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Under review as a conference paper at ICLR 2027

Towards Practical FHE-Federated LLMs Training: FHE-Compatible Compression Techniques and Versatile Advanced Aggregation

Abstract

Federated learning (FL) enables collaborative LLM training on decentralized data, but plaintext updates remain vulnerable to privacy leakage, such as gradient inversion. Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) can secure aggregation, but scaling FL-FHE to LLMs introduces two bottlenecks. First, ciphertext expansion exacerbates communication overhead. Prior work applies Top-k sparsification to compress updates, but it conflicts with FHE’s SIMD packing, forcing a trade-off: coarse ciphertext-level sparsification discards more information, whereas element-wise sparsification requires Top-k unions that sacrifice compression efficiency. Second, costly non-linear FHE operations limit aggregation to linear FedAvg, excluding the advanced aggregators essential for statistical heterogeneity. In this work, we present **FUSE** (FHE-compatible Unified Sparse-Encode), a unified, novel FHE-native compression suite. It features (i) **FUSE-SPA** that resolves the SIMD-sparsification conflict by reframing Top-k selection as encrypted importance voting, achieving fine-grained sparsification at exact cardinality under a selection fidelity bound; and (ii) **FUSE-RDX**, which avoids pruning-induced information loss by preserving full density through radix encoding under an aggregation-aware radix condition. For statistical heterogeneity in FL-FHE, we also design a homomorphic Norm Bounding circuit that reformulates costly non-linear comparison into polynomial arithmetic, extending secure aggregation beyond linear FedAvg. Experiments demonstrate that FUSE achieves communication reductions of 3.46× for GPT-2 and 3.87× for Llama-7B, yielding end-to-end WAN latency speedups of 3.24× and 3.88× with < 1% perplexity degradation relative to FHE baselines.

Primary area:
alignment, fairness, safety, privacy, and societal considerations
Keywords:
Federated Learning, Fully Homomorphic Encryption, Large Language Models, Communication-Efficient, Encrypted Versatile Aggregation

Reviews

Among:
Shape:
1234this paper, Bottom 27%
Figure 1. Mean review rating of the reviewed papers at ICLR 2027. This paper averages 2.00 over 2 reviews, above 27% of the others.
Reviewer_vPZNOpenReview ↗
Rating
2(+1)
Confidence
2
Informativeness
2
Presentation
2
Soundness
1
Read review
Paper summary

This paper presents a method to accelerate federated FHE-based LLM training, especially communciation and server-side optimization algorithms. The contributions are two-fold. First, the authors present two methods to work together: a compression-based method which involves two RTT to first reach a consensus (via secure importance weighting) on the top-k elements, and then aggregate the top-k elements; and a radix based method to pack a pair of elements into one slot to accelerate aggregation. Second, the authors propose a method to implement NormBounding, a simple method in plaintext but requires comparison and branching---hard to achieve by ciphertexts.

The authors experiment with two models: GPT-2, and LLaMA-7B to showcase the effectiveness of the proposed FUSE. The efficiency improvement is about 4x and the perplexity loss lies within in 1% (evaluated on GPT-2 only).

Critical strengths
  1. The paper is generally well-written in its technical part. I am not an expert in FHE but the paper presents its methodology in a way that does not require deep understanding into the implementation of FHE, which makes it easy to understand.

  2. The experiments (especially the ones in Table 1) are extensive. It covers two models with different sizes (it may determine whether a model is compute-bound or communication-bound), two network models, and various parameters --- providing a good and all-around comparison of FUSE's effectiveness.

Critical weaknesses
  1. Questionable relationship with LLMs. Throughout the paper, I find little relationship between the paper's technique/methodology and LLMs. There may be two --- but both are weak. First, LLMs have a large number of parameters, making communication especially slow. However, if we only care about the effectiveness of FUSE, all models will do to showcase the effectivess as comparison is done on the same model. Second, the optimization involves LoRA, but that is also weak -- the methodology does not exploit the low-rank property of LoRA, and also works for full-rank optimization. Therefore, I would say that the relationship between this paper and LLMs is doubtful and not sufficient. This is a positioning issue that should be fixed.

