of the jailbreak evaluation.
The paper primarily relies on LlamaGuard-2 to measure attack success rates. However, LlamaGuard-2 is a relatively old safety moderation model, and more recent approaches, such as GuardReasoner (Liu et al., 2025), have demonstrated substantial improvements in safety classification.
Without cross-validation using stronger safety evaluators or human annotations, the reliability of the reported ASR remains uncertain. This is particularly important because several improvements over AcT are relatively small, and evaluator errors could potentially affect the resulting method rankings.
- Gao, L., Geng, J., Zhang, X., Nakov, P., & Chen, X. (2025). Shaping the Safety Boundaries: Understanding and Defending Against Jailbreaks in Large Language Models. ACL 2025.
- Gu, T., et al. (2026). Probing the Safety Robustness of LLMs in Latent Space. ACL 2026.
- Liu, Y., et al. (2025). GuardReasoner: Towards Reasoning-based LLM Safeguards. ICLR 2025 Workshop.
Questions for authors
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Novelty and Gaussian assumption: What evidence supports the Gaussian assumption for harmful and harmless activation distributions? Can the authors clarify what advantages Gaussian OT provides beyond existing multidimensional representation manipulation methods?
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Evaluation reliability: Can the authors validate the reported ASR using a stronger safety evaluator, such as GuardReasoner, or provide human evaluation on a subset of outputs? In particular, do the relative rankings of the compared methods remain consistent?
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Comparison with recent work: How does the proposed approach differ from the representation-level safety analyses in Gao et al. (2025) and Gu et al. (2026)? Can the authors clarify its distinct contribution relative to these studies and discuss its applicability to models strengthened by adversarial training?