- The central multiplicative-depth claim does not adequately distinguish plaintext–ciphertext computation from ciphertext–ciphertext computation, undermining the claimed contribution.
The main technical argument is that quaternion composition is bilinear and therefore can be evaluated at multiplicative depth one. However, Proposition 1(ii) explicitly assumes that the quaternion �0� representing the applied rotation is plaintext, while �1� is encrypted. Under this assumption, every component of �2� is a linear combination of the encrypted components of �3� with plaintext coefficients.
This distinction is fundamental. In standard homomorphic-encryption accounting, multiplication by a plaintext scalar or plaintext constant does not ordinarily incur ciphertext–ciphertext multiplicative depth. Some approximate-arithmetic schemes may consume a modulus level or incur rescaling costs, but these are not equivalent to ciphertext–ciphertext multiplicative depth. The paper needs to define its cost model precisely and explain why the claimed depth-one bound is meaningful under that model.
More importantly, if both �4� and �5� are encrypted because the rotation parameters themselves must remain confidential, their composition generally requires encrypted–encrypted multiplication. Proposition 1(ii) does not establish the claimed cost for this case. Conversely, if �6� is public to the server, the construction does not hide that rotation parameter from the server. The manuscript does not adequately reconcile these alternatives with its intended privacy guarantees.
This issue is central rather than cosmetic: the paper's main efficiency claim depends on what is encrypted, which party knows each rotation, and which operations are actually evaluated homomorphically.
The novelty argument also requires sharper positioning against Ma and Li, Quantum Fully Homomorphic Encryption by Integrating Pauli One-time Pad with Quaternions (Quantum, 2022). That work already uses quaternion representations for single-qubit quantum homomorphic evaluation and develops a conversion between quaternion and Pauli encryption schemes.
The present manuscript may offer a useful federated-learning application or a different aggregation analysis, but it must isolate the genuinely new construction and establish its complexity advantage over the existing scheme. As currently presented, the algebraic observation alone is insufficient to support the broad claim of a new depth-one encrypted-training paradigm.
- The security model, protocol description, and empirical validation do not establish the claimed end-to-end secure federated-learning system.
The paper combines two distinct cryptographic mechanisms: homomorphic encryption of classical quaternion components for model-update aggregation and quantum-state encryption using quaternion and Pauli one-time pads for delegated quantum computation. Their security properties are not interchangeable. The fact that a quantum state becomes maximally mixed when averaged over a suitable random pad does not, by itself, establish confidentiality of classical model updates, security among clients, or security of the complete composed protocol.
A particularly important inconsistency concerns the shared-key assumption. The manuscript states that clients share homomorphic decryption capability and that the server cannot decrypt the ciphertexts. However, Appendix J also acknowledges that a peer client holding another client's ciphertext can decrypt it under this shared-key model. Consequently, the statement that peers learn only the decrypted global aggregate is not a cryptographic guarantee under the stated threat model: a curious client with access to an individual ciphertext and the shared decryption capability can inspect that ciphertext directly. This is especially consequential because protecting client updates from other participants is one of the motivations for federated confidentiality.
The protocol's treatment of server-side rotation updates also remains unclear. The manuscript describes clients training locally in plaintext, encrypting the resulting quaternion components, and the server optionally applying a plaintext rotation before aggregation. It does not sufficiently specify how these operations correspond to the actual federated optimization update, which party possesses the rotation parameters, and whether those parameters are intended to remain private. A precise end-to-end protocol and a security argument covering all transmitted objects are necessary to substantiate the claimed confidentiality.
The empirical evidence does not resolve these concerns. The paired-seed experiment evaluates a small six-qubit hybrid model on two tabular datasets, while the hardware experiment evaluates single-qubit rotation behavior. These experiments provide some evidence about numerical consistency under the tested configurations, but they do not independently demonstrate the security of the complete protocol or the claimed end-to-end efficiency of encrypted federated training. In particular, near-identical plaintext and encrypted losses show that the tested encryption/decryption path introduces little measurable numerical disturbance; they do not establish that the proposed protocol delivers the claimed security and computational advantages over appropriate baselines.
The paper also reports a structural-verification cryptographic parameter profile that explicitly carries no formal security guarantee for the reported runs. This is a legitimate way to test an implementation, but it cannot substantiate an empirical claim of secure deployment. In combination with the unresolved shared-key issue and the ambiguity about which operations are performed on encrypted data, this substantially limits the conclusions supported by the experiments.
Taken together, these issues prevent me from verifying the paper's central claim that the proposed method simultaneously achieves the advertised multiplicative-depth reduction, confidentiality, and practical end-to-end federated training.
Response to Reviewer HFnS
Thank you for an actionable review!
W1 — Euclidean averaging in training. Correct for the submitted curves, which came from the harness. E7 trains end-to-end with server-side homomorphic quaternion aggregation in every round (OpenFHE CKKS, 128-bit; five paired seeds, 50 rounds). IID: Δ=−8.9×10−8 versus plaintext (95% CI [−4.2,+2.4]×10−7) at R2=0.66 (Table 1).
W2 — partitioning and non-IID. E1/E5/E6 used the first 512 California records in three contiguous client blocks, the next 128 for validation. On that split, even ridge regression does not beat the training-mean predictor, so those runs test only the effect of encryption on the trajectory; Appendix G says so. E7 uses a random 2,048/1,024 split, partitioned IID, geographically (k-means on location; client sizes 175/1,152/721) and by target tertile: every encrypted arm is equivalent to plaintext within ±0.01 MSE (TOST p≤2.3×10−5); label skew lowers R2 to 0.36 for every arm alike. On Wine Quality (IID, red-vs-white, quality tertiles; R2=0.31/0.28/0.13) the same holds (TOST p≤7.4×10−11).
W3 — Z-basis fidelity. Agreed: it is an upper bound on state fidelity and blind to phase errors, and the submitted point was a single 64-shot execution. We therefore ran an interleaved tomography experiment on
ibm_fez(E11, Appendix G.14): unencrypted, padded and pad-only arms interleaved in one job on one qubit, barriers between stages, X/Y/Z state tomography at 4096 shots over 20 angles, no mitigation. State fidelity: 0.9850 (unencrypted) and 0.9812 (padded); the pad costs 3.8×10−3 (95% CI [0.8,6.7]×10−3), inside the pre-specified ±0.01 margin (TOST p=1.2×10−4). On the Z-basis statistic of the submission, the same arms score 0.9987 and 0.9976, which shows how much that statistic flatters.W4 — comparison with standard HE-FedAvg. E7 has two depth-0 baselines: raw-angle HE-FedAvg (angles encrypted as reals, as in Dutta et al. 2024a) and circular HE-FedAvg on (cosθ,sinθ). E7b and E7c then locate where the charts differ:
So the benefit of the quaternion chart is not better accuracy on RX circuits; it is that one representation serves general gates, principal-branch encodings and composition with pad keys at depth 1.
W5 — efficiency. The 167 s per round and 22.67 MB per client-round belong to the bit-level reference, which encrypts every fixed-point bit separately. In CKKS at 128-bit security, one 132 kB ciphertext carries a client's whole model; per round, encryption takes 1.9 ms per client, aggregation 0.7 ms, decryption 0.8 ms. The ≈1.5 h per encrypted CNOT concerns delegated execution in the bit-level reference; the federated loop evaluates none. Interactive baselines need 37–73 sequential exchanges per round.
W6 — security. All contexts of E7–E9 and E12 run under OpenFHE's
HEStd_128_classic. An executable core-SVP audit (Appendix J) shows the bit-level profiles (n≤256) are broken; no security is claimed for them.W7 — Figure 3. Thank you. The figures are regenerated from the result files without editing labels.
We hope the revision addresses each point and would be grateful if you took it into account in your assessment.