- Rating
- 2
- Confidence
- 2
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 2
- Soundness
- 2
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Paper summary
This paper proposes VTEGuard, which protects images containing text from being edited by diffusion-based image text editors. Instead of optimizing perturbations in RGB pixel space, the method optimizes them in the YCC-DCT coefficient space and uses a loss based on the posterior variance of the VAE encoder, showing strong performance on text editing tasks.
Critical strengths
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I think protection for the specific application of text forgery is very reasonable, and the benchmark protocol for this setting is also very good.
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On this benchmark, the proposed method shows stronger protection with less perturbation, and since the method explicitly considers JPEG during protection, it also shows robustness against JPEG compression as purification. However, as far as I understand, the comparison with DCT-Shield is not clearly shown.
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The comparison study is broad and clear, including evaluations against various recent methods and across multiple tasks.
Critical weaknesses
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The paper overall seems to argue that visual text is different from the general image domain, but the proposed method itself looks more like a general image protection method rather than something specifically designed for visual text. I am not sure which part of the method is specifically tailored to visual text. The baselines are also mostly general image protection methods, although I understand that this is because there are few existing methods for this setting. Then, I am curious how the method performs on other image domains.
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As discussed in the paper, the method seems to combine ideas from two existing research directions, such as LA or VOID, with JPEG-oriented frequency-focused methods such as DCT-Shield, and then integrate them through the ESL loss. I also wonder whether the motivation behind ESL is largely based on the analysis already presented in LA. Therefore, I am not fully convinced by the methodological novelty.
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For the approach of increasing the posterior variance, I wonder whether it can be easily bypassed if the attacker changes the encoding process, e.g., through purification. In particular, since the method targets open-source models, if an attacker understands how the protection works, it may be relatively easy to bypass. Therefore, although the reported performance is very strong, I wonder whether the method may be impractical under an adaptive attacker.
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For purification, I think comparison with DCT-Shield is necessary. Also, although the method works well against JPEG, more evaluation is needed to verify whether it is robust against other purification methods. In particular, methods such as [1, 2] should be included. I also think TESR and related metrics should be reported under purification settings.
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Regarding the black-box or transferability claim, if different models use the same encoder, I wonder whether this should really be considered black-box. Since the proposed method directly targets the encoder posterior, I think results should also be reported for models with different VAEs, such as SDXL and SD3.0.
[1] Adversarial Perturbations Cannot Reliably Protect Artists From Generative AI, ICLR25
[2] Off-The-Shelf Image-to-Image Models Are All You Need To Defeat Image Protection Schemes, SaTML26
Questions for authors
See the weaknesses. In addition, I am curious what specific advantage comes from specializing the method for visual text. To me, the text-specific contribution seems to be mainly in the evaluation metrics and benchmark, rather than in the method itself.