  2. The claim seems stronger than what is actually achieved in terms of optimization algorithms. The authors claim in the introduction that the aggregation scheme is versatile. However, the authors only implement FedProx and NormBound in this paper. In practice, there are lots of federated optimization algorithms that go beyond FedProx and norm-bound. For example, FedAdam, FedYogi, etc., algorithms that require server-side states and first & second order moments, are at least non-trivial to support in this framework. Given this in mind, it is important that the authors should clarify the scope of supported optimization algorithms in the framework of FUSE, to support the claim of "versatile".

  3. The design choice of Normbound, especially the hidden τ\tau from clients, is not well justified either. Given the semi-honest setting, there is a simple go-around --- just to disclose the τ\tau to clients, and everything can be done at client-side. As clients are semi-honest, they are supposed to follow the protocol, and from my understanding the whole process still works. Therefore, the authors should at least justify, why the simple go-around of disclosing τ\tau to clients would not work, otherwise the designs become doubtful and unnecessary.

  4. Evaluations, especially in terms of utility, are not done extensively. The authors only do utility experiments on GPT-2, which is a 2019-year model and by current standards not sufficiently strong model. Therefore, at least utility experiments on a more modern billion-scale LLM should be done to justify the utility claim. Moreover, only relying on perplexity for utility may not be sufficient, especially for LLMs. At least some benchmark scores can be reported as they align better with the Q&A nature of LLMs.

  5. Some presentation details can be improved. Notably, I list two specific points:

    • In algorithm 1, the authors use kcmaxk_c^{max} and kcmink_c^{min}, which I suppose are the largest and smallest absolute values of the top-k updates. However, this is very confusing as this looks very like the kk in top-k.
    • Figure 3 is also very confusing. At a double-log scale, the advantage of NB over FedProx and FedAvg becomes indistinguishable in terms of perplexity. Instead, NB shows significantly larger communication. The figure thus becomes very confusing as to whether the authors want to show the advantages of NB, or the disadvantages.
Questions for authors

Please address the weaknesses 1-5 above.

2 comments

Thank you for the constructive feedback. We provide the following clarification to address the raised concerns:  

Q1 – Relationship between the proposed method and LLMs  

FUSE is model-agnostic as an FHE aggregation primitive, the central claim is that FUSE makes non-linear FHE-based aggregation affordable for LLM-scale federated PEFT. First, model scale alters the nature of the problem rather than merely its size. Unlike prior CNN-scale literature with marginal overhead, LLM fine-tuning creates multi-gigabyte ciphertexts (reaching 11.87 GB under Norm Bounding) that make encrypted non-linear aggregation at LLM scale difficult. FUSE is proposed to make this computation feasible, reducing it to 1.80 GB. Second, parameter-efficient fine-tuning (PEFT) is standard for federated LLMs (e.g., OpenFedLLM (Ye et al., 2024), SHE-LoRA (Liu et al.,  2026)), but LoRA alone may be inefficient once updates are encrypted due to ciphertext expansion. Thus, FUSE and LoRA are complementary by design. Finally, the need for affordable FHE protection is a rising need for language model, DAGER (Petrov et al., 2024) shows that gradient inversion attacks can  recover training text from language model updates. FUSE is one essential layer that makes this cryptographic protection affordable at LLM scale.

Q2 – Scope of the claim of versatile   The intended meaning was related to the current state of the encrypted FL literature. Existing FL-FHE compression methods for LLMs are designed around linear FedAvg or relies on non-colluding server architecture. Thus, this study proposed encrypted Norm Bounding, realizing an non-linear aggregator in FL within a single-server FHE pipeline at LLM scale. We will clarify the scope explicitly.

Server-side adaptive optimizers such as FedAdam and FedYogi handle non-linear operations on the final global model after aggregation, not on any encrypted client update. In contrast, Norm Bounding represents a significantly more demanding case, requiring expensive conditional selections on each client's encrypted update before aggregation. This rigorous evaluation makes Norm Bounding the ideal benchmark for research.

  Q3 – Why threshold is kept on server?

The current solution is a baseline that isolates the cost of this sign-gating primitive. It becomes necessary for non-linear aggregation that depends on cross-client information and cannot be pushed to clients without revealing cross-client norms. Modern privacy-preserving federated learning increasingly relies on adaptive, data-dependent clipping thresholds, as static thresholds may become mis-calibrated as update norms shrink during training (Allouah et al., 2025). Recent clipping methods therefore set the threshold τ\tau adaptively as a function of all clients' update norms (Andrew et al., 2021; Allouah et al., 2025). Since these thresholds depend on cross-client statistics that cannot be disclosed, clipping must be evaluated server-side under encryption. The current solution serves as a baseline that realizes this core sign-gating primitive, while providing a pathway to adaptive clipping as a future extension.

