- Rating
- 3(+1)
- Confidence
- 3
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 2
- Soundness
- 2
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Paper summary
This paper investigates the long-term privacy-utility trade-off by considering how privacy leakage affects future user participation. The authors propose a performative privacy framework and theoretically characterize population dynamics and privacy noise thresholds under Bernoulli mean estimation, Gaussian mean estimation, and ridge regression. Numerical experiments on synthetic datasets support the theoretical analysis, showing that an intermediate level of privacy protection can improve long-term utility by mitigating user attrition.
Critical strengths
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Problem Formulation: The paper models the feedback loop between privacy leakage and future user participation, providing an interesting perspective on the long-term privacy-utility trade-off by considering realized privacy leakage rather than directly relying on privacy budgets.
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Theoretical Analysis: The paper analytically characterizes privacy leakage probabilities and population dynamics under different learning settings, establishing quantitative relationships between privacy noise, user retention, and long-term learning utility.
Critical weaknesses
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Existing studies, such as Differential Privacy: An Economic Method for Choosing Epsilon (Hsu et al., 2014) and Optimal Data Acquisition with Privacy-Aware Agents (Cummings et al., 2023), have explored the interplay between privacy protection, user participation, and estimation utility. The paper does not sufficiently clarify the additional theoretical insights offered by its leakage-driven population dynamics.
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The long-term utility analysis relies on mean-field approximations and surrogate objectives without establishing optimality for the original objective. Moreover, the proof of Lemma 13 appears to overlook dependencies induced by shared Gaussian noise.
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The Bernoulli setting treats unchanged randomized responses as privacy leakage even when the privacy budget approaches zero. Furthermore, the assumed user participation dynamics lack validation beyond synthetic simulations.
Questions for authors
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In the proof of Lemma 13, how does the concentration analysis account for the dependencies among users' leakage events induced by shared Gaussian noise? Can the authors provide a rigorous justification for the bounded martingale differences?
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What motivates defining unchanged randomized responses as privacy leakage in the Bernoulli setting, particularly when the privacy budget approaches zero? Would the main conclusions remain valid under alternative leakage definitions or more realistic user participation models?
4 comments
Thank you for the detailed response and revisions. I appreciate the correction to Lemma 13, which substantially addresses my concern about dependencies induced by shared Gaussian noise. The differences from prior economic DP studies are also clearer. However, some of my concerns remain. In particular, the Bernoulli leakage definition relies on an unvalidated behavioral assumption, and the main conclusions appear sensitive to the participation dynamics, as also suggested by the alternative model in Appendix C. Moreover, the mean-field surrogate still lacks a theoretical guarantee of optimality for the original stochastic objective. While the revisions improve the paper's technical soundness and clarity, these remaining limitations prevent me from changing my overall assessment. For now, I will maintain my original rating, but I would be open to reconsidering and potentially raising it if the authors can further address these remaining concerns.
We thank the reviewer for engaging in the discussion, and for confirming that many of the points initially raised are adequately addressed. We answer the two remaining points below.
- Unvalidated Bernoulli assumption. We cannot deploy and validate a behavioral assumption in the time of the rebuttal, but we believe that our simple model has its own merit. We designed it not to be as plausible as possible, but as simple as possible while already exhibiting interesting behavior. As similar behaviors are proved in Sections 4 and 5 under other tasks and data leakage models, we do not believe that the fact that some models would lead to other dynamics makes the Bernoulli setup uninteresting.
- Bounding the error between the original objective and the mean-field surrogate. Even though reviewer 4ybJ, who also noted this point, considered it a minor concern, we had worked on bounding the error, and we are now including this bound in purple in the new revision. This new result bounds the gap between the original objective evaluated at the surrogate’s optimal and its true optimum. The proof outline is to bound uniformly the difference between the true function and its surrogate, which we obtain through simple analysis tricks and by introducing a constant that depends on but not on . We will further polish the presentation of this bound in the camera-ready version. This result further confirms what the numerical experiments suggested: the mean-field approximation preserves the same behavior as the exact process, and proves that the optimal remains finite for the original process. The updates have been highlighted in purple in pages 33-37. We hope that this update will lift the remaining concerns the reviewer had on our paper.
Thank you for the further clarifications and substantial theoretical revisions. I appreciate the authors' continued efforts to address my remaining concerns. The successive revisions have strengthened the paper and addressed most of my original concerns. I am therefore willing to raise my rating. I encourage the authors to clearly state the assumptions and scope of the new optimality-gap guarantee, as well as the limitations of the behavioral model, in the final version.
Rebuttal
W2 + Q1 Mean-field and Lemma 13 We thank the reviewer for pointing out the dependence induced by shared Gaussian noise. The previous proof stated that we were neglecting this effect, but we have now fixed this. We have revised Lemma 13 and its proof in the updated manuscript to account explicitly for this dependence. Under a stated low-leakage condition, the revised result retains the central conclusion that the next-round population concentrates around its conditional expectation, with an additional term accounting for shared-noise effects. The lemma serves an auxiliary role, providing partial theoretical support for the mean-field approximation underlying our optimization proxy. The proxy's main contribution is practical: it is inexpensive to evaluate, enables efficient noise selection, and yields choices that agree reasonably well with empirical optima in our experiments, as can be seen in the figures. The revised analysis preserves this role while making the conditions and scope of the concentration guarantee precise. We believe that the mean-field approximation, by allowing for rather simple formulas that are easy to interpret, contributes to the interest of the paper for human understanding.
W3 + Q2 Leakage definition, participation model In the case of the Bernoulli output, a participant can observe only two possible outputs: either their bit has been flipped, or it remains identical. The model of the paper is that people assess from the output whether their data is leaked, rather than from an abstract definition. If what they see is their true answer, regardless of what happens in the black box, it looks like the data has been leaked, so people have a certain probability of treating it as a leakage. The fact that perceived leakage can happen even at ϵ=0 does not invalidate our model: imagine for instance that we did not consider a Y/N question but a histogram computation with a large number K of possible outputs. Even if the output is uniform over the K answers, which corresponds to ϵ=0, it is very likely that a user seeing their true answer returned by the mechanism will consider their data leaked: users access only one draw, not the full output distribution, which might not even make sense for a non-technical user.
W1 Relation to economic DP works We thank the reviewer for the opportunity to clarify this distinction. Both works are already discussed in Section 2, where we distinguish participation based on anticipated privacy costs and benefits from the repeated population dynamics studied here. Hsu et al. (2014) analyze privacy, compensation, and accuracy under a financial budget, including circumstances where privacy improves accuracy through increased participation. Cummings et al. (2023) characterize optimal estimator weights and noise under agents' participation constraints. These establish important connections between privacy and utility that our work builds upon. (Hsu et al.; Cummings et al.)
These works show that the question of setting ϵ is well discussed in the community, but we believe we bring a new perspective with the following advantages: