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- Informativeness
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Paper summary
The authors focus on a gap between the two main approaches to private LLM inference: cryptographic methods are secure but slow, while obfuscation-based methods are fast but fail to hide sequence correspondence, i.e., which row corresponds to which token position. To address this, they propose PMA, which splits attention between a Trusted Client, handling the current block in prefill and the pending window in decode, and a Server, handling the historical K/V cache with row-permuted entries, and then exactly merges the two partial softmax states on the Client.
Critical strengths
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The observation that feature obfuscation leaves the sequence axis unprotected is well motivated, and the causal-mask argument makes it concrete.
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The design is clean. The exact log-sum-exp merge keeps attention identical to ordinary inference.
Critical weaknesses
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PMA only hides the row order of the K/V cache inside attention. The FFN and residual stream still run on the Server, which receives hidden states in the ordinary feature basis and gets the merged attention output back in logical token order. I am not a cryptography expert, but even combined with a feature-obfuscation scheme, token order seems to remain exposed along this path, since feature obfuscation changes values rather than row positions. If so, the contribution is considerably weaker than claimed.
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Tokens are permuted only within each block, and block order stays visible. An attacker therefore already knows every token’s position to within the block size. If they attempt to undo the permutation at all, what remains is reordering 16 (if block_size is 16) words into a coherent sentence, which seems fairly easy for a language model.
For these reasons I am currently leaning toward rejection. Since cryptography is not my primary area, I will weigh the other reviewers’ assessments carefully before settling on a final decision.
Questions for authors
Please see the Weaknesses section.
5 comments
Dear Reviewer pSXS,
Many thanks again for your time and effort in reviewing this submission. I greatly appreciate your thoughtful comments and valuable contribution to the review process.
Now that the authors have responded to your review, could you please read through their responses and join the discussion when you have a chance?
Thank you again for your continued help and support!
Best wishes,
Your AC
Response to Reviewer pSXS
Dear Reviewer pSXS,
Thank you again for your thoughtful comments.
In our response, we explained how feature and sequence-axis obfuscation in other modules compose with PMA, and added a prefill comparison using Server transcripts to examine order-based associations. We also evaluated language-model reordering with known block boundaries; it did not improve reconstruction in the tested setting.
We would appreciate any further feedback on whether these explanations and experiments address your concerns about order exposure outside attention and recovery through language-model reordering. We would be happy to clarify any remaining questions.
Thank you for your time and consideration.
Response to Reviewer pSXS — Part 1/1
Response to Reviewer pSXS — Part 1/1
W1 — Order exposure through FFNs and residual paths
PMA focuses on sequence correspondence in attention and the K/V cache, so the paper discusses other modules in less detail. Modules outside attention use composable feature obfuscation and sequence-axis obfuscation mechanisms. Per-token normalization, FFNs, and per-token MoE computation can follow the same row permutation as their inputs. Both residual branches use the same row permutation, and feature transformations are paired with the corresponding weights. The Client permutes inputs before sending them, while the other modules on the Server, including the final normalization and LM head, preserve the permuted physical row order. The Client handles positional encoding and causal dependencies at the PMA boundary. The output transformation is fused into the Server projection offline, so returned representations remain in the corresponding obfuscated feature coordinates. Thus, computation in the other modules need not return per-token representations to the Server in their original logical order.
We have implemented full-model obfuscation in the Qwen1.5-MoE-A2.7B decoder. Feature protection uses an AloePri-inspired expanded feature transformation, combined with vocabulary-row obfuscation, fixed perturbations to embedding/LM-head weights, and sequence-axis obfuscation (Seq). The Server holds obfuscated weights and processes inputs and intermediate representations in physical row order. The Client maintains the feature encoding/decoding maps, vocabulary mapping, and logical-position correspondence. To test whether sequence-axis obfuscation in other modules suppresses order-based associations in Server transcripts, we conduct a prefill comparison using each configuration’s Server transcript. Both configurations enable PMA and keep the other protection transformations and PMA state fixed, toggling only Seq in the other modules. TTRSR is 0.4167% with Seq enabled and 16.2500% with it disabled, a difference of 15.8333 percentage points. All 39 recovered positions in the disabled configuration come from direct correspondences between the source’s own ordered prefix and input aliases. This comparison supports the ability of sequence-axis obfuscation in other modules to suppress the evaluated prefill association attack in combination with PMA’s attention protection.
Table pSXS-1. Effect of sequence-axis obfuscation in other modules on prefill association-based recovery
W2 — Language-model reordering with known block order
To test whether known block boundaries help recover the original order, we directly evaluate language-model reordering. O denotes the original attack, and A adds shared row-assignment search; O+LM and A+LM reorder their respective recovered token multisets. LM reordering preserves the token multiset recovered in the first stage, including multiplicities. Conditioned on the public prefix, it uses the public candidate language model to compute the conditional log-probability of each candidate ordering and searches for an ordering with beam search of width 4. This procedure only changes the order of the recovered tokens. All four settings use the same model and frozen targets.
On the same targets, word-level ROUGE-L F1 is 0.175364 for O and 0.164826 for O+LM, and 0.223618 for A and 0.203335 for A+LM. LM reordering with known block boundaries does not improve reconstruction in either comparison.
We believe a possible reason is that the first-stage token multiset already contains errors and omissions: reordering these tokens cannot recover missing content, and an ordering preferred by the language model for fluency need not match the original text. Thus, knowing block boundaries does not lead to further improvement from language-model reordering in this experiment.
Table pSXS-2. Decode reordering with known block boundaries
Q — Questions referring to the weaknesses
W1 describes the principles, implementation, and prefill comparison for protecting modules outside attention. W2 presents language-model reordering with known block boundaries and analyzes the results.