- Rating
- 3(+1)
- Confidence
- 2
- Informativeness
- 1
- Presentation
- 2
- Soundness
- 2
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Paper summary
This paper proposes SPIN, an image immunization method that adds small, norm-bounded perturbations to hinder unauthorized diffusion-based editing while preserving the input image’s visual appearance. To reduce the computational cost of full-trajectory backpropagation, SPIN uses single-step projection to predict clean latents from early denoising states. Under a fixed editing instruction, it generates multiple neighboring states using different noise realizations and optimizes the input perturbation to maximize the average cosine distance between their projected clean latents and a fixed clean-edit reference. This reference is obtained by running the full editor once on the unperturbed image. The editing model’s weights remain fixed throughout optimization, and computational overhead is reduced by avoiding full denoising rollouts for each branch. In white-box evaluations targeting SD3 and InstructPix2Pix, SPIN outperforms the evaluated baselines and remains effective under unseen instructions and previously unseen seeds, achieving unseen-instruction immunization success rates of 85% and 91%, respectively.
Critical strengths
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By predicting clean latents through single-step projection from early denoising states, SPIN reduces the computational overhead of backpropagating through the entire denoising trajectory at every optimization iteration. This efficiency is particularly compelling relative to methods that differentiate through the full sampling process.
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SPIN constructs perturbations using a single instruction by aggregating feedback across multiple stochastic branches, while maintaining strong protection against the tested unseen instructions. Within the same-model white-box setting, its unseen-instruction ISR reaches 85% on SD3 and 91% on InstructPix2Pix, demonstrating effective cross-prompt generalization under the evaluated conditions.
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Since protected images are intended for public sharing, perturbation imperceptibility is important. Under the same perturbation budget, SPIN achieves an ISR of 90% on SD3 while maintaining high input fidelity. These results indicate a favorable trade-off between protection effectiveness and input imperceptibility under the evaluated settings.
Critical weaknesses
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The evaluation does not establish protection against unseen editing models. Once a protected image is released publicly, the target editing model may be unknown, and robustness to unseen prompts within the same model does not establish cross-model protection. Given that SIFM already evaluates cross-model transfer, experiments applying perturbations constructed on one editor to another without re-optimization would strengthen the practical relevance of SPIN.
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The main quantitative comparisons omit relevant methods, including DiffusionGuard, which also targets early denoising stages, and the recent work “Universal Image Immunization against Diffusion-based Image Editing via Semantic Injection.” The latter is particularly relevant to evaluating SPIN’s practical efficiency and scalability because it learns a single universal perturbation reusable across images and evaluates black-box transferability. Given the differences between per-image optimization and universal perturbations, the authors should compare protection performance under matched editing models, model-access conditions, and perturbation budgets, clearly distinguishing initial training costs from per-image application costs, or explain why these methods were excluded.
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The adaptation and optimization settings of several baselines are insufficiently specified. For example, SIFM reports excluding MIST and SDS from its SD3 evaluation due to architectural incompatibilities, whereas SPIN reports their SD3 results without explaining how these baselines were implemented or adapted for SD3. To assess the fairness and reproducibility of the comparisons, the authors should clarify whether each baseline was re-optimized against the corresponding target editor and report the model checkpoints, objective adaptations, if any, and method-specific hyperparameters.
Questions for authors
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Could the authors evaluate cross-model transfer by applying perturbations generated on one editor to the other editing models without re-optimization?
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Could the authors compare SPIN with DiffusionGuard and Lee et al. 2026, under matched evaluation conditions, reporting initial training and per-image application costs separately, or justify their exclusion?
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Could the authors clarify how MIST and SDS were implemented or adapted for SD3 and whether each baseline was re-optimized against the corresponding target editor, specifying the checkpoints, any objective modifications, and method-specific hyperparameters?
4 comments
Thank you for pointing out the need to clarify the SD3 adaptations and optimization settings. MIST and SDS were independently re-optimized against each target editor, with model weights frozen.
