acceptodds
Under review as a conference paper at ICLR 2027

Late-Fusion Transformer with Selective Homomorphic Token Encryption for Efficient Private Language Processing

Abstract

To protect sensitive information when processing text with an external language model, it is necessary to safely protect the data throughout the entire inference pipeline. Token redaction can safely remove sensitive information trading accuracy for protection, while encrypting entire tokens significantly increases the inference cost. To overcome these limitations, we present Late-Fusion Transformer (LFT) that merges homomorphically encrypted tokens after the final attention block via cross-attention to minimize the computation overhead while keeping the sensitive data in the inference path. The client encrypts under CKKS only the embeddings of the tokens it designates for protection, and the redacted text runs through a plaintext transformer backbone. Then, the merger module combines the sensitive information (ciphertext) with the backbone's plaintext representation through a single encrypted cross-attention layer. This allows only a small portion of computations to be done under homomorphic encryption, efficiently enabling private language processing. Finally, the server returns an encrypted output that can only be decrypted by the client using the secret key. We evaluate LFT with 13 globally deduplicated text classification datasets on RoBERTa-base and ModernBERT-base. The mean gain over the redacted-input baseline was positive or at par across twelve datasets where larger redaction losses typically yielded greater gains. A GPU implementation of LFT on FIDESlib reproduces its plaintext-based implementation on 99.9% of the evaluation inputs, verifying reliable CKKS implementation. Against full-layer encrypted RoBERTa-base and ModernBERT-base built on the same GPU and CKKS library, the proposed LFT with selective token encryption is 247× faster on a single text input and 2,392× faster per input under batching, on average, demonstrating its efficiency.

Primary area:
alignment, fairness, safety, privacy, and societal considerations
Keywords:
homomorphic encryption, CKKS, private inference, privacy-preserving NLP, selective token encryption, text redaction, re-identification, text classification

Reviews

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Figure 1. Mean review rating of the reviewed papers at ICLR 2027. This paper averages 2.00 over 3 reviews, above 27% of the others.
Reviewer_ATNsOpenReview ↗
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Paper summary

This paper presents a practical architecture method for implementing selective homomorphic encryption in privacy-preserving text classification. Its main advantage lies in demonstrating that sensitive tokens can be integrated by means of an encrypted post-fusion module, without fully encrypting the Transformer inference. This research has a solid empirical foundation and the implementation results are encouraging.

Critical strengths

s2. This paper discusses the key trade-offs between privacy, predictive utility, and computational efficiency. Its later fusion architecture separates plaintext context processing from encrypted sensitive token processing, and limits expensive homomorphic operations to a lightweight merging module. This design choice is of great significance, providing a practical alternative for only performing masking inference and fully encrypting the Transformer.

s1. The evaluation covers 13 text classification datasets, two Transformer backbone networks, and multiple controlled benchmark methods, including ZEROZ ablation experiments, which helps to distinguish the contributions of private token information from the additional capacity of the model. It is notable that the authors implement the encrypted merging and full-layer homomorphic encryption benchmarks using GPU-based CKKS technology, rather than relying solely on plaintext simulation.

Critical weaknesses

w1. The speed improvement in the report is impressive compared to the fully encrypted Transformer, but the comparison is not entirely fair. Full-layer homomorphic encryption (HE) protects all input tokens and processes the entire Transformer, while LFT only reveals the masked context and mask positions, encrypts only the selected token embeddings, and updates the classification representation through a single merge operation. Additionally, the full-layer baseline model calculates some output positions that are not needed in classification, and the authors have acknowledged this. Therefore, the significant speed improvement mainly reflects the advantages of adopting different privacy and computational trade-offs, rather than achieving the same performance improvement under the same privacy guarantee.

w2. Since the sensitive tokens are excluded from the main body of the Transformer and only introduced through the final cross-attention module, they cannot participate in the multi-layer context interaction provided by the standard Transformer. This may limit its performance in tasks that require more complex relationships between public and private tokens, which explains the weak recovery ability on the MedNLI dataset and the decrease in accuracy on the MRPC task. Moreover, the experiments on the merge operation indicate that removing the softmax operation usually only leads to a small loss in accuracy, but the paper did not report the corresponding encryption inference cost.

Questions for authors

See weaknesses.

1 comment
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response to Reviewer ATNs

We thank the reviewer for the positive assessment and the constructive comments. We address both weaknesses in order.

W1. Comparison under different privacy guarantees

"the significant speed improvement mainly reflects the advantages of adopting different privacy and computational trade-offs, rather than achieving the same performance improvement under the same privacy guarantee."

We agree that LFT and full-layer HE make different privacy trade-offs (Section 6). The revision adds two things.

  • Comparison under the same disclosure as LFT (new Section 5.3, Table 4). We added a model called Insert-k. It inserts the designated-token embeddings before the last k RoBERTa layers. From that point, every token depends on the encrypted embeddings, so those k layers must run under encryption. The server sees the same redacted text and mask positions as with LFT. Insert-12 is the unmodified RoBERTa-base model. Its time is that of the full-layer RoBERTa baseline: 177 times the merger's encrypted time for a single input and 1,689 times under batching. Disclosing the redacted text does not by itself reduce the cost. The speedup comes from limiting the encrypted computation to the merger. On average over the thirteen datasets, LFT is as accurate as Insert-4 (82.4% vs. 82.3%), and Insert-4 takes about 48 times the merger's encrypted time for a single input and 485 times under batching.
  • Unused output positions. The last layer of both baselines now computes only the CLS output. The speedup averaged over the two baselines changes from 247× to 235× for a single input and from 2,392× to 2,279× under batching.

W2 (a). Multi-layer interaction between public and private tokens

"they cannot participate in the multi-layer context interaction [...] which explains the weak recovery ability on the MedNLI dataset and the decrease in accuracy on the MRPC task."

We tested this explanation with the same experiment.

LFTInsert-1Insert-4Insert-10Insert-12
Estimated encrypted time, single input (× merger)1548136177
Accuracy, eleven single-text datasets (%)83.781.083.484.185.1
Accuracy, MedNLI and MRPC (%)74.875.676.481.883.1

On the eleven single-text datasets, running more layers under encryption adds little over LFT. MedNLI and MRPC gain more: 7.0 pp on average with Insert-10 and 8.3 pp with Insert-12. These results support your explanation for MedNLI, where Insert-k is significantly more accurate than LFT only with ten or more layers. On MRPC, Insert-1 is already about 3 pp more accurate than LFT. The cost grows roughly linearly with k.

W2 (b). Encrypted cost without the softmax

"removing the softmax operation usually only leads to a small loss in accuracy, but the paper did not report the corresponding encryption inference cost."

Appendix E (Table 10) now reports this cost. The implementation and the measurement procedure are the same as for the cross-attention merger.

MergerSingle input (s)Batched, per input (s)Relative to cross-attention (single / batched)
Cross-attention1.2770.1101.00 / 1.00
Linear (no softmax)0.4320.0810.34 / 0.74
Mean pooling0.3530.0560.28 / 0.51

For a single input, the softmax takes most of the time, so removing it saves a lot. Under batching, one softmax serves 32 inputs, and the saving is smaller. Cross-attention is more accurate than the linear variant on 12 of the 13 datasets (Table 9), so we keep the softmax.

We hope these responses are helpful, and we are glad to discuss any remaining points.

Reviewer_UW6jOpenReview ↗
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Paper summary

The authors mainly address the efficiency of secure inference. To accelerate inference, the authors separate sensitive information from the original queries and mask it. They then process the two parts separately and fuse them in the last layer. With this strategy, latency is greatly reduced, but there are significant performance drops in several subjects.

Critical strengths
  • The method is efficient since sensitive information is fused only at the final stage.
Critical weaknesses
  • The key idea of separating sensitive and non-sensitive information and processing them separately is not novel, and a key reference is missing [1].
  • There is significant performance degradation compared to ORIG. I'm concerned about tasks where masked information is critical, such as numerical reasoning or accounting, which are not evaluated.
  • Public context can still reveal sensitive information implicitly such as sensitive attribute or semantic leakage.
  • Autoregressive models are the dominant architecture in LLMs, but the paper did not provide experiments on them, and the proposed method does not seem straightforward to apply to autoregressive models.

[1] Song, J., Park, J., & Yang, E. (2026). Secure autoregressive inference with prompt separation via key-value caching.