  Q4 – Extent of the utility evaluation

We acknowledge that PPL alone is not sufficient for LLM utility. It is sensitive to the noise and precision loss introduced by FHE-compatible compression, making it a suitable stress test for convergence stability as baseline. Thus, we provide preliminary Llama-7B accuracy results on GSM8K. As shown below, all variants improve from Round 1 to Round 3. A full downstream evaluation across diverse tasks will be included in the final version.  

MethodVariantRound 1Round 3
FedAvgBaseline2.358.78
FUSE-SPA 50%2.288.64
FUSE-RDX2.458.81
FUSE-Fusion 50%2.418.80
Norm BoundingBaseline2.388.91
FUSE-SPA 50%2.358.78
FUSE-RDX2.499.08
FUSE-Fusion 50%2.439.03

  Q5 – Presentation issue: Algorithm 1 and Figure 3   The symbols kk denote the max and min magnitudes within a client's local Top-k set. While Figure 3 condenses our full convergence study (Appendix J) to highlight two key findings: (1) FUSE-Fusion convergence stably with lower communication. (2) Norm Bounding achieves the best final utility despite higher communication overhead. We will revise them accordingly for clarification.

References

  • Liu, J.,et al.. SHE-LoRA: Selective homomorphic encryption for federated tuning with heterogeneous LoRA. In ICLR, 2026.
  • Petrov, et al. : Exact gradient inversion for large language models. In NeurIPS, 2024.
  • Ye, et al. OpenFedLLM: Training large language models on decentralized private data via federated learning. In KDD, pp. 6137–6147, 2024.
  • Allouah, Y., et al.. Adaptive gradient clipping for robust federated learning. In ICLR, 2025.
  • Andrew, et al.. Differentially private learning with adaptive clipping. In NeurIPS, 2021.
Reviewer_vPZNOpenReview ↗

Not fully convinced by the rebuttal.

I am not fully convinced by the rebuttal.

  1. My questions about the relationship with LLMs are not fully answered.
  • If the technique works on LLMs, it should also work on other models as well, and achieve a similar level of compression ratio --- after all, all parameters, LLMs or CNNs, are equal in the scope of this paper. There is no such thing that makes the technique applicable only to LLMs, but not on CNNs.
  • The similar argument holds for LoRA. In the scope of this paper, LoRA parameters are not treated differently, so if it works on LoRA, it should also work on full-parameter training, and achieve a similar level of compression ratio --- again, all parameters, LoRA or not LoRA, are equal in the scope of this paper. There is no such thing that makes the technique applicable only to LoRA parameters, but not on others.
  1. The authors should have limited the claim to "all federated optimizers without server-side non-linear states" then, instead of "Versatile Advanced Aggregation" in the title.

I have no further comments in terms of the rebuttal for Q3 and Q4.

I will accordingly raise my rating to 2.

Reviewer_XVdbOpenReview ↗
Rating
2(+1)
Confidence
3
Informativeness
2
Presentation
2
Soundness
1
Read review
Paper summary

This paper proposes FUSE to reduce communication costs in FHE-based federated LLM fine-tuning. FUSE-SPA negotiates shared Top-k indices, FUSE-RDX improves CKKS slot utilization, and polynomial approximation enables encrypted server-side Norm Bounding. The experiments report up to 6.59× communication reduction for Llama-7B under dual-context Norm Bounding, with less than 1% PPL degradation in the GPT-2 evaluations. These results suggest that FUSE could improve the practicality of privacy-preserving federated LLM training.

Critical strengths
  1. The problem is important, as ciphertext communication overhead limits the scalability of FHE-based federated LLM training.
  2. SPA and RDX introduce useful compression techniques through sparse-index alignment and more efficient ciphertext packing.
  3. The paper demonstrates substantial communication reduction across different aggregation settings while evaluating the associated changes in model quality.
Critical weaknesses
  1. The necessity of importance-based Top-k negotiation and its ability to maintain parameter coverage across training rounds are insufficiently justified. (Q1–Q2)
  2. It is unclear whether importance scores from different clients are comparable and whether these scores help select useful parameters for federated training. (Q3–Q4)
  3. The necessity of server-side encrypted clipping, its correctness when combined with RDX, and whether its benefits justify the extra FHE costs are insufficiently demonstrated. (Q5–Q7)
Questions for authors
  1. Why is importance-based negotiation necessary? Clients could use a shared random seed to select identical parameter indices or rotate through predefined parameter subsets across rounds, both without per-round negotiation. What evidence shows that importance-based selection improves model quality or convergence compared with these simpler approaches at the same sparsity level?

  2. How much does Top-k selection change across rounds? If the selected parameters rarely change, other parameters may remain excluded from global aggregation. Can the authors report cross-round Top-k overlap, parameter selection frequencies, and their impact on convergence?

  3. Can importance scores from different clients be directly compared? Each client constructs bins using its own update range, so identical scores may represent different magnitudes. Although Theorem 1 accounts for this difference, how large is the heterogeneity gap under practical Non-IID settings, and how does it affect the consensus ranking?

  4. Why does the proposed importance score identify useful parameters for federated training? The score is based on local update magnitudes, but clients may have different aggregation weights or conflicting update directions. What evidence shows that this criterion leads to better parameter selection or convergence?

  5. Why is confidential server-side clipping necessary Under the paper's semi-honest client assumption, clients could clip their updates before encryption if the threshold were public. What specific security requirement motivates keeping the threshold confidential and performing expensive encrypted clipping on the server?

  6. Can RDX still decode correctly after Norm Bounding? Appendix C analyzes RDX correctness under packed arithmetic, but Algorithm 3 applies client-specific, non-integer clipping factors to encrypted updates. How is correct recovery of the packed components guaranteed in this setting, and what is the resulting aggregation error?

  7. Are the benefits of Norm Bounding worth its additional FHE costs? Appendix J reports lower final PPL with Norm Bounding, while the deeper FHE circuit substantially increases ciphertext size and computation. Do these improvements justify the additional costs compared with FedAvg/FedProx under comparable resource budgets?

2 comments

We thank the reviewer for the structured questions, and addressing the raised concerns as follows:  

Q1 – Necessity of Importance-Based Negotiation vs. Random/Rotating Masks  

Both alternatives amount to skipping the index exchange at the cost of abandoning data-driven parameter selection. A shared random mask preserves only a fraction k/d of the update energy. While Top-k is a standard sparsifier, and importance-based parameter selection forms the foundation of modern sparse fine-tuning methods (Zhang et al., 2024; He et al., 2025). A round-robin rotation mask introduces update staleness. At a 25% retention ratio, each value is aggregated only once every four rounds, regardless client drift. The net communication reductions already absorb the additional overhead while preserving the model utility.

Q2 – Top-kk selection change across rounds and static parameter selection  

The consensus set is dynamic. In standard Top-k sparsification, the aggregation is recomputed every round with new local updates across varying client subsets (non-IID data). This is to prevent adaptability restrictions seen in fixed masks (Guastella et al., 2025; Kim et al., 2024), then the omitted coordinates are re-evaluated in subsequent rounds. At the most aggressive setting (25%), the final perplexity remains within [−0.64%, +0.88%] of the encrypted baseline on GPT-2 and within [−0.60%, +0.74%] on GPT-2-XL over 150 rounds.  

Q3 – Score Comparability and Heterogeneity Gap in FUSE-SPA

The scores are deliberately normalized between 0 and B for each coordinate relative to its local Top-k range, per client. This design serves three purposes. First, it bounds the influence of any single client on the consensus. Second, it enables overflow-free digit packing for the encrypted index exchange. Third, it limits information disclosure, as the decrypted aggregate reveals only coarse, scale-free saliency without exposing raw magnitudes (Appendix B.2). The cost of this normalization is the heterogeneity gap, that bounded the gap by the spread of local ranges across clients, vanishing when the ranges coincide.  

Q4 – Why does the proposed importance score identify useful parameters for federated training?  

Update magnitude serves as the standard importance criterion because it preserves significantly more update energy than random selection. FUSE-SPA adapts this by building consensus across clients. While conflicting update directions could theoretically cause sign cancellation, the binned ranking approximates total magnitude Tj=∑c∣uc,j∣≥∣∑cuc,j∣T_j = \sum_c \vert{}u_{c,j}\vert{} \ge \vert{}\sum_c u_{c,j}\vert{}, ensuring that coordinates with large aggregates are not missed due to opposing signs. Any resulting false positives introduce a bounded efficiency loss rather than an error, avoiding the privacy risks associated with exposing raw directional signs.  

Q5 – Why is confidential server-side clipping necessary under the paper's semi-honest client assumption?  

Current solution is deliberately serve as a baseline, while providing a pathway to encrypted adaptive clipping as a future extension. Server-side confidential Norm Bounding is essential because modern FL requires adaptive clipping thresholds (Andrew et al., 2021; Nguyen et al., 2022), to prevent mis-calibrated during training. Please see detailed response to Reviewer vPZN Q3.

Q6 – FUSE-RDX Correctness Under Norm Bounding   FUSE-RDX does not interfere with Norm Bounding because non-linear clipping factors are evaluated using encrypted scalar norms and thresholds rather than encrypted updates. Decoding remains correct with aggregation error bounded by quantization 1/(2ΔFUSE)1/(2\Delta_{\text{FUSE}}) and sign-approximation deviations (Appendix D).

  Q7 – Are the benefits of Norm Bounding worth its additional FHE costs?  

Advanced non-linear aggregators stabilize training under heterogeneous (non-IID) data, making Norm Bounding a valuable option for divergent updates, while FUSE makes its computational cost practical. As shown below, FUSE-Fusion 25% reduce NB communication overhead from 7.32x to 1.1x of FedAvg baseline, while achieving the lowest final perplexity overall. It reduce wall-clock time substantially due to fast model convergence, making secure non-linear aggregation more achievable at LLM scale.  

MetricModelFedAvg (baseline)Norm Bounding (baseline)Norm Bounding (FUSE-Fusion 25%)[cite: 1]
CommunicationLlama-7B1.62 GB11.87 GB (7.32$\times$)1.80 GB (1.1$\times$)
ComputationLlama-7B45.40 s161.78 s (3.56$\times$ slower)33.36 s (1.36$\times$ faster)
 

References  

  • He et al. SMT: Fine-tuning LLMs with sparse matrices. ICLR, 2025.
  • Zhang et al. Gradient-based parameter selection for efficient fine-tuning. CVPR, 2024.
  • Guastella et al. SparsyFed: Sparse adaptive federated learning. ICLR, 2025.

Thank you for the authors' response. The rebuttal clarifies some of my concerns. However, the authors have not sufficiently demonstrated the advantages of importance-based Top-k negotiation over simpler alternatives. Moreover, the actual changes in Top-k selection across training rounds remain unclear. Overall, the rebuttal partially addresses my concerns, and I have decided to raise my rating to 2.

Comments on the paper

2 comments

We thank the reviewers for their insightful feedback. We address the raised concerns as follows:

Q1 – Recovery of FUSE-RDX Components Under Norm Bounding FUSE-RDX maps updates to fixed-point integers via scaling factor ΔFUSE\Delta_{\mathrm{FUSE}} and radix-encodes them. INorm Bounding’s non-linear sign function evaluates exclusively on encrypted scalar norms and thresholds to produce clipping factors, instead of the FUSE-compressed updates. Thus, FUSE-RDX does not interfere with the Norm Bounding logic. Each ciphertext slot holds compact, scaled integer into pairs. The aggregated slot resolves as Z=∑cwczc=BrdxUA+UBZ = \sum_c w_c z_c = B_{\mathrm{rdx}} U_A + U_B. Satisfying the radix condition Brdx>2⋅A⋅Wtotal(Eq. 3)B_{\mathrm{rdx}} > 2 \cdot A \cdot W_{\mathrm{total}} \qquad \text{(Eq. 3)} isolates UBU_B via centered remainder, allowing UAU_A extraction via integer division n (Z−UB)/Brdx(Z - U_B) / B_{\mathrm{rdx}}. Under the CKKS condition, noise remains below 0.5, allowing precise client-side rounding. Appendix D bounds the deviation of the sign-approximation clipping decision. The preliminary experiments on Llama-7B (GSM8K), Norm Bounding with FUSE-RDX achieves 9.08% accuracy at Round 3 versus 8.91% for the baseline.