For SD3, we adapt the VAE and DiT interfaces and replace the original noise-prediction residual with the native flow-velocity residual:
r=\hat v_\theta-(\epsilon-z),$$ where $z=E(x+\delta)$ is the scaled VAE latent. - **MIST:** We minimize $\|z-z_{\mathrm{target}}\|_2^2-10^4\operatorname{mean}(r^2)$, preserving its combined texture–semantic objective and backpropagating through both DiT and VAE. We retain the original target image and fusion weight $10^4$, without SD3-specific tuning. The target is resized to $512\times512$ and encoded by the target VAE; the texture loss uses sum reduction. Perturbations are initialized uniformly within the budget. - **SDS(-):** We inject the detached residual $r$ through the VAE and apply projected sign descent, preserving its update mechanism without DiT backpropagation or additional timestep weighting. Perturbations are initialized to zero. Both methods use **100 iterations**, an $\ell_\infty$ budget of $8/255$, a step size of $1/255$, and text/image guidance scales of **7.5/1.5**. To match SPIN’s instruction access, both methods optimize against the original editing instruction. Each protected image is reused for all five unseen instructions **without re-optimization**.Thank you for answering my questions and sorry for late reply. The transfer experiments directly address my concern about reusing protected images on unseen editors, and the comparison with DiffusionGuard shows higher protection success rates at comparable per-image cost on both evaluated editors. The clarification of how MIST and SDS were adapted to SD3 also makes the original comparisons easier to assess. Since the authors addressed most of my concerns, I am raising my score from 2 to 3.
Thank you for your thoughtful feedback and for taking the time to reconsider our work. We are glad that our additional experiments and clarifications have addressed your concerns. We sincerely appreciate your constructive comments and updated assessment.
1.Cross-model transferability
Thank you for raising this concern. We agree that unseen-instruction robustness alone does not establish cross-model protection. We therefore evaluate transfer between IP2P and SD3, and additionally to FLUX.2-klein-4B, a widely used open-source editor. The same protected images are reused without re-optimization, with the original instructions held fixed to isolate editor transfer. Each entry reports PSNR ↓ / LPIPS ↑ / ISR ↑.
Overall, SPIN achieves a higher average cross-model protection success rate, with a mean ISR of 72.00%, compared with 67.25% for SIFM[1], 65.00% for AdvDM[2], and 62.50% for SDS[3]. Despite differences in latent representations and denoising dynamics across editors, these results support the transferability of SPIN’s protection to unseen editing models without re-optimization.
2.Comparison with more recent methods
Thank you for this suggestion. We now compare SPIN with both DiffusionGuard [4] and Universal Image Immunization [5] under the same editing protocol and an 8/255 perturbation budget. All experiments are conducted on single NVIDIA RTX 5090. The table reports ISR, output deviation from clean edits, and protection costs on unseen instructions. The baseline implementations are based on the methods described in their original papers.
DiffusionGuard is also an optimization-based method and incurs a per-image cost comparable to SPIN, but achieves lower protection effectiveness. SPIN improves ISR over DiffusionGuard by 23% on SD3 and 11% on IP2P, with consistently better PSNR and LPIPS. Universal Image Immunization avoids per-image optimization by reusing a universal perturbation, but requires approximately 10.4 hours of offline training and still trails SPIN by 20% and 13% ISR, respectively. SPIN requires no offline training, and its per-image optimization is performed only once; the protected image can then be reused across editing instructions.
[1] Dong, S., Zhang, J., Zhao, G., Shan, S., & Chen, X. (2025). Semantic mismatch and perceptual degradation: A new perspective on image editing immunity. arXiv preprint arXiv:2512.14320.
[2] Liang, C., Wu, X., Hua, Y., Zhang, J., Xue, Y., Song, T., ... & Guan, H. (2023). Adversarial example does good: Preventing painting imitation from diffusion models via adversarial examples. arXiv preprint arXiv:2302.04578.
[3] Xue, H., Liang, C., Wu, X., & Chen, Y. (2024, May). Toward effective protection against diffusion-based mimicry through score distillation. In International Conference on Learning Representations (Vol. 2024, pp. 25734-25758).
[4] Choi, W. J. S., Lee, K., Jeong, J., Xie, S., Shin, J., & Lee, K. (2025, May). Diffusionguard: A robust defense against malicious diffusion-based image editing. In International Conference on Learning Representations (Vol. 2025, pp. 27134-27180).
[5] Lee, C., Choi, D., Shin, S., Jeon, H. G., & Son, J. (2026, September). Universal image immunization against diffusion-based image editing via semantic injection. In European Conference on Computer Vision (pp. 463-481). Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland.