- Rating
- 4(+1)
- Confidence
- 2
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 2
- Soundness
- 3
Read review
Paper summary
The authors present a work for encrypted inference where latent token representations are encrypted by the client and processed by the server, whose outputs are then processed and passed through a prediction head to recover intended output. The authors also show that this is not sufficient to preserve privacy as gram- structure is still preserved in the latent encrypted space.
Critical strengths
The paper presents an approach that may be taken by others to do "encrypted inference" and show that it doesn't really work and there is more research to be done in this area.
Critical weaknesses
Are there other approaches that are also exposed the same gram-structure weakness? Would be good to have a discussion on them.
Questions for authors
Are there other approaches that are also exposed the same gram-structure weakness? Would be good to have a discussion on them.
2 comments
Thank you again for your constructive review. We have revised the manuscript to directly address your question on whether the Gram-structure weakness extends beyond our specific EqCipher implementation.
The revised Related Work, Discussion, and Supplementary Section C now distinguish between: (i) the mathematical implication for representations exposed under a shared orthogonal action, (ii) representation-level evidence, and (iii) full-system empirical vulnerability. We also clarify that our comparator rows should not be interpreted as claims that the complete cited systems are broken.
We hope this addresses your main concern. If you feel the revision resolves the issue you raised, we would be grateful if you could reconsider the overall assessment accordingly.
Author Response: CW1 / Q1
This is an important distinction. Any interface that exposes a set of vectors transformed by the same shared orthogonal action satisfies (XR)(XR)⊤=XX⊤, so the within-set Gram matrix is mathematically available without the key. Privacy from Symmetry/ConjFormer therefore lies in the same mathematical vulnerability class when the relevant transformed vectors are exposed under one shared action.
However, the algebraic implication is not by itself evidence that every complete system is empirically vulnerable. We now distinguish three levels of claim: the mathematical invariant, representation-level evidence under a specified interface, and a demonstrated full-system attack. Whether SentinelLMs, Split-and-Denoise, AloePri, or another system exposes the required vectors depends on its mechanism, interface, noise, aggregation, and threat model.
Our ConjFormer-style, Sentinel-style, and Split-and-Denoise-style rows apply representation transformations under a common retrieval protocol. They are not full-system reproductions and are not presented as claims that those complete systems are broken. Only EqCipher is evaluated as a full system in this work. We revised the related-work and discussion sections to make this conditional scope explicit.
Addressed locations:
Main: Related Work, “Scope of comparison”; Discussion, “Broader applicability of Gram leakage.”
Supplement: Section C, “Scope of Comparisons to Related Methods.”