Llama-7B, GSM8K accuracy (%)VariantRound 1Round 3
FedAvgBaseline2.358.78
FUSE-SPA 50%2.288.64
FUSE-RDX2.458.81
FUSE-Fusion 50%2.418.80
Norm BoundingBaseline2.388.91
FUSE-SPA 50%2.358.78
FUSE-RDX2.499.08
FUSE-Fusion 50%2.439.03

Q2 – Comparison with existing encrypted compression methods under matched conditions

Appendix I provides an extended comparison with other works. Below, we summarize a few representative existing methods. FedSHE-CQ dynamically expands union sizes of Top-k with client overlap (k≤∣U∣≤min⁡(Ck,d)k \le \vert{}\mathcal{U}\vert{} \le \min(Ck, d)), causing per-client communication to fluctuate between 0.53 GB and 1.75 GB on Llama-7B. In contrast, FUSE-SPA achieves overlap-invariant bandwidth stability (≈ 0.61 GB) via exact-k consensus selection. FedPHE relies on coarse ciphertext-block pruning via mean thresholds but it does not report the hyperparameter for mean value, that complicates quantitative comparison. Although a direct runtime comparison is challenging, the effect of compression on model accuracy can be evaluated. FedPHE incurs ≈ 2.5% compared to other CKKS-based methods under FedAvg, while FUSE exhibits a maximum perplexity degradation of < 1% across all datasets under FedAvg. Within these missing parameter constraints, our evaluations demonstrate that FUSE's advantages stem from overlap-Invariance and fine-grained selection on sparsification, and extend encrypted aggregator to advanced non-IID algortihms.

Q3 – Theorem 1 Scope, Convergence Assumptions and Complexity Derivation

The theorem does not claim asymptotic convergence to the exact global Top-k. Instead, it provides a distribution-free worst-case bound separating errors into local discretization and scale-heterogeneity gaps. Thus, the bin count BB optimizes rank-consensus resolution up to a saturation limit. To establish conditions under which FUSE-SPA approaches the true global Top-k as BB grows, two assumptions are supported by the proof:  

  • Clients maintain comparable local scales, such that the bin widths wc are uniform across clients.
  • Local Top-k inclusion, minimizing client set divergence C0(i)\mathcal{C}_0(i) As BB grows and client overlap increases, the bound approaches the global Top-kk. With packing factor ρ=⌊l/(⌈log⁡DC⌉+1)⌋\rho = \lfloor l / (\lceil \log_D C \rceil + 1) \rfloor, communication scale as:

O(C∣θ∣(r+(⌈log⁡DC⌉+1)/l))\mathcal{O}(C \vert{}\theta\vert{} (r + (\lceil \log_D C \rceil + 1)/l))

yielding a reduction factor of (r+1ρ)−1\left(r + \frac{1}{\rho}\right)^{-1}.  

Q4 – Scope of Latency and Full-Round Speedups   Table 2 reports only the processes relevant to encrypted federated learning, without the local training time. Since FUSE is applied post-training, thus training time is constant across clients. Factoring latency into full round time (Tround=Ttrain+TWANT_{\mathrm{round}} = T_{\mathrm{train}} + T_{\mathrm{WAN}}) shows significant wall-clock speedups:  

Configuration (WAN, per round)TtrainT_{\mathrm{train}} (s)TWANT_{\mathrm{WAN}}: baseline / FUSE-Fusion 25% (s)TroundT_{\mathrm{round}}: baseline / FUSE-Fusion 25% (s)Full-round speedup
GPT-2, FedAvg42021.24 / 9.10441.24 / 429.101.03×
GPT-2, Norm Bounding420149.10 / 46.06569.10 / 466.061.22×
Llama-7B, FedAvg2,220305.33 / 104.372,525.33 / 2,324.371.09×
Llama-7B, Norm Bounding2,2202,060.65 / 531.694,280.65 / 2,751.691.56×

The efficiency gains scale directly with the cost of homomorphic operations (Norm Bounding 22% → 56%). If Llama-7B is run for 150 FL rounds, this reduces the cumulative time by ~64 hours under Norm Bounding and ~8 hours under FedAvg.

The authors have adequately addressed my concerns in the rebuttal, and I will raise my score accordingly.

From OpenReview, CC BY 4.0. Authors as signed there; shown unedited.

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