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- Informativeness
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Paper summary
DiSHE allows federated learning clients to choose different encryption masks without first agreeing on a common mask. A shared chunk layout keeps corresponding update coordinates aligned during mixed plaintext and ciphertext aggregation. Clients use per-example gradient dispersion to select chunks for encryption and always encrypt the classifier head. The same dispersion scores also determine aggregation weights. The paper provides aggregation and communication analysis, implements the protocol with CKKS, and evaluates model accuracy, protocol costs, and gradient reconstruction attacks.
Critical strengths
- The protocol supports different client masks without mask consensus. The shared chunk layout makes mixed plaintext and ciphertext aggregation straightforward. The broadcast analysis also makes the cost of combining different masks explicit.
- The analysis clearly separates encryption from changes to model training. With aggregation weights fixed, changing which chunks are encrypted does not change the aggregate in exact arithmetic. The paper then studies dispersion-based weighting separately.
Critical weaknesses
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The proposed dispersion-based selector has no clear demonstrated privacy advantage. In Table 2, DiSHE has the lowest LPIPS under both reconstruction attacks at every reported round, meaning that the reconstructed images are closer to the originals under those tests. Blocking the analytic label attacks comes from always encrypting the classifier head; it does not establish the benefit of dispersion-based selection. There is no controlled comparison against random selection with the same head protection and encryption budget.
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The communication advantage depends heavily on the baseline message format. The baseline implementations send large amounts of per-coordinate metadata. When counting only plaintext values and ciphertexts, DiSHE sends about 965 MB per round versus 862 MB for the baselines. The paper acknowledges that compact baseline formats could narrow or reverse the result. The current measurements therefore do not establish a communication advantage that comes from the method itself.
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The accuracy comparisons do not isolate the benefit of dispersion-based weighting. Runs are not paired on data partitions and initialization. The FAS and ParaAegis adaptations also use substantial clipping and noise under unmatched privacy settings, which limits what their large accuracy gaps tell us. Without a controlled weighting ablation, it remains unclear whether inverse-dispersion aggregation improves on ordinary data-size weighting.
Questions for authors
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With classifier-head encryption, aggregation weights, and the actual communication budget held fixed, does dispersion-based selection improve attack resistance over random selection or a strong existing selector?
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What accuracy and communication advantages remain over the strongest noise-free baselines when all methods use the same data partitions and initialization, along with equally compact message formats?
2 comments
Thank you for your response. After careful consideration, I have decided to keep my score.
Response to Reviewer 6TB7
We thank Reviewer 6TB7. We provide the requested selection experiment, accept the communication and noise-calibration concerns, and clarify pairing and the remaining weighting ablation.
W1 / Q1: CGD versus Random and Gradient Magnitude.
We agree that the mandatory classifier-head rule confounded the original evidence. We therefore disabled it for all selectors on LeNet-5 / Fashion-MNIST (α=0.05, b=256, K=12, Round 4, seed 123), holding the checkpoint, chunk map, partitions, targets, and attack settings fixed.
Across 5 client masks and 3 targets, IG success is 1/15 (6.67%) for CGD, versus 7/15 (46.67%) for Random and 5/15 (33.33%) for Magnitude. CGD leaves 5.14% of classifier weights visible versus 100% and 98.29%; iDLG label recovery succeeds in 9/15 versus 15/15 for both baselines. IG LPIPS is 0.4954 versus 0.3378 and 0.3611. DLG success is zero for all three.
This supports a benefit from CGD without the head rule in this setting. PART 1, Section 1 (Controlled Selection Ablation) contains the complete metric tables and notes the one-seed, three-target scope.
W2: Communication accounting. Accepted.
Counting raw ciphertexts and plaintext values, DiSHE sends approximately 965 MB versus 862 MB (about 12% higher), reflecting the union broadcast. The original 45-56% total-savings claim depends on baseline serialization and metadata accounting; it is not a compact-payload advantage.
We will use ciphertext-plus-plaintext bytes as the primary payload metric, report metadata separately, and qualify the encoding-dependent claim. Eliminating the mask-consensus exchange remains a protocol benefit; 1.51 s versus 1.82-15.54 s is the measured runtime in our reported setup, not a universal latency guarantee.
W3 (1): Pairing of partitions and initialization.
For each seed (123, 456, 789), all five methods use identical client partition indices and initial
state_dict, with shared model, data-loading, and local-training code (Section 6.1).The Limitations sentence concerns a separate issue in
app:grid: the size-borrowing allocator can reuse a sample across clients within a run. We will clarify that this does not mean unpaired comparisons. Correcting the allocator changes the partition construction, so affected comparisons must be rerun consistently before reporting corrected results.W3 (2): FAS/ParaAegis clipping and noise. Accepted.
Appendix F documents the mismatch: sensitivity was derived as 2C/ni, while clipping was applied to multi-epoch Adam updates. Mean clipping coefficients were 0.024-0.046, and aggregate RMS noise norms were 4.30 (CIFAR-10) and 21.52 (Fashion-MNIST/SVHN), against clipped signal norm at most 1.
The 20.7-49.5 percentage-point accuracy losses do not establish the intrinsic cost of DP. We will label these rows as uncalibrated adaptations and remove claims of superiority based on those gaps. A meaningful DP comparison requires compatible clipping, sensitivity, and privacy accounting.
W3 (3): Isolated weighting ablation.
We agree that paired seeds and cross-method Table 1 results do not replace an isolated weighting ablation. MaskCrypt and FedML-HE themselves differ by 0.48-0.61 percentage points despite both using data-size weights; their comparison with DiSHE therefore cannot cleanly isolate weighting.
The DiSHE-to-HE-baseline gaps fall below DiSHE's reported three-seed standard deviations, but this proves neither equivalence nor a weighting benefit. We will include a within-DiSHE γ∈{0,0.5,1} evaluation with partitions, initialization, masks, and other settings held fixed; this response does not present that experiment as completed.
Q2: Remaining advantages under compact formats and matched runs.
The supported claims are eliminating mask-consensus exchanges, the measured protocol runtime, and improved IG resistance against Random/Magnitude in the controlled chunk-selection experiment. These come with approximately 12% higher raw payload in the reported breakdown. We do not claim demonstrated accuracy superiority, a calibrated DP advantage, or universal privacy superiority over scattered masks.