- Rating
- 2
- Confidence
- 2
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 1
- Soundness
- 1
Read review
Paper summary
This paper proposes RADAR, a framework that distinguishes four reasoning states (direct answering, effective reflection, excessive reflection, and persistent looping) using attention statistics and generation progress. It further introduces Attention Realignment, which adjusts attention distributions toward patterns observed in normal reasoning to mitigate uncontrolled generation. Experiments across multiple reasoning models evaluate the framework's state classification, temporal detection behavior, and intervention effectiveness, suggesting that attention dynamics may provide useful signals for identifying and mitigating uncontrolled reasoning.
Critical strengths
-
Meaningful problem formulation: The distinction between excessive reflection and persistent looping is useful, as these behaviors differ in their characteristics and may require different mitigation strategies.
-
Interesting mechanistic perspective: Analyzing attention dynamics throughout generation offers a potentially useful perspective on how normal reasoning may develop into uncontrolled behavior, going beyond surface-level repetition.
-
Practical intervention and empirical evaluation: The proposed attention realignment method is an interesting attempt to mitigate uncontrolled generation while preserving useful reasoning, and the evaluation across multiple models provides encouraging preliminary evidence.
Critical weaknesses
-
Potential errors in PAS and CTS: Equation (1) seems to sum attention over the wrong token positions, while Equation (3) only considers tokens shared by the prompt and generation. These definitions may affect the validity of the attention analysis and the resulting intervention.
-
Unclear evaluation protocol: Each prefix inherits the label of its full trajectory, so the classifier predicts the eventual outcome rather than necessarily detecting the current state. The paper also does not clearly specify whether prefixes from the same trajectory are kept in the same data split, making it difficult to assess the reliability of the reported results.
Questions for authors
The definitions of PAS and CTS seem inconsistent with their intended interpretations. Could the authors clarify these definitions and confirm that the implementation matches the descriptions? Do the main results remain consistent under the corrected definitions?
Are training and test sets separated at the trajectory level, ensuring that prefixes from the same trajectory cannot appear in both sets? Does the reported classification performance hold under this protocol?
Since each prefix inherits the label of its complete trajectory, how should the reported detection time be interpreted relative to the actual onset of excessive reflection or looping? Does the method predict eventual failure, detect an ongoing failure, or both?
4 comments
I appreciate the authors' clarifications. I believe this paper has some value as an analysis of attention dynamics. However, as the authors acknowledge, naturally occurring uncontrolled reasoning is relatively rare. Moreover, Appendix F shows that simple n-gram blocking achieves substantially stronger loop suppression with a relatively modest loss in benign-task accuracy. These observations limit the practical value of the proposed framework for real-world deployment. Therefore, I will maintain my current rating.
Response on Adversarial Relevance and the Defense–Utility Trade-off (1/2)
Thank you for your thoughtful follow-up and for recognizing the value of our attention analysis. We understand that you remain concerned about the practical significance of our work, and we also note the confidence score of 2 indicated in your review. We would therefore like to offer additional background and supporting evidence from recent research in this area, with the aim of clarifying the relevance of resource-exhaustion threats and the motivation for studying defenses. We hope that this additional context will be helpful in assessing the practical significance of our findings.
1. The rarity of spontaneous failures does not establish a low risk of resource exhaustion.
Section 3.1 of the paper explicitly includes adversarially induced uncontrolled reasoning, and Section 4.4 states that our current evaluation focuses on targeted attacks. The recent survey Resource Consumption Threats in Large Language Models: A Survey [1], published in EMNLP 2026, systematically reviews resource-consumption threats across LLMs. It explains how adversarially amplified generation can increase inference latency, undermine service availability, and threaten economic sustainability. Representative empirical findings make these consequences concrete:
- Engorgio [2] reports inference costs per query reaching approximately 13 times those of normal inputs in its white-box evaluation, demonstrating how adversarial prompts can amplify computational demand.
- LoopLLM [3] reports generated outputs exceeding 90% of the maximum output length through repetition-induced decoding loops, demonstrating that malicious inputs can drive models to consume nearly the entire generation budget.
- AutoDoS [4] reports that, in simulated high-concurrency scenarios, its attack reduces server throughput from approximately 1 to 0.009 requests per minute, a decrease of about 99.1%, demonstrating how malicious resource consumption can severely degrade service availability.
Together, the survey and these empirical results establish a concrete security motivation for studying attacker-induced uncontrolled reasoning. Low incidence under benign inputs does not establish low risk under deliberate attack; the latter is the setting evaluated in our paper.
2. The n-gram results demonstrate a suppression–utility trade-off with a measurable cost to normal-task performance.
The relevant comparison appears in Appendix E.2–E.3, Tables 9 and 10 of the paper. On DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-8B, n-gram blocking lowers benign-task accuracy from 66.4% to 58.4%, a decrease of 8.0 percentage points. We respectfully consider this a substantial loss of task utility, particularly for reasoning applications where preserving answer correctness is a central requirement.
Although n-gram blocking can be useful in tasks such as summarization [5], empirical studies on complex reasoning show that blanket repetition suppression can substantially degrade task accuracy:
- To Reason but Not to Stop [6] directly evaluates n-gram blocking. For DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-14B, its No-Repeat baseline (n = 32) lowers LiveCodeBench accuracy from 62.4% to 46.6%. This result demonstrates a substantial coding-performance cost in the evaluated setting.
- Word Salad Chopper [7] reports that a repetition penalty lowers AIME25 accuracy from 37.92% to 25.83%. This provides direct evidence that a conventional repetition penalty can harm mathematical reasoning.
- LZ Penalty [8] reports that, for QwQ-32B on AIME, increasing the frequency penalty from 0 to 0.1 lowers accuracy from approximately 73% to 7%. The authors explain that penalties accumulating over long reasoning traces can suppress common but essential tokens and severely degrade generation.
These studies cover different repetition-control mechanisms and experimental settings, and demonstrate why strong repetition suppression (n-gram) cannot by itself establish suitability for complex reasoning tasks. These findings are consistent with the conclusions from our own research, indicating that simple defenses are unreliable within the complex reasoning processes of an LRM.
Response on Adversarial Relevance and the Defense–Utility Trade-off (2/2)
Resource exhaustion, whether arising spontaneously or induced by adversarial attacks, motivates targeted defenses that preserve legitimate reasoning. Simple repetition constraints can substantially impair performance on complex tasks, highlighting the need for more selective interventions. Our work addresses this need through attention-based reasoning-state analysis and targeted intervention.
We hope these clarifications help convey the practical significance of the problem and support a fuller assessment of our contributions. We would be happy to discuss any remaining concerns. If our responses have satisfactorily addressed your concerns, we would be grateful if you would consider raising your score.
[1] Resource Consumption Threats in Large Language Models: A Survey (EMNLP 2026).
[2] An Engorgio Prompt Makes Large Language Model Babble On (ICLR 2025).
[3] LoopLLM: Transferable Energy-Latency Attacks in LLMs via Repetitive Generation (AAAI 2026).
[4] Crabs: Consuming Resource via Auto-generation for LLM-DoS Attack under Black-box Settings (ACL 2025).
[5] A Deep Reinforced Model for Abstractive Summarization (ICLR 2018).
[6] To Reason but Not to Stop: Understanding and Recovering Pruned Large Reasoning Models (arXiv preprint, 2026).
[7] Word Salad Chopper: Reasoning Models Waste A Ton Of Decoding Budget On Useless Repetitions, Self-Knowingly (EMNLP 2025).
[8] LZ Penalty: An Information-Theoretic Repetition Penalty for Autoregressive Language Models (Transactions on Machine Learning Research, 2026).
Response to Reviewer wNsr
We appreciate your recognition of the relevance and empirical findings of our work. We believe some concerns may stem from insufficient clarification in our presentation, which we aim to address below.
W1&Q1: PAS and CTS definitions and analytical validity
We thank the reviewer for pointing this out. The PAS summation range contains a typographical error, while the restriction of CTS to shared tokens is intentional. We would like to clarify these points.
(1) PAS: correcting the input-region summation range. PAS measures the proportion of the current token's attention allocated to the input. Let p denote the input length and s the current total sequence length. The numerator in Eq. (1) in the paper should be ∑j=1pAs,j(l), with the denominator covering all visible positions and the result averaged across layers. The original text incorrectly specifies the generated region. We will correct this error consistently.
(2) CTS: a fine-grained comparison over shared token identities. Shared tokens are tokens present on both sides, rather than only repeated segments in looping outputs. Non-shared tokens have no corresponding occurrence on the other side. If included, their difference terms equal their attention shares in their respective regions, incorporating vocabulary differences introduced by new steps in normal reasoning and thereby interfering with the attention discrepancies we intend to measure. We have added a supplementary experiment including non-shared tokens in Appendix D.2 of the paper, "Effect of Including Non-Shared Tokens in CTS," and found that persistent looping is difficult to distinguish from normal requests.
W2&Q2: Prefix-based risk prediction and trajectory-level separation
RADAR aims to identify potential risks of uncontrolled reasoning from the current generation prefix, providing a basis for timely intervention. Training and test sets are separated at the complete-trajectory level, and different prefixes of the same trajectory never appear across the two sets. During training, we assign the complete-trajectory label of each training sample to its prefixes to learn the relationship between current attention dynamics and the reasoning behavior eventually exhibited by that trajectory. These data are independent of the test data.
Our experiments also cover MMLU-Geor, MMLU-Econometrics, MMLU-World-History, Joint, and MiP, which are not used for training. The main experiments in the paper already demonstrate the method's effectiveness on these datasets.
Q3: Detection timing relative to the onset of uncontrolled behavior
RADAR continually assesses potential risks of uncontrolled reasoning from the current generation prefix to support timely intervention. During training, each prefix inherits its complete-trajectory label, allowing the classifier to learn the relationship between current attention dynamics and the trajectory's eventual reasoning behavior. Prediction uses only information available in the current prefix. An early O/L prediction therefore indicates a risk that the trajectory will develop into uncontrolled reasoning; it does not require excessive reflection or looping to have already occurred. This design allows intervention before abnormal behavior fully develops and continued risk identification after it has emerged.
For successful attack trajectories, Table 1 in the paper reports both the first generated position satisfying P(O)+P(L)≥τ and the recorded onset of repetition, each measured from the start of generation. For Recur, LoopLLM, and MiP, the mean risk-detection positions precede their respective mean repetition onsets, indicating that RADAR can provide early warnings to some extent.
We hope these clarifications alleviate your concerns and would welcome any further questions. If our responses resolve your reservations, we respectfully ask you to consider increasing your rating. Thank you for your careful evaluation.