Questions for authors

Please see the weakness section.

1 comment
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response to Reviewer UW6j

We thank the reviewer for the comments and for the reference. We respond to each weakness in order.

W1. Novelty and the missing reference [1]

"The key idea of separating sensitive and non-sensitive information and processing them separately is not novel, and a key reference is missing [1]."

We now cite and discuss [1] in Section 2. Both works treat the sensitive tokens separately from the rest of the input. The difference is how much computation has to be done securely.

[1]LFT
Secure computationMPC among two or three non-colluding serversCKKS on a single semi-honest server
Layers under secure computationevery layer, for the sensitive tokensone merger layer, independent of the backbone depth
Speedup over securing all tokensabout 1.5–2.5× (as reported in [1])177× to 2,868× (Section 5.2)
Targetgenerationclassification

The new Section 5.3 measures what more encrypted layers cost in LFT's setting. Insert-k, a model we added, inserts the designated tokens before the last k of the twelve RoBERTa layers and runs those layers under encryption. This costs an estimated 5 to 177 times the single-input encrypted time of LFT's merger (Table 4).

W2. Accuracy relative to ORIG, and tasks where the masked information is critical

"There is significant performance degradation compared to ORIG. I'm concerned about tasks where masked information is critical, such as numerical reasoning or accounting, which are not evaluated."

ORIG reads the original text, so it shows the accuracy without protection. RED reads the same redacted text as LFT, so we measure LFT's gain over RED. With RoBERTa, LFT averages 82.4% over the thirteen datasets, against 84.8% for ORIG and 77.6% for RED. The medical and mental-health datasets are tasks where the masked information is critical. On these datasets, redaction lowers the RoBERTa accuracy by 5.6 to 18.0 pp, and LFT recovers 70% (RoBERTa) and 65% (ModernBERT) of the loss on average (Section 4.2, Table 1).

RoBERTa-base accuracy (%)ORIGREDLFTInsert-10
ADR92.382.687.986.9
Drug Reviews85.769.885.185.4
MedNLI80.267.168.578.7
Symptom2Dx95.777.693.594.0
MentalHealth82.677.181.482.1
RedditMH84.672.483.684.4

LFT recovers little on MedNLI and is below RED on MRPC, the two sentence-pair datasets. When higher accuracy is needed, the designated tokens can be fused earlier, at a higher encrypted cost (new Section 5.3). The last column shows Insert-10, which runs ten layers under encryption. It raises MedNLI to 78.7% and takes about 136 times the merger's encrypted time. We did not evaluate numerical reasoning or accounting tasks. Our experiments cover text classification only (Section 6).

W3. Sensitive attributes and semantic leakage

"Public context can still reveal sensitive information implicitly such as sensitive attribute or semantic leakage."

We agree, and the revision measures both kinds of leakage. LFT sends the redacted text to the server in plaintext. The server can infer from this text exactly what it could infer with redaction alone. The encrypted tokens reveal nothing more (Appendix G).

  • Semantic leakage of the masked content (Section 4.3, Table 2; Appendix F). Two attackers (ModernBERT-large and RoBERTa-large) predict the masked spans from the redacted text. A prediction may differ from the span but have the same meaning, and an LLM judge (Qwen3.5-9B) decided this for every prediction. Counting such predictions as reconstructed raises the rates by 2.6 pp on average, and the highest rate rises from 26.4% to 29.5%. When we instead count predictions that nearly match the span or share a content word with it, the rates rise by 3.4 and 3.1 pp, and the highest rate becomes 31.0%. To check the judge, a second judge from another model family (Phi-4) rated a sample of the pairs. The two judges agree on whether the meaning is the same for 98.0% of them (weighted agreement; Cohen's κ = 0.64).
  • Sensitive attributes (Appendix F, Table 12). On six datasets, the label is an attribute of the document, such as the diagnosis. Redaction masks the designated tokens, but the remaining text can still indicate the label. We asked an LLM (Qwen3.5-9B, without fine-tuning) to choose the label. It is correct for 39.6–62.3% of the inputs when it reads the redacted text, which is 10 to 36 pp lower than when it reads the original text.

W4. Autoregressive models

"the proposed method does not seem straightforward to apply to autoregressive models."

The paper covers classification only (Section 6). The merger updates only the classification position. Generation needs more output positions, and computing them under encryption is future work. For generation, [1] is a complementary approach.

We would be glad to answer any further questions.

Reviewer_CoYnOpenReview ↗
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Paper summary

This paper studies private inference when a client sends text to an external language model. It targets the gap between two options. Token redaction protects sensitive content but loses task-relevant information and accuracy. Full-layer homomorphic encryption (HE) protects everything but is extremely slow. The authors propose the Late-Fusion Transformer (LFT), a hybrid of the two.

Critical strengths
  • The proposed method shows significant performance compare to previous baselines.
Critical weaknesses
  • Lack of novelty. Combining plaintext processing of redacted text with encryption of a few designated tokens is a straightforward hybrid design, not a new scientific finding. The merger is a minimal instantiation, and the ablation shows it beats mean pooling by under 1 pp on most datasets. Accuracy gains largely track how much information masking removed, which is expected once the masked content is returned. The speedups mainly follow from limiting HE to one layer, and are measured against self-built full-layer baselines.

  • Incomplete leakage analysis. The paper does include a re-identification test (§4.3), but it is narrow. It scores only exact reconstruction of masked spans by fill-in-the-blank attackers, and still finds up to 28.8% recovered. It does not measure partial or semantic leakage, such as inferring a diagnosis or attribute from the remaining plaintext, and mask positions and span counts are also visible to the server.

  • No formal security guarantee. The paper states a semi-honest threat model, but it gives no formal definition or proof of what the server learns. The claim that the server learns nothing beyond the redacted text and mask positions is asserted, not proven.

  • Unfair baseline comparison. The 247×/2,392× speedups compare LFT against full-layer HE baselines that the authors implemented themselves. These baselines protect all tokens, while LFT discloses the redacted text and mask positions, so the two systems offer different privacy guarantees. The authors also note that the baselines compute unused output positions in their final layers, which inflates their cost.

Questions for authors

see above.

2 comments
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response to Reviewer CoYn (1/2)

Thank you for the detailed assessment. We address W1 in this comment, and W2 to W4 in the next one.

W1. Lack of novelty

"The merger is a minimal instantiation [...] The speedups mainly follow from limiting HE to one layer."

We made the merger minimal on purpose, to keep the computation under HE as small as possible. LFT has only one encrypted layer, and its cost does not grow with the depth of the backbone. We designed this layer to be cheap to run under HE (Sections 3.2 and 3.3). The attention query is plaintext, so the attention scores need only plaintext–ciphertext multiplications. The merger updates only the classification position, so one encrypted softmax and layer normalization can serve 32 inputs. This lowers the encrypted time from 1.285 s to 0.111 s per input (Table 3). Every input has the same ciphertext layout and the same sequence of encrypted operations. We expect this fixed workload to suit hardware accelerators.

"Expected once the masked content is returned." We agree. LFT protects the masked content with HE, and the language model can still use information from both the redacted text and the designated tokens. This compensates for much of the accuracy lost to redaction. The comparison with ZEROZ (the LFT architecture trained with only the redacted text) shows that the gain comes mainly from the designated content and not from the added parameters (Table 1). We restore the masked content by late fusion at the last layer in order to minimize the computational overhead under HE. This is the main novelty of our paper. The encrypted tokens can of course be fused at an earlier layer, and we added this experiment to the revised paper (new Section 5.3, Table 4). Insert-k inserts the designated tokens before the last k RoBERTa layers and runs those k layers under encryption. The results show that LFT and Insert-4 have similar accuracy on average over the thirteen datasets, while Insert-4 takes about 48 times the merger's encrypted time for a single input. LFT therefore balances accuracy and speed well. To improve the accuracy further, more layers can be computed under encryption.

ModelEstimated encrypted time (× merger), single / batchedAccuracy, 13 datasets (%)
LFT1 / 182.4
Insert-15 / 4780.2
Insert-448 / 48582.3
Insert-12 (unmodified RoBERTa)177 / 1,68984.8

Insert-1 runs one standard RoBERTa layer under encryption. It is less accurate than LFT (80.2% against 82.4%) and takes about 5 times the merger's encrypted time for a single input.

"Beats mean pooling by under 1 pp on most datasets." The difference reaches 2.5 pp on ADR, a medical dataset, and the medical and mental-health datasets are the main targets of LFT (Section 4.2). Cross-attention is more accurate on 11 of the 13 datasets (Table 9). Under batching, cross-attention takes 0.110 s per input and mean pooling 0.056 s (new Appendix E, Table 10). Both are small next to the 187.3 s of the full-layer RoBERTa baseline (Table 3), so we chose the more accurate merger.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response to Reviewer CoYn (2/2)

This comment continues our response with W2, W3 and W4.

W2. Incomplete leakage analysis

"It does not measure partial or semantic leakage, such as inferring a diagnosis or attribute [...] mask positions and span counts are also visible to the server."

We extended Section 4.3 and Appendix F. LFT sends the redacted text to the server in plaintext. The server can infer from this text exactly what it could infer with redaction alone. The encrypted tokens reveal nothing more.

  • Partial and semantic reconstruction (Table 2). We now also count predictions that nearly match the masked span or share a content word with it. This raises the reconstruction rates of the two attackers by 3.4 and 3.1 pp on average. Separately, an LLM judge marked the predictions that have the same meaning as the masked span. Counting these predictions raises the rates by 2.6 pp on average, and the highest rate rises from 26.4% to 29.5%. To check the judge, a second judge from another model family rated a sample of the pairs. The two judges agree on whether the meaning is the same for 98.0% of them (weighted agreement; Cohen's κ = 0.64; Appendix F).
  • Which spans are reconstructed (Appendix F). Exact reconstruction succeeds mostly on frequent strings such as "pain", "doctor" and "anxiety". For the ModernBERT-large attacker, 80% of the reconstructed spans are strings that occur at least ten times among the masked spans of a test split. It reconstructs 5.1% of the spans whose text occurs only once.
  • Attribute (label) inference (Appendix F, Table 12). On six datasets, the label is an attribute of the document, such as the diagnosis. We asked an LLM (Qwen3.5-9B, without fine-tuning) to choose this label. It is correct for 39.6–62.3% of the inputs when it reads the redacted text, which is 10 to 36 pp lower than when it reads the original text.
  • Mask positions and span counts. Every attacker receives the mask positions and span counts as the server sees them. In the original submission, the ModernBERT-large attacker saw span lengths in its own tokens, which the server does not know. We corrected this. The attacker now sees them only in the server's tokens, and its highest exact rate changes from 28.8% to 26.4%.

W3. No formal security guarantee

"The claim that the server learns nothing beyond the redacted text and mask positions is asserted, not proven."

We added a security argument in Appendix G, and Section 3 refers to it. For each input, the server sees the redacted text, the mask positions and the CKKS ciphertexts of the designated-token embeddings. These ciphertexts have the same layout for every input, and the homomorphic operations applied to them depend only on the redacted text, the mask positions and the model. The server receives no decrypted value. Therefore, the server cannot tell apart two inputs with the same redacted text and mask positions (computational indistinguishability under the IND-CPA security of CKKS).

W4. Unfair baseline comparison

"These baselines protect all tokens, while LFT discloses the redacted text and mask positions [...] the baselines compute unused output positions in their final layers."

  • Different guarantees. We agree, and Section 6 states this. LFT protects part of the input, and as its baseline we chose inference that protects the whole input. The reported ratio compares full-layer HE, which protects every token, with LFT, which protects only the designated tokens. For a comparison under the same disclosure as LFT, the revision adds Insert-12 (Section 5.3, Table 4). It is the unmodified RoBERTa model, with the redacted text and mask positions disclosed as in LFT. Once the encrypted tokens enter the model, every token depends on them, so all twelve layers must run under encryption. Its time is therefore that of the full-layer RoBERTa baseline, 177 times the merger's encrypted time for a single input. Disclosing the redacted text does not by itself reduce the cost. The speedup comes from limiting the encrypted computation to the merger. If you have another baseline in mind, we will be glad to compare with it.
  • Self-built baselines. The RoBERTa and ModernBERT baselines use the same GPU, CKKS library and parameters as the merger. They reproduce their plaintext predictions on 99.1% and 96.9% of the evaluated inputs (Section 5.2).
  • Unused output positions. We fixed this. The last layer of both baselines now computes only the CLS output. The speedup averaged over the two baselines changes from 247× to 235× for a single input and from 2,392× to 2,279× under batching.

We hope these responses address your concerns, and we are glad to answer further questions.

Comments on the paper

1 comment
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

General response and summary of the revision

We thank the reviewers for their careful reading and constructive comments. We are glad that the reviews recognize the performance against the baselines (CoYn), the efficiency of fusing the sensitive tokens only at the final stage (UW6j), and the practical trade-off among privacy, utility and cost (ATNs). Reviewer ATNs also notes the evaluation on 13 datasets and two backbones, the ZEROZ control, and the GPU CKKS implementations of the merger and both full-layer baselines.

We uploaded a revised PDF. This comment lists what is new and which values changed.

New content

1. Fusing the designated tokens earlier, under the same disclosure as LFT (new Section 5.3, Table 4; Reviewers CoYn, UW6j, ATNs). We added a model called Insert-k. It inserts the designated-token embeddings at their mask positions before the last k of the twelve RoBERTa-base layers. From that point, every token depends on the encrypted embeddings, so those k layers must run under encryption. The server sees the same redacted text and mask positions as with LFT. Insert-12 inserts the embeddings at the input, so it is the unmodified RoBERTa-base model with all twelve layers under encryption. We estimate the encrypted time of Insert-k from the measured times of the same layers in the full-layer RoBERTa baseline.

ModelEstimated encrypted time, single input (× merger)Batched, per input (× merger)Accuracy, 13 datasets (%)MedNLI and MRPC, the sentence-pair datasets (%)
RED (redacted text only)––77.676.1
LFT1182.474.8
Insert-154780.275.6
Insert-21919581.176.3
Insert-44848582.376.4
Insert-81081,06682.777.7
Insert-101361,35483.881.8
Insert-121771,68984.883.1

On average over the thirteen datasets, LFT is more accurate than Insert-1 and Insert-2 and as accurate as Insert-4, which takes about 48 times the merger's encrypted time for a single input. LFT is designed to keep the encrypted computation as small as possible. When higher accuracy is needed, the designated tokens can be fused earlier, at a higher encrypted cost.

2. Leakage beyond exact reconstruction (Section 4.3, Table 2; Appendix F, Table 12; Reviewers CoYn, UW6j). The original submission counted only exact reconstruction of the masked spans. Table 2 now also counts partial reconstruction, and predictions that have the same meaning as the masked span according to an LLM judge. Appendix F explains how we validated the judge, reports how well an LLM infers a document attribute from the redacted text, and describes which spans are reconstructed.

3. Encrypted cost of the merger alternatives (Appendix E, Table 10; Reviewers CoYn, ATNs).

4. Security argument (Appendix G, referred to from Section 3; Reviewer CoYn).

5. Related work [1] (Section 2; Reviewer UW6j).

Changed values

6. Full-layer baselines without unused output positions (Sections 5.1 and 5.2, Tables 3 and 16, Figure 2; Reviewers CoYn, ATNs). In the original submission, the last layer of both baselines computed every output position, although only the CLS output is used. It now computes only the CLS output, and we measured the baselines again. The speedup averaged over the two baselines (RoBERTa and ModernBERT) changes from 247× to 235× for a single input and from 2,392× to 2,279× under batching.

7. Re-identification attacker (Tables 2 and 11). In the original submission, the ModernBERT-large attacker saw the length of each masked span in its own tokens, which the server does not know. We corrected this, and the attacker now sees this length only in the server's tokens. Its highest exact reconstruction rate changes from 28.8% to 26.4%.

8. ModernBERT-base accuracy (Table 1, Figure 5b, Section 4.2). The original submission applied the final normalization of ModernBERT twice to the last-layer output that the merger reads. We corrected this and retrained the ModernBERT LFT and ZEROZ models. The 13-dataset mean of LFT changes from 81.4% to 81.2%. LFT remains above RED on eleven datasets. The RoBERTa-base results are unchanged.

Appendix C now states the early-stopping rule more precisely.

Details are in the individual responses.

From OpenReview, CC BY 4.0. Authors as signed there; shown unedited.

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