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- Informativeness
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- Presentation
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Paper summary
This paper introduces a cooperative framework that protects images from unauthorized editing through imperceptible watermarks and a learned protective response.
It fine-tunes the editor to suppress its generative velocity on watermarked inputs while preserving clean-input behavior through teacher matching, without requiring paired editing data or predefined output targets. Experiments demonstrate strong protection under common image transformations with limited degradation of normal editing quality. However, protection depends on using an adapted editor and remains vulnerable to diffusion-based purification at native watermark strength.
Critical strengths
- The paper is well written and easy to understand. The proposed training objective is simple and effective, the training is not costly and works well.
Critical weaknesses
- The biggest concern is that this paper seems to have very tiny contribution. The only difference between this paper and other backdoor paper is a zero regression loss to surpress watermarked input and clean teacher distillation.
Questions for authors
Can you show more about how this paper is different from the literature?
3 comments
Relation to Prior Work and Purification (2/2)
“Protection [...] remains vulnerable to diffusion-based purification at native watermark strength”
Thank you for pointing out that diffusion purification weakens IRIS at its native watermark strength. We agree, and the revised paper now makes clearer how much protection remains and how that changes when the watermark is strengthened. After DiffPure (), protected images remained harder to edit with native-strength IRIS: edit success was 4.3% lower on protected photos than on clean photos for FLUX.2 and 10.6% lower for Qwen. GuardDoor lost nearly all selectivity under the same conditions. On both editors, it fulfilled only about a third of requests on either clean or protected photos (Appendix D.2, Tables 17 and 18).
However, IRIS protection can be restored cheaply at inference time: doubling the perturbation strength, without retraining, blocks 94% of edits on FLUX.2 and 100% on Qwen after purification at (Table 11). Input LPIPS rises from 0.042 to 0.113, which is still below the values reported for EditShield and PhotoGuard. In the FLUX.2 example in Figure 7, a stronger watermark kept the requested edit from succeeding even after stronger DiffPure at , and concentrating the added signal in high-frequency, textured regions reduced input distortion relative to the stronger uniform setting. The revised main results report the amplification comparison on 100 VetoBench-General photos.
Thank you for prompting us to make this distinction clearer. The revised PDF explains this intuition in Section 3.2 and reports the controlled comparison in Appendix Table 3.
Dear Reviewer, as the discussion period is coming to an end, we would appreciate hearing from you. Thank you!
Relation to Prior Work and Purification (1/2)
We thank the reviewer for highlighting the clarity of our paper and the low training cost of IRIS. We agree that the objective is simple. Our intuition was that it would be easier to learn a selective response if the editor had to predict the same velocity on every protected input. We appreciate the opportunity to elaborate more on the intuition and reasoning behind this design choice.
Q1/W1: How does IRIS differ substantively from the existing backdoor literature?
GuardDoor and Chen et al. established the cooperative protection setting. We built on that but when we applied their approaches to FLUX.2, both failed to preserve editing on unprotected images. Each completed only 44.3% of requests on unprotected photos, compared with 88.3% for IRIS (Table R5; revised paper, Table 1). Our controlled ablations in Table R6 show that the choice of the response objective, i.e. what we teach the editing model to do for protected images, has an independent effect on selectivity when the other training choices are held fixed. Our methodological contribution is to show that the safeguard response we teach the editor on protected photos matters for how well it can preserve ordinary editing abilities. GuardDoor trains the encoder toward the features of a fixed target, whereas Chen et al. train the editor to generate a predefined image (Appendix B.2).
Table R5. VLM edit success of IRIS in comparison to full cooperative baselines on 300 images.
The earlier work already showed that a trigger can change a model’s behavior. Our question was which response to teach a rectified-flow editing model so that it can still follow normal unprotected requests. To answer it, we kept the watermark and clean training loss fixed and changed only the response on protected images (Table R6 below).
The flow equation helps explain why the choice of response matters. Along the training path xt=(1−t)y+tϵ toward a replacement image y, the target velocity at t>0 is v∗(xt,t)=ϵ−y=(xt−y)/t. Even for the same fixed image, the editor must predict a different velocity as the noise sample changes. IRIS asks for v∗=0 on every protected input. Since each sampling update scales with the predicted velocity, a zero prediction stalls denoising without requiring the editor to synthesize a particular replacement. Our intuition is that this simpler velocity field cooldown objective makes it easier to learn when to suppress an edit. Table R6 shows a controlled comparison of different response objectives measuring the resulting selectivity across both editors.
Table R6. Response objectives on FLUX.2 and Qwen-Image-Edit, averaged over four transformations. Cells show VLM edit success (%) with DINO similarity (×100) in parentheses. Selectivity is clean minus protected edit success in percentage points (revised paper, Table